63 Periodicals
Royal



23 JUL 1979

TRANSACTIONS

OF THE

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

The Society, AS A BODY, *is not responsible for the opinions advanced in the following pages.*

TRANSACTIONS

OF THE

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Fourth Series

VOLUME XXVII

LONDON
OFFICES OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY
96 CHEYNE WALK, S.W.10
1945

THIS BOOK IS PRODUCED IN COMPLETE
CONFORMITY WITH THE AUTHORISED
ECONOMY STANDARDS

Made and Printed in Great Britain by Butler & Tanner Ltd., Frome and London

CONTENTS

PAGE

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: THE SCANDINAVIAN COLONIES IN ENGLAND AND NORMANDY. By Professor F. M. Stenton, *M.A., D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A.* 1

POPE ALEXANDER III AND THE CANONIZATION OF SAINTS (*The Alexander Prize Essay*). By the Rev. E. W. Kemp, *B.D.* . 13

THE ORGANISATION OF INDENTURED RETINUES IN FOURTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND. By N. B. Lewis, *Ph.D.* 29

PETITIONS FOR BENEFICES FROM ENGLISH UNIVERSITIES DURING THE GREAT SCHISM. By Professor E. F. Jacob, *D.Phil., F.S.A., F.R.Hist.S.* 41

BISMARCK AND THE THREE EMPERORS' ALLIANCE, 1881–87. By W. N. Medlicott, *M.A., F.R.Hist.S.* 61

INDEX 84

REPORT OF THE COUNCIL SESSION, 1942–43 87

ALEXANDER PRIZE 97

DAVID BERRY PRIZE 99

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL, 1944–45 100

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 103

TRANSACTIONS

OF THE

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

Read 12 February 1944

By Professor F. M. Stenton, M.A., D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A.

The Scandinavian Colonies in England and Normandy

The Scandinavian settlements in England and France naturally invite comparison. In point of time they are little more than a generation apart. The colonies in eastern England were founded between 876 and 879.[1] The beginning of the colony which became the duchy of Normandy cannot be dated so precisely. But there can be no serious doubt that the Scandinavian occupation of Upper Normandy had taken place by the year 918 and there is good reason for believing that it began soon after 911.[2] It is also probable that a considerable number of veterans who had been campaigning in England between 892 and 896 took part in the foundation of Normandy, for there is a definite statement in the *Chronicle* [3] to the effect that vikings who had made no profit in the recent war crossed to the Seine in the latter year. In any case, the movement from which the duchy of Normandy arose clearly belongs to the same phase of Scandinavian enterprise which had founded the English Danelaw and thrown the kingdom of the West Franks into confusion in the last third of the ninth century.

But although the general circumstances of the Scandinavian settlement in Normandy are reasonably clear, its details and the nature of the social order to which it gave rise are impenetrably obscure. The history of the English Danelaw, doubtful as it is at many points, is illustrated by a considerable amount of ancient material. The course of the war which brought the Danelaw under the West Saxon monarchy is related at some

[1] *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* under 876, 877, and 880.

[2] The circumstances of the occupation have recently been discussed, with a critical discussion of the historical evidence, by Professor D. C. Douglas, *English Historical Review* (1942), lvii, pp. 417–36.

[3] Under 897.

length by the contemporary Old English *Chronicle*. There still survive a number of careful statements of the customs prevailing in Danish England under the late Anglo-Saxon kings. The social order of the early Danelaw can in great part be recovered from Domesday Book, supplemented by charter-evidence of the Norman age. The intensity, and to some extent the nature of the settlement, are shown by the Scandinavian place-names of that country. There is much that will never be known about the condition of eastern England in the century before the Norman Conquest, but the main outlines of its Anglo-Danish society can be drawn with reasonable assurance.

For the study of early Norman society materials are few, and many of them are untrustworthy. The foundation of Normandy took place in an age which produced no contemporary chronicle in France or the Low Countries. There is no consistent Norman tradition about the foundation of the duchy. The panegyrical history of the early dukes written by Dudo of St. Quentin for Duke Richard II [1] has suffered irretrievably from modern criticism. There are no early Norman surveys or treatises on the management of estates, such as the English *Rectitudines singularum personarum*. The reconstruction of early Norman society from later records, in any case a hazardous task, is made still more difficult by the fluctuating terminology applied to different social classes in different parts of the duchy and at different periods. Private charters of the middle ages which for the English Danelaw supply information of almost embarrassing volume, give much less help for Normandy. They are sparing of detail, particularly in regard to topography and to the facts which throw light on the relations between men of different classes. It follows that there are questions of the first importance about the Norman settlement on which it is hard to form any definite opinion. It may be hoped that the early Norman scene may become clearer when the Norman charter-evidence has been analysed more completely, but it is very unlikely that the social condition of any district in eleventh-century Normandy will ever be known as the social condition of the Danelaw shires is known to-day.

The most important of all the problems connected with early Normandy relates to the density and character of the settlement. In England the Danish colonisation of Alfred's time can fairly be described as a migration. It produced a settlement which in volume must have been intense and was

[1] *De moribus et actis primorum Normanniæ ducum*, ed. J. Lair (1865).

sufficiently coherent to preserve in England a large amount of inherited Danish custom. In at least the northern Danelaw, the settlement began with the ordered colonisation of definite regions by the rank and file of Danish armies under the supervision of the men who had led them in previous wars. In Normandy, large numbers of individual warriors must have taken part in the colonisation. The distinction between the Normans and the men of other provinces in northern France was recognised as late as the very end of the tenth century, when, for example, a contemporary writer records that Richard duke of the Pirates died of the lesser apoplexy.[1] The descent of a considerable number of Norman families can be traced back to an ancestor bearing a Scandinavian name. But the strength of the popular element in the Norman colony is still an open question. Here and there Norman records of the middle ages suggest the existence of small landholders who, though no more than peasants economically, were personally free from all the heavier forms of manorial servitude. It is not unreasonable to assume that some and probably many of these peasants represent the undistinguished ranks of the armies of the settlement. It is on the whole most probable that the peasants' revolt which is recorded by William of Jumièges in connection with the reign of Duke Richard II was a rising in defence of threatened liberties. On the other hand, there is no continuous tradition of Scandinavian influence behind the peasant order of medieval Normandy and there is nothing in the authorities for Norman history comparable to the explicit statement of the *Chronicle* that after the Danish leader Halfdan had divided Northumbria among his men in 876 they turned immediately to the cultivation of the land.

The study of Norman place-names which may in time make this essential problem clearer, is at present in an early stage of development.[2] A large number of early forms are preserved in medieval charters and it is not difficult to find references to at least the more important manorial centres of the duchy. But at the present time there are comparatively few cases in which the history of a particular name can be traced continuously through the middle ages. Moreover, names of insignificant settlements are recorded far less fully in Normandy than in the English Danelaw, and Norman records give much less information about field-names and names of uninhabited

[1] Richer, *Libri quatuor historiarum*, ed. G. Waitz, p. 180.

[2] The well-known account of early Norman history by H. Prentout, *Essai sur les origines et la fondation du duché de Normandie* (Paris, 1911), does not discuss this kind of evidence.

sites. In England, names of this kind supply some of the most convincing arguments for the intensity of the Scandinavian settlement of the Danelaw, and the comparative scarcity of this material for Normandy means that the picture of the settlement as supplied by local names is blurred. Comparatively little, even of the published evidence, has so far been critically studied for this purpose, and until this work has been carried through, any observations that are made about Norman place-names in general or about the character of early Norman society can be no more than tentative.

In much of what has been published on this subject, its difficulties are minimised. The book which gives the most convenient general view of the field, *Danske Minder i Normandiet* by A. Fabricius,[1] provides what is at first sight a very impressive list of Scandinavian words occurring in Norman place-names and of Scandinavian personal names occurring in Norman records. The more familiar work of Auguste Longnon, *Les noms de lieu de la France*,[2] devotes a section to the Scandinavian element in French nomenclature which again gives the impression of a considerable Scandinavian vocabulary in early Normandy. Many of his examples are clear enough. But Longnon approached the subject as a historian rather than as a philologist, and his work, like that of Fabricius, needs much revision. In particular, neither Fabricius nor Longnon made sufficient allowance for the fact that for more than four hundred years before the Norman occupation, Normandy had been part of the Frankish kingdom, nor for the well-recorded settlement of Saxons in western Normandy before the Franks had gained possession of the Norman coast-lands. Many of the elements which are generally taken as evidence of Scandinavian colonisation may equally well be due to earlier Saxon or Frankish settlement. There are many words of common Germanic origin of which the Scandinavian, the Saxon and the Frankish forms are indistinguishable in medieval spellings. On a strict examination such as that recently carried through by Hermann Gröhler,[3] many elements generally regarded as characteristically Scandinavian prove to be of little if any value as evidence for the racial composition of the Norman people. It is, for example, an important fact that many names which have at one time or another been regarded as proofs of Scandinavian influence in Normandy, have parallels in the Somme valley or in parts of the Low Countries where Scandi-

[1] Copenhagen, 1897. [2] Paris, 1920–9.
[3] *Über Ursprung und Bedeutung der französischen Ortsnamen*, Part ii, Heidelberg, 1933.

navian settlement can never have been more than negligible. The whole study of Norman place-names needs to be re-handled, with constant reference to recent work upon the early vocabulary and habits of name-formation of the various people inhabiting the coast of the North Sea.

It is already clear that the Scandinavian element in Norman place-names is much less extensive than might at first sight be expected. The words which can be of no other than Scandinavian origin are few. The chief among them are *búth*, 'booth',[1] *bú*, which in Normandy was used, though rarely, where *by* would have been used in England,[2] *thorp*, 'hamlet or farm',[3] *thveit*, 'enclosed clearing',[4] *toft*, 'dwelling',[5] *haugr*, 'hill',[6] *holm*, 'water meadow or low-lying land',[7] *hafn*, 'haven',[8] and Old Norse *floi*, Swedish *flo*, 'water-course'.[9] Among the words not specifically Scandinavian which from their context may generally be regarded as of northern origin, the chief are *bec*, 'stream',[10] *gata*, 'road',[11] *marr*, 'lake or pool',[12] and *dalr*, 'valley'.[13] The impression of an intensive Scandinavian settlement which many writers have derived from the local names of Normandy, is due not so much to the number of Scandinavian elements which are employed as to the numerous cases in which such elements as *bec*, *buth* and *toft* re-appear in local names in different parts of the Duchy. When all allowance has been made for the imperfect record of minor names in Norman documents, it is clear that there is a fundamental distinction between the character of the Scandinavian place-names of Normandy and the English Danelaw. The most remarkable feature of the English evidence is its variety, which places the popular nature of the Danish settlement beyond dispute. The Norman evidence is varied enough

[1] e.g. Daubeuf (Eure), Daubœuf (Calvados), 'booth in a valley', Elbeuf (Seine Inférieure), 'booth by the elder-trees'.

[2] See below, p. 6.

[3] Rarely found, but survives in Torps (Calvados), le Torpt (Eure).

[4] Fairly common. Survives, e.g., in numerous examples of Le Thuit (Eure) and in compounds such as Longthuit (Seine Inférieure).

[5] Very common, both independently as in Le Tôt (Manche) and in compounds. Ecquetot, which contains ON *eski*, 'ash grove', is identical with Eastoft in Axholme. Sassetot (Seine Inférieure) contains the personal name Saxi, which occurs in Sasseville (below, p. 8) and elsewhere in Normandy.

[6] As in Saint-Waast-la-Hogue (Manche).

[7] Often appears independently as in le Houlme (Seine Inférieure).

[8] Of which the most interesting compound is Fécamp, 'fish haven'.

[9] As in Honfleur (Calvados). This word does not seem to occur in Danish England.

[10] Very common, Houlbec (Eure), 'stream in a hollow', has several parallels in England, such as Holbeck near Leeds.

[11] e.g. Houlgate (Calvados), 'Hollow way'.

[12] Common, as in Longuemare (Seine Inférieure).

[13] Common, as in Daubeuf above.

to show that the leaders who carried through the colonisation were accompanied by a considerable number of followers of lower rank. But there is no sign in any part of Normandy of the wholesale incorporation of Scandinavian loan-words into the local agricultural vocabulary.

Perhaps the most striking contrast between the Scandinavian place-names of Normandy and those of the English Danelaw is the rarity of Norman names corresponding to the innumerable English names in *-by*. The English evidence shows that a word *byr*, or *by*, had come into common use as the designation of a settlement by the middle of the ninth century. In Normandy the one clear example of this name seems to be Hambye (Manche), of which the first element is uncertain. There is more evidence for the use in Normandy of the closely related *bú*, of which the only recorded English example is apparently Barnbow in the West Riding of Yorkshire. In Normandy the elements *by* and *bú* sometimes appear interchangeably with one another in the same name. Carquebut (Manche), for example, appears in early sources both as *Quierquebu* and as *Kirkebi*. But the total number of place-names containing either word is negligible in comparison with the number of English names in *-by*. In addition to Hambye and Carquebut, Bourguèbus (Calvados), ' settlement by the fort ', Tournebut (Manche), ' village by the thorns ', and Tournebu, of which there is one example in Calvados and another in Eure, are well recorded. To all appearance the element *bú* stands by itself in La Bu sur Rouvres in Calvados. Some names of this type may have escaped notice owing to the absence of early forms. But it is clear that the element was used most sparingly and its rarity gives some ground for the belief that colonisation in village settlements was far less common in Normandy than in England. The same impression that the settlement of Normandy was much more individualistic than that of the English Danelaw is given by the numerous Norman names containing the elements *buth* and *toft*, neither of which is at all prominent in the earlier names of Danish England. Regarded as a whole, the place-names of Normandy give the impression that the Scandinavian colonisation was a process essentially aristocratic, in which the settlement of large groups of peasant warriors was, to say the least, exceptional.

The Scandinavian strain in the Norman aristocracy is naturally reflected to some degree in the personal names borne by its members. But the reflection is less clear than could be wished, for before Norman records become numerous a

large number of important Norman families had adopted names of continental Germanic origin similar to those in use elsewhere in northern France. The change began early in the ducal house itself. Rollo, the founder of the duchy, gave the Germanic name Wilhelm to his son and heir. The personal names in the oldest extant collection of Norman records—the cartulary of the abbey of the Holy Trinity at Rouen [1]—show that the process had gone very far before 1066. At the date of Domesday Book, which is by far the most important source of material for this study, there is no doubt that names of Scandinavian origin, with few exceptions, were completely out of fashion in baronial, and even in knightly circles. Here and there among the Normans in England there appear names which recall earlier history. Thurstan son of Rolf, who had carried the Norman standard at Hastings, bore, as his father had borne, a name undoubtedly of Scandinavian origin. In the names of Hugh son of Grip, William son of Manne and William son of Stur, the father's name is Scandinavian and the son's name is continental Germanic. Stigand bishop of Chichester who was of Norman extraction, bore, like Stigand archbishop of Canterbury, the Old Norse adjectival name *Stígándr*. On the other hand, it is clear that names like these represent a tradition in name-giving which was rapidly becoming faint. In the end the only Scandinavian name-stems which retained much vitality in Normandy were *Ás*,[2] *Ketel* and *Thór*. Whatever the rate at which the change may have proceeded, it seems clear that the stock of Scandinavian names which was still being drawn upon by the English thegns of 1066 had in great part been abandoned by their contemporaries of equal rank, the barons of pre-Conquest Normandy.

The prevalence of northern names among the Norman aristocracy of an earlier time comes out clearly enough in the series of personal names preserved in Norman place-names. Here again much of the evidence is ambiguous. Among the names thus preserved a considerable number may equally well be of Scandinavian or Germanic origin.[3] It is, for example,

[1] *Cartulaire de l'abbaye de la Sainte-Trinité du mont de Rouen*, ed. A. Deville (*Collection des cartulaires de France*, iii. 1840).

[2] Generally represented in Normandy by the Saxon equivalent *Ōs*, as in Osbern for Ásbjǫrn, Osmund for Ásmundr, or by the Frankish equivalent *Ans*, as in Ansger for Ásgeirr, Ansfrid for Ásfriðr. On the conditions which produced these replacements, see O. von Feilitzen, *The Pre-Conquest personal names of Domesday Book* (Uppsala, 1937, p. 164.) In course of time, *Ans* frequently became *An*, as in the name of Anquetil Mallory, a well-known baron of the earl of Leicester's fee in the reign of Henry II.

[3] The relationship between the personal nomenclature of the Scandinavians and that of other Germanic peoples is set out in detail by H. Naumann in *Altnordische Namenstudien* (Berlin, 1912).

uncertain whether the personal name compounded in Fatouville is the Scandinavian *Fastulfr* or the Germanic *Fastulf*. It is necessary to make large deductions from the long list of Scandinavian personal names in Fabricius's *Danske Minder i Normandiet*. But more recent and more critical studies of these names, such as that of Jakob Jakobsen in *Stednavne og Personnavne i Normandiet*,[1] leave no doubt of the extent to which names of northern origin were at one time prevalent in the duchy. Éculleville (Manche) contains ON *Skúli*; Émondeville (Manche), ON *Ámundi*; Carville (Seine Inférieure and Calvados), ON and ODan *Kári*; Heugueville (Seine Inférieure and Eure), ON *Helgi*; Équiqueville (Seine Inférieure), ON *Skeggi*; Écauville (Eure), ON *Skalli*; Équeurdreville (Manche), ON *Skjǫldr*; Sotteville (Seine Inférieure, Eure and Manche), ON *Sóti*; Sasseville (Seine Inférieure), ON *Saxi*; Azeville (Manche), ON *Ási*; Catteville (Manche), ON *Káti*; Hattenville (Seine Inférieure), ON *Hásteinn*; Thouberville (Eure), ON *Thorbjǫrn*; Tourgeville (Calvados), ON *Thorgils*; Tourlaville (Manche), ON *Thorlákr*; Tremauville (Seine Inférieure), ON *Thormóðr*; Toutainville (Eure), ON *Thorsteinn*; Torqueville (Seine Inférieure), ON *Thorketill*; and Quetteville (Calvados) ON *Ketill*. This list contains nothing beyond a representative selection of the Scandinavian names preserved in the local names of Normandy. It could be more than trebled at the present time, and it is probable that many new examples will be found when the analysis of Norman place-names has gone further, and the influence of French sound-changes on this Scandinavian nomenclature can be traced more clearly. Many of these names are recorded in or before the second half of the eleventh century. Nothing definite can be said about the date at which they came into being. But their variety leaves little doubt that they arose in the first half of the period between the Scandinavian settlement of Normandy and the Norman invasion of England.

In any case they offer a line of approach towards some difficult questions in early Norman history. In particular they afford a small amount of trustworthy evidence on what is still the controversial question of the origin of the Norman people. The relative strength of the Danish and Norwegian elements in early Normandy is one of those problems for which no very definite solution is ever likely to be found. The origin to be assigned to Rollo, the original Norman leader, depends on a nice balancing of probabilities.[2] On the other

[1] Published in *Danske Studier* (1911), pp. 59–84.

[2] Discussed most recently by Professor Douglas in the article, noted above, p. 1, which indicates the weight of the evidence for Rollo's Norwegian descent.

hand, the general question of Norman origins has been brought a little nearer a solution by modern work upon the personal names of Norway, Sweden and Denmark. There is a small but gradually increasing number of these names which can be ascribed with reasonable certainty to Denmark or Sweden on the one hand, and to western Scandinavia on the other.[1] Although the great majority of the personal names compounded in Norman place-names may equally well be derived from east Scandinavian or west Scandinavian sources, there are a few about which it is possible to be definite. It is doubtful whether any of these names are specifically west Scandinavian, and the study that has so far been given to them certainly strengthens the impression that the Danish element was definitely preponderant in the tenth century duchy. *Áki*, for example, which is contained in Acqueville (Calvados and Manche); *Api*, which occurs in Appeville (Manche, Eure and Seine Inférieure); *Toki*, from which Tocqueville is derived; and *Manni*, which underlie three separate examples of Manneville (Seine Inférieure, Eure, and Calvados), are all specificially east Scandinavian. *Múli*, which is compounded in Muneville (Manche), occurs in Swedish and Danish runic inscriptions, but, apart from place-names, is only recorded as a bye-name in west Scandinavian sources. Drageville (Manche) and Draqueville (Seine Inférieure) contain a name *Draki*, or *Draghi*, which is only found in Sweden and Denmark. *Barni*, found in Banneville (Calvados) and Barneville (Eure, Calvados and Manche), is not recorded in Old Norse, but occurs in Denmark both independently and in place-names. The unidentified *Maltevilla*, where the monastery of the Holy Trinity, Rouen, had property,[2] is derived from a name *Malte*, which seems to be confined to Denmark, but is well-recorded there. *Bondi*, found in Bondeville (Seine Inférieure) is among the commonest of names in Denmark, but is extremely rare in western Scandinavia. In view of the obscurity of many Norman names and the imperfect record of others, even a brief list like this proves a strong east Scandinavian element in the society which has left its memorial in the place-names of Normandy.

The group of place-names from which these examples have been quoted is also of value as an illustration of general conditions in Normandy in the period following the original settle-

[1] Other examples are likely to appear when the definitive collection of Danish personal names appearing in *Danmarks Gamle Personnavne* (Copenhagen, 1936–9) has been completed. At present it does not extend beyond the letter I.

[2] *Cartulaire de l'abbaye de la Sainte-Trinité*, pp. 437 *et seqq.*

ment. In each of these names a Scandinavian personal name is compounded with the Late Latin word *villa*. It is impossible to define at all closely the sense which this word bore at the beginning of the tenth century. Of its various meanings, 'manor' probably represents the word most nearly. Whatever may have been the type of estate denoted by the word, there can be no doubt that at the time of the Norman settlement the word itself was part of the current vocabulary of the districts which passed into Scandinavian occupation. On general grounds it is more than probable that compounds such as Hattenville and Éculleville arose, not among the Scandinavian colonists themselves, but among the peasantry of whom in varying degrees they had become the lords. In many cases it is possible that the Scandinavian personal name has replaced the name of an earlier Frankish or Saxon owner of the estate. In any case the remarkable frequency of such compounds proves at least that the pre-invasion peasantry of the region cannot have been displaced in any wholesale manner by the new settlers from the North.

Names of a type which is essentially similar to this occur in very considerable numbers in the English Danelaw. The word *villa* was never adopted by the original Anglo-Saxon colonists of England. The word which was applied most frequently in England to the nucleus of an estate was the familiar Old English *tūn*. In the Danelaw there are many place-names in which this native element is preceded by a Scandinavian personal name. Compounds such as Thorkell's *tūn*, Gunnulf's *tūn*, Thorgeirr's *tūn*, and Aslak's *tūn*, which have become Thurcaston, Gonalstone, Thurgarton and Aslocton, correspond both in type and in historical significance to Norman names like Azeville, Heugueville or Torqueville. If the distribution of these Anglo-Danish hybrids is plotted on a map, the result is interesting. They occur in largest number not within, but on the fringes of the districts where other signs of Scandinavian influence are most numerous and convincing. They are characteristic of regions such as Derbyshire, the centre and south of Nottinghamshire, and East Anglia, where Scandinavian settlement was clearly less intensive than in counties such as Lincoln and York. Like the hybrids of a similar type in Normandy, they point to a state of society in which the immigrants from the North formed a minority of the population, dominant, but too small to impress a purely Scandinavian character on the names given to estates.

The most interesting point of contrast between the place-names of Normandy and those of the English Danelaw is the

fact that while hybrid formations of this type are exceptional in Danish England, they give a distinctive character to the village names of Normandy.[1] So far as can be seen, there is no part of Normandy in which, as in many parts of Yorkshire and Lincolnshire, large numbers of local names were created by men speaking a Scandinavian language. In particular, there are no Norman parallels to the innumerable village names of a Scandinavian pattern which are characteristic of the English Danelaw. It is possible that the Latinised spellings in which these Norman names repeatedly appear, may sometimes conceal Scandinavian forms preserved in common speech. But the general contrast between the local names of Normandy and those of the English Danelaw is too clear to be explained away on these lines, and there can be little doubt that its origin lies very far back in the history of these countries.

It can at least be said that a contrast of this kind might be expected to follow from the different circumstances under which the Scandinavian colonies in England and Normandy came into being. The effect of these contrasted circumstances can be traced through all the subsequent history of these colonies. As a political unit the English Danelaw has no history. Its inhabitants were brought to accept West Saxon lordship within fifty years from the original settlement. Thenceforward their main concern was to preserve the ways of life which they had found for themselves in the time of their independence. Their allegiance to the West Saxon monarchy was secured, a century after the landing of their ancestors in England, when King Edgar granted them autonomy in all matters of law and social custom. In the wars of the eleventh century their attitude was determined far more effectively by the personal interests of a small group of great families than by any general consciousness of an alien origin. Their action at any particular crisis was incalculable. They were ready to fight at any time for their ancestral liberties, but they continued to regard themselves as members of a united English state.

There is no need to underline the contrast between the massive rustic conservatism of the Danes in England and the passion for militant adventure through which the Normans changed the course of European history. But there is much to

[1] The contrast has often been obscured by inaccurate parallels drawn between individual names in England and Normandy, such as the statement that Hacqueville (Manche) is identical with Haconby in Lincolnshire. In reality, the two names differ from each other fundamentally. Each contains the ON personal name Hákon. But while Haconby is a purely Scandinavian compound, Hacqueville is partly Scandinavian and partly Frankish Latin.

suggest that the contrast itself reflects an essential difference between the nature of Scandinavian colonisation in England and in Gaul. The Danish colonies in England were founded after more than ten years of incessant fighting by men who deliberately turned from warfare to agriculture. The establishment of Rollo's army in upper Normandy was not the conclusion of an enterprise but an episode in a series of campaigns. It may be doubted whether Rollo himself foresaw that the lands by which King Charles the Simple had purchased his support would form the nucleus of a permanent state. Earlier Frankish kings had given land to earlier viking leaders for the greater security of the Frankish kingdom. None of the viking colonies thus founded had survived. What Rollo and his followers obtained from the grant of upper Normandy was not land for peaceful settlement so much as a base of operations for future wars. The later acquisitions of Rollo and his son—Maine and the Bessin in 924, the Cotentin and Avranchin in 933—were made with difficulty, and some of them proved to be impermanent. There was little opportunity under these conditions for the conversion of fighting men into farmers, which is the outstanding feature of the Danish settlement in England. In dealing with any aspect of early Norman history it is impossible to get very far down beneath speculation to concrete fact. But it may at least be claimed that the facts which are at present known about early Norman society, the personal names which it employed and the place-names which in some degree reflect its character, agree with the picture of Norman origins which is suggested by the historical evidence.

POPE ALEXANDER III AND THE CANONIZATION OF SAINTS

The Alexander Prize Essay

By the Rev. E. W. Kemp, B.D.

Read 10 June 1944

Although the cult of the saints was so prominent an element in medieval religion, decrees controlling it occupy a comparatively small place in the medieval canon law. In the Decretum of Gratian, composed about nineteen years before Alexander III became pope, there are only two decrees of importance which seem to concern the canonization of saints. They come from the two chief periods of legislation on this subject, the fifth and the ninth centuries. The first of them is a canon of the so-called fifth Council of Carthage (401 A.D.) [1] which was perpetuated in the West in the Dionysian and Hispana collections, and was among the canons chosen from the Dionysiana by Charles the Great as specially relevant to his time.[2] The second was passed in 813 by the Council of Mainz [3] and under the influence of the same emperor. Together they appear in the collections of Burchard of Worms and Ivo of Chartres and then in the Decretum of Gratian where they remained in effect the only written legislation on the subject until the time of the fourth Lateran Council.

The African canon orders the bishops to examine carefully all supposed shrines and to destroy them where there is no evidence of connection with a true martyr. No person is to be venerated as a martyr except upon a reasonable basis of historical evidence. This canon clearly recognizes that the primary responsibility rests with the diocesan bishop, subject to the direction of the provincial synod, and this theory corresponds generally with the practice of the next four centuries. The canon of Mainz forbids the translation of the

Abbreviations used : *Act. SS. : Acta Sanctorum* (the references throughout are to the first edition) ; *M.G.H. : Monumenta Germaniae Historica ; P.L. : Migne, Patrologia Latina.*

[1] Canon 15. *P.L.*, 84, col. 212. Cf. F. Maassen, *Geschichte der Quellen und der Literatur des canonischen Rechts*, p. 163.

[2] *Admonitio generalis*, cap. 42 ; Council of Frankfurt (794), Canon 42 ; Ed. A. Boretius, *M.G.H., Capitularia I*, pp. 56 and 77. Cf. C. de Clercq, *La Législation religieuse franque de Clovis à Charlemagne*, pp. 171 ff.

[3] Canon 51. Ed. A. Werminghoff, *M.G.H., Legum sectio iii, Concilia II, ii*, p. 272.

bodies of saints without the knowledge of the prince and the permission of the bishop and synod. Since, at this period and for some centuries afterwards, translation was the principal outward sign of recognition of a saint, this was equivalent to saying that the authority in canonization was the bishop and synod acting with the knowledge of the secular power. Here too the theory corresponds roughly with the practice of the next three hundred years, although the tendency is for the secular power to be overlooked. The comments of the early glossators of the Decretum on this canon have been collected by Dr. Kuttner.[1] The first glossators interpret *princeps* as equivalent to bishop and synod. Towards the end of the 12th century the term was regarded as meaning the pope or the emperor, and in the 13th century the pope alone.

At the end of the 5th century Pope Gelasius I had been consulted about the translation of the body of St. Severinus,[2] and in the second half of the 8th century Boniface of Mainz and Burchard of Würzburg sought the permission of Pope Zacharias before translating the body of St. Kilian,[3] but the first event which can properly be called a papal canonization does not occur until 993 when John XV canonized St. Ulric of Augsburg at a council held in the Lateran palace.[4] Between this date and the time of Gregory VII at least ten persons were canonized by the popes. By the end of the 11th century the procedure had become sufficiently clear for Urban II to refuse a canonization on the grounds that proper witnesses had not been produced,[5] and by 1120 the pope's interest in the matter was recognized to such an extent that the bishop of Chartres could say at the Council of Beauvais, when the miracles and virtues of St. Arnulf of Soissons were being discussed: 'If the Lord had done such things concerning any of my predecessors I would not consult the pope, or the legate, or even the archbishop, but would translate the saint of God with all confidence, as he deserves.'[6] Three years later Ulric of Constance speaks of it being a 'custom of the churches' to ask the pope for the canonization of saints.[7] Eugenius III, probably in 1146, says

[1] *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*, 4 série (1938), pp. 215–19.

[2] Eugippus, *Vira S. Severini*, cap. xlvi *Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum*, vol. ix, pars. 2, p. 65.

[3] *M.G.H., Script. rerum merovingicarum*, v. 728.

[4] *P.L.* 137, col. 845 ff.

[5] L. Maitre et P. de Barthou, *Cartulaire de l'abbaye de Ste. Croix de Quimperlé* (2nd ed., 1904), p. 285.

[6] *Domine Tornacensis, dico vobis in veritate; si Dominus talia vel semel fecisset circa aliquem praedecessorum meorum, ego nec papam nec legatum nec vel archiepiscopum consulerem; sed tota constantia Sanctum Dei, ut dignus est, exaltarem.* *P.L.*, 174, col. 1434.

[7] *P.L.*, 170, col. 865.

that it is the usual practice to deal with these matters only in general councils, but he immediately proceeds to make an exception and to canonize the Emperor Henry III ' by the authority of the holy Roman Church which is the authority behind all councils '.[1] About the middle of the 12th century the notorious forger, Peter the deacon, wrote the life of the 6th-century hermit, Martin of Montemassico, in which he describes an attempted translation in the 8th century. According to Peter the bishop of Benevento persuaded those who proposed the translation not to do anything without the consent of the pope. This account is, of course, worthless as evidence of what took place in the 8th century, but it indicates a view at the time of Peter the deacon that the pope ought to be consulted, at least about Italian canonizations.[2] Evidence of a similar nature comes from Switzerland in the case of St. Othmar.[3]

The account of the canonization of St. Godehard of Hildesheim by Innocent II contains a puzzling statement that ' it was decreed at that time (i.e. 1131) on account of the illusions of demons which frequently happened in the Church in these matters, that no one should be canonized except by apostolic authority and after his life had been examined by duly qualified persons '.[4] No one has yet discovered the canonical decree referred to and in the absence of any corroborative testimony the statement must be received with caution, but it is definite proof of an opinion held in certain German circles that only the pope could canonize. The remarks about the illusions of demons suggest the possibility that the statement may be based ultimately on the African canon which was in circulation at this time and which spoke of dreams and ordered the proper investigation of the lives of those who were to be venerated as saints. Another Hildesheim saint canonized in the 12th century was St. Bernward. His case was begun about the same time as that of Godehard and brought first before the archbishop of Mainz and then before the papal legate Octavian.[5] It was not concluded until the end of the century. Further evidence of a view that the pope alone could canonize comes from Denmark where, about 1147, the young prince Waldemar

[1] *Auctoritate tamen Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae quae omnium conciliorum firmamentum est.* *P.L.*, 180, col. 1118.

[2] *Act. SS. Oct.* x, p. 837. [3] *M.G.H., Script.* ii, pp. 48 and 85.

[4] *Sed cum canonica censura propter illusiones daemonum, quae frequenter in ecclesia Dei in talibus contigerunt, statutum sit, ne quis sine apostolica auctoritate, ei vita ipsius per viros auctorabiles approbata, canonizaretur.* *M.G.H., Script.* xii, pp. 641 f.

[5] *Act. SS. Oct.* xi, p. 992.

determined to translate the relics of his murdered father, Canute Laward. News of his intention came to the ears of Eskil, archbishop of Lund and papal legate for Scandinavia, who *Romane sedis reverenciam observans nec obvians racioni, a voto iuvenum velle avertens, id ne fieret, auctoritate pontificali interdixit.*[1] This seems to indicate that Eskil held canonization to be a matter for the pope.

It is clear that at the accession of Alexander III the control of the individual bishop over canonizations in his diocese was still recognized, as also the desirability of dealing with such matters in a synod. Both these points had foundation in written law. There was also a widespread opinion that the pope ought to be consulted and ought to exercise some control over canonizations. This idea finds no expression in the legal circles of Bologna but we meet it in Southern Italy, Switzerland, Germany and Denmark. The intervention of the higher ecclesiastical authorities seems to have led to a rudimentary distinction between canonization and beatification, beatified saints being those whose veneration had received only a local authority. This distinction seems to be implied in the case of Bernward of Hildesheim in which the archbishop first conceded the use of a special office and then the papal legate allowed the erection of an altar but explicitly forbade translation.[2] This is also one of the two cases before the time of Alexander III in which we note the appearance of legates. The other is that of Arnulf of Soissons in which the papal legate, Conon of Praeneste, and the archbishop of Rheims jointly confirmed the decision of the bishops assembled at Beauvais. In 1138 Osbert of Clare writing to the legate Alberich, speaks of the *exaltatio sanctorum* as being part of the legate's *officium*.[3] In papal canonizations the procedure was gradually becoming clear. It was usual for a written account of the proposed saint's life and miracles to be presented, and in some cases the testimony of witnesses was required. Urban II and Innocent II both refused canonizations, alleging that there was not sufficient testimony.[4] As in the case of episcopal canonizations it was usual for the pope to act in synod, and in the case of Godehard of Hildesheim Innocent II postponed the final decision to a general council since this was held to be the custom of the

[1] *M.G.H., Script.* xxix, p. 18. Goertz, *Vitae Sanctorum Danorum*, p. 202.
[2] *Act. SS. Oct.* xi, p. 992.
[3] E. W. Williamson, *The letters of Osbert of Claire*, p. 82.
[4] For Urban II and St. Urloux see page 14, note 5. Innocent II refused to canonise Edward the Confessor in 1139. There were political factors in this case. *P.L.*, 179, col. 568. Cf. M. Bloch in *Analecta Bollandiana* (1923), vol. 41, pp. 12–14.

Roman Church.[1] We have already seen Eugenius III paying lip-service to this principle but departing from it in practice.

We may now turn to consider the canonizations performed by Alexander III. In 1139 Innocent II had refused to canonize Edward the Confessor. The civil war in England, which was one of the causes of the refusal, prevented anything more from being done for some years, but in 1160, after Henry II had decided in the summer to take sides in the papal schism and to recognize Alexander III, Gilbert Foliot, then bishop of Hereford, wrote to the pope asking for the canonization of the Confessor and suggesting delicately but plainly that this would be an appropriate return for Henry's allegiance.[2] On 7 February 1161 Alexander replied with a bull of canonization.[3] There is no clear evidence that the further investigations demanded by Innocent II were carried out, although in the bull Alexander says that he has seen the letters of his predecessor and examined a book of miracles and testimonies from the archbishops, bishops, abbots, and priors of England. He further writes that although important matters of this kind are usually dealt with in solemn councils he has decided in this case, after consultation with his brethren, to proceed to canonization immediately.

Alexander III was not usually so prompt in granting these petitions. In the early part of 1163 he was asked by a number of prominent persons to canonize St. Bernard at the approaching Council of Tours. It seems from his letters that Alexander had every intention of doing so, but when the Council was opened it was found that there were so many other requests for the canonization of various people that the pope decided to avoid trouble by postponing them all.[4] The case of St. Bernard was not brought forward again for ten years. We have definite evidence only of one other of the petitions presented at Tours. On 9 June 1163 Alexander wrote to Archbishop Becket reminding him that he had presented an account of the life and miracles and asked for the canonization of St. Anselm at the Council. The pope says that he had to postpone this case with all the others but he now commits it to Becket's discretion. The archbishop is to call together an assembly of his suffragans, abbots, and other prominent ecclesiastics of the province, and with their aid to determine whether Anselm ought to be canonized or not. He can rely upon it that the

[1] *M.G.H., Script.* xii, p. 641 f.
[2] *P.L.*, 190, col. 852 ff.
[3] *P.L.*, 200, col. 106. Cf. Jaffé-Loewenfeld, *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 10654.
[4] *P.L.*, 185, col. 622.

pope will hold valid whatever he decides.[1] There is no evidence of Becket having carried out these instructions and it is likely that he was prevented from doing so by his quarrel with the King. The important point of this letter, however, is that it shows the pope explicitly delegating the power of canonization, reserving to himself only the right of confirmation which, however, he seems to promise shall not be withheld.

It is highly probable that another of the petitions presented at the Council of Tours was for the canonization of Iñigo, one of the early abbots of the Benedictine monastery of San Salvador at Oña in the diocese of Burgos. There are many uncertainties about this case, but if it is to be assigned to the pontificate of Alexander III it probably shows the pope refusing a full canonization but granting a local veneration, symbolised by the bishop of Burgos celebrating the Mass of a Confessor in honour of St. Iñigo. Unfortunately the case is too conjectural to be of any considerable value.[2]

At some date before 1170 and probably after 1165, Bertrand, bishop of Comminges, who had died in 1123, was canonized. Most of our information about him comes from Vitalis, a notary of the apostolic see and a clerk of the Church of Auch, who prepared a Life of Bertrand which was presented to Alexander III and the cardinals in the Lateran palace, possibly in 1167. The case was promoted by the Archbishop of Auch, in whose province the diocese of Comminges lay, and the Cardinal Deacon Hyacinth of whom we shall hear more presently. It was at their command that Vitalis prepared his account of the saint's life.[3]

We are on surer ground with the canonization of Canute Laward in 1169 since the bull of canonization and extracts from an early account of it have survived. The action of the papal legate Eskil in preventing an unauthorized translation of Canute's body in 1147 has been noted already. Some years

[1] *P.L.*, 200, col. 235.

[2] See *Act. SS. June* i, p. 119; H. Florez, *España Sagrada* (2nd ed., 1772), vol. xxvi, pp. 274 ff.; Fidel Fita, *Canonizacion del abad San Iñigo. Bulario antiguo e inedito del monasterio de Oña*, in *Boletin de la Real Academia de la Historia*, 1895, vol. xxvii, pp. 76 ff.; and 1901, vol. xxxviii, pp. 206 ff. Additional evidence pointing to the early years of Alexander III may be found in the dispute between the abbeys of Oña and San Millan over certain rights in the parish of Altable. A settlement was made by Cardinal Hyacinth in 1155 and confirmed by Alexander III in 1169. The monks of Oña failed to observe the award and the case was constantly being brought before popes and papal legates until the end of the century, so it is perhaps unlikely that the offending abbey would have received any privilege from Rome after 1169. See Kehr, *Papsturkunden in Spanien, ii, Navarra und Aragon* (1928), pp. 386, 388, 435, 464, 558 ff., 561 ff.

[3] *Act. SS. Oct.* vii, pp. 1142, 1160 f., 1181.

later when Waldemar had become king of Denmark he revived his earlier idea of honouring his father's memory, but this time he consulted Eskil of Lund [1] and in 1169 a mission, headed by the archbishop of Uppsala, a see in some points subject to Lund,[2] was sent to Rome. Whether the main object of the mission was to procure the canonization or to give the pope an account of the state of the Swedish Church is not clear,[3] but at least we know that Stephen of Uppsala presented evidence about the life and miracles of Canute Laward and returned to Scandinavia with a bull of canonization.[4]

In many ways the most interesting case of the period is that of Becket who was canonized in 1173. In England, as soon as the news of his murder spread, there was an immediate outburst of popular devotion to his memory and stories of miracles wrought at his tomb and by his intercession were quickly circulated. The pope, however, proceeded with the utmost caution. Seven of his letters between December 1170 and March 1173 in the Migne edition contain references to Becket [5] and in only one of these does Alexander show any sign of regarding Thomas as a martyr. In the letter of 14 May 1171, addressed to the archbishop of Tours and his suffragans, he speaks of *Cantuariæ archiepiscopus, cujus anima Deo, sicut credimus, pretioso martyrio dedicata in coelis cum sanctis habitat.*[6] Normally he says *Sanctae recordationis Thomas, quondam Cantuariensis archiepiscopus,* and the archbishop's death is treated as a fairly ordinary piece of violence. During this time the pope was having reports of miracles investigated by his legates Albert and Theodwin, and although he was himself fairly convinced by the stories which reached him, he waited for their official report before taking any action. On 10 March 1173 he wrote to the legates that Thomas had been solemnly canonized and enrolled in the glorious college of martyrs.[7] Two days later he addressed the bull *Gaudendum est* to the chapter of Canterbury, telling them of the canonization and ordering them to translate the martyr's body to an

[1] *M.G.H., Script.* xxix, p. 19.

[2] Alexander III created the province of Uppsala in 1164, but ordered that the archbishops should be consecrated by the archbishops of Lund and respect them as their primates. *P.L.*, 200, col. 301 ff.

[3] Cf. *P.L.*, 200, col. 609. The letter is dated 8 November, and must belong to 1167, 1168 or 1169, the only years that Alexander was at Benevento in November. It is natural to suppose that this letter is a result of the mission since the bull canonizing Canute is also dated from Benevento on 8 November and definitely belongs to 1169.

[4] *P.L.*, 200, col. 608.

[5] *P.L.*, 200, cols. 725, 726, 727, 730, 735, 872, 894. Letters 788, 789, 790, 794, 798, 995, 1014.

[6] *P.L.*, 200, col. 727. Letter 790.

[7] *P.L.*, 200, col. 900.

altar or some other suitable raised place and to observe the anniversary of his passion every year.[1] On the same day two copies of the bull *Redolet Anglia* were issued, one addressed to the clergy and people of England and the other to the English archbishops, bishops, and other prelates. This bull describes the examination of Thomas's miracles and the testimony of the papal legates, records the canonization, and orders the observance of the martyr's feast.[2] It appears that Alexander himself signalized the canonization by singing Mass in honour of the martyr.[3]

The pope's deliberation had been a great trial of patience for the English people, and the growing irritation at the delay is seen clearly in the correspondence of John of Salisbury. In 1171, probably not long after Becket's death, John wrote to his friend the bishop of Poitiers to give him an account of the murder. At the end of his letter he asks whether it is safe, without the authority of the pope, to treat Thomas as a martyr in the Mass and in public prayers, or whether they must still go on saying the office of the dead for him. The latter course seems to John very improper and likely to lead to misunderstandings and to the dishonour of the martyr. He explains that the pope would have been consulted but it was very difficult to travel at the moment and no one was allowed to take ship without the king's permission.[4] Later in the year John wrote to the archbishop of Sens marvelling that Thomas had not yet been enrolled in the catalogue of martyrs. He remembered, however, Orosius's story of the senate being consulted about the worship of Christ and replying that he might quite properly be worshipped if the provincials had not anticipated the imperial decision. In spite of this the deity of Christ had been established. John remembers also that in the Acts of the Apostles some unbaptized persons had received the Holy Ghost without the authority of the apostles, and he says *Profecto, ubi Deus auctor est, frustra superior desideratur auctoritas.*[5]

This correspondence shows clearly that in the circles in which John of Salisbury moved there was a definite opinion that people should not be venerated as saints without papal permission. That such a view was current in England at the time is confirmed by an incident in William of Canterbury's *Miracula S. Thomae.* A certain priest had a vision in which

[1] *P.L.*, 200, col. 900 f. [2] *P.L.*, 200, col. 901 f.
[3] Cardinal Boso, *Vita Alexandri*, in L. Duchesne, *Liber Pontificalis*, vol. ii, p. 426.
[4] *P.L.*, 199, col. 359. [5] *P.L.*, 199, col. 362.

he seemed to be attending the divine office. Two monks standing before the choir intoned the commemoration of the saints and when this was done one of them signed to the other that he should make a memorial of the martyr Thomas. The second monk did not understand the sign and the first had to explain his meaning, telling him to sing an antiphon to the holy martyr. The second monk replied that it was not authentic because Thomas had not yet been inscribed by apostolic authority in the catalogue of martyrs.[1] They then proceeded to sing the antiphon in English as a substitute. Canonization was, therefore, definitely regarded as a papal prerogative, although persons not yet canonized might be venerated with popular devotions outside the liturgical offices.

At this time the Cardinal Deacon Hyacinth was engaged upon the second of his two great missions to Spain as papal legate. At the monastery of Cella Nueva in Galicia in September 1172 he canonized St. Rosendo, a former bishop of Duma, and later, in March 1173, at Leon, he translated the relics of the three primitive martyrs Claudius, Lupercus, and Victoricus. This latter ceremony was performed at the request of King Ferdinand II, Bishop John of Leon, and a certain Abbot Pelagius. It looks as though Hyacinth made a careful investigation of the authenticity of the relics before agreeing to their translation, but there is no suggestion that the martyrs are now for the first time being enrolled in the number of the saints, although the event was of sufficient importance for Hyacinth to confirm his action when, at the end of the century, he had become pope as Celestine III.[2]

The case of St. Rosendo is more important. In connection with it Hyacinth issued a letter of which Spanish translations have been published by Yepes [3] and Morales.[4] From these it seems that Hyacinth speaks of having performed the translation by the authority of the pope which he exercised in Spain,[5] and at the end, after granting an indulgence, he says: 'We grant this by virtue of the dignity and office which we possess and by the authority which is given us.'[6] On 7 October 1195,

[1] *Non eam authenticam esse; nondum enim ex apostolica auctoritate catalogo martyrum martyr ascriptus erat. Materials for the History of Archbishop Thomas Becket*, i. 150 (Rolls Series).

[2] *Act. SS. Oct.* xiii, pp. 290–92. H. Florez, *op. cit.*, vol. 35, pp. 407–10.

[3] A. de Yepes, *Coronica general de la orden de San Benito* (1615), vol. v, fos. 14a–15a.

[4] A. de Morales, *Coronica general de España*, lib. xvi, cap. xxxvii, n. 7 (1791 ed.), vol. viii, p. 287 ff.

[5] *Por el autoridad del Papa nuestro Señor la quel (aunque indígnos) tenemos en las provincias de España.* Morales, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

[6] *Y esto concedemos por virtud de la dignidad, y oficio de que usamos, y de la autoridad que nos esta dada.* Yepes, *loc. cit.*

when he had become pope, Hyacinth issued a bull from which we learn that in the course of his legation he heard a good deal about the virtues and miracles of St. Rosendo and that a life of the saint was read to him. He says that he made a careful examination of all these matters and then decided that Rosendo's name ought to be placed among the saints, since he believed him to belong to the heavenly choir and to contemplate the face of Jesus Christ. Hyacinth speaks of having at that time issued letters attesting the elevation of the relics and he repeats some of the accounts of the miracles from the earlier document. Then he continues: *Igitur quia illa, quae dum in minori gradu constituti persolvimus, in perpetuum illibata permaneant . . . nunc in montis, Deo operante, cacumine collocati, omnia per Nos tunc circa hoc facta, apostolica auctoritate firmamus, et praesentis confirmationis firmitate munimus.*[1] We shall have occasion presently to discuss the implications of this as concerns the powers of papal legates.

The last bull of canonization which has survived from the pontificate of Alexander III is for St. Bernard. In 1173 the monk Tromund was sent by the abbot of Clairvaux to the papal court to remind Alexander of Bernard's virtues and miracles and to renew the petition presented ten years earlier. We have a letter of Tromund in which he reports to the abbot on the success of his mission and records the help he had received from other abbots and monks.[2] He exhorts the abbot of Clairvaux to observe strictly the text of the Mass which the pope had composed and used in honour of St. Bernard. The canonization was announced by Alexander in four bulls issued on 18 January, 1174.[3] The most interesting point, however, in Tromund's letter concerns another saint. It appears that it was part of his mission to Rome to ask also for the canonization of Malachy, archbishop of Armagh, who had died at Clairvaux in 1148, and whose life had been written by St. Bernard. The pope, however, advised that this petition should be dropped as the pressing of both cases at once might result in the loss of both. The words of the letter are: *Quod autem de sancto Malachia opus simile aggredi praetermisimus, consilio factum est principis sacerdotum, qui praemonuit nos in ipsa sermonis origine fieri posse de pluralitate fastidium, quod etiam in uno intentionis nostrae frustraret effectum.*[4]

[1] Joannes Tamayus Salazar, *Anamnesis sive commemorationis sanctorum hispanorum*, 1562, vol. ii, p. 40. Yepes, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, fos. 15b–16a, gives a Spanish translation of the bull.

[2] *P.L.*, 185, col. 626 f.

[3] *P.L.*, 185, cols. 622–5.

[4] *P.L.*, 185, col. 626.

Three other processes begun but not completed under Alexander III must be noted. The first is that of William of Malavalle, a Tuscan hermit who died in 1157. We have a letter of Innocent III addressed to the bishop of Grosseto, from which it appears that one of the bishop's predecessors, Martin (1174-9), had applied to Alexander III for the canonization of William. Alexander promised to listen to the petition *tempore opportuno* and meanwhile ordered him to use the office of a confessor on the anniversary of William's death, and to cause this to be observed in his diocese.[1] Here is a clear case of the permission of a local cult while full canonization is withheld.

Unfortunately we have very little evidence about the early stages of the process of Peter of Tarentaise. He died probably on 8 May 1175 and certainly not later than that date,[2] and was buried in the abbey of Bellevaux. The Bollandists print three letters, one from Alexander, abbot of Cîteaux, and the general chapter of the Cistercians, one from Louis VII of France, and one from Abbot Henry of Morimond, asking for the canonization of Peter.[3] Since Alexander, seventh abbot of Cîteaux, died on 29 July, 1175,[4] the request was evidently made within a few months of Peter's death. There is no record of the pope's reply but we have two letters of his which seem to be connected with the case, both dated from the Lateran in the month of July, and since 1178 was the only year between 1174 and 1181 that Alexander was at Rome in July they must belong to that year. The first is addressed to the monks of Bellevaux and the second to the canons of Tarentaise.[5] There had been strife over the possession of Peter's body, the canons of Tarentaise claiming it as their right. The pope orders that the monks are to be left in undisturbed possession. There is no indication of Peter's being regarded as a saint.[6] It is possible that this dispute may have stopped the case for the time being, or Alexander III may have been moved by the reasons which caused Lucius III to postpone canonization some years later. On this occasion the pope was ap-

[1] J. Fontanini, *Codex constitutionum quas summi pontifices ediderunt in solemni canonizatione sanctorum* (1729), p. 644. P. Kehr, *Italia pontificia*, vol. iii, p. 261.

[2] The Bollandists, *Act. SS. May* ii, p. 320, incline to 8 May 1175, and A. Luchaire, *Etudes sur les actes de Louis VII*, p. 312, agrees with them.

[3] *Act. SS. May*, ii, pp. 321.

[4] *Gallia Christiana*, ed. P. Piolin, vol. 4, p. 988.

[5] S. Loewenfeld, *Epistolae pontificum romanorum ineditae*, p. 156.

[6] Unless Alexander's remark about Bellevaux: *Dignum est ut domus tantae religionis tanti patroni iugiter praesentia gratuletur*, be taken to imply this.

proached by the abbots of Bellevaux and Altacumba on behalf of the Cistercian order. Lucius replied, probably in 1183, that the time was not very convenient and that in any case, although Peter's virtues were well known all over the Christian world and were believed by him and his brethren, yet they had not received any written certificates of his miracles and conversation. He therefore decreed that the matter should be postponed and that in the meantime Peter's life should be written.[1] Whatever may be the truth about the postponement of Peter's canonization by Alexander III it is evident that by the time of that pope's death the principle of proceeding with great deliberation and care in these matters was firmly established. Peter of Tarentaise had been a great servant of the papacy and was renowned throughout Western Europe for his holiness, but this was allowed to make no difference to the due legal process of canonization.

The interest in the canonization of Anno of Cologne turns again on the powers of papal legates. In 1181 Cardinal Peter of Pavia came to the abbey of Siegburg near Cologne for a short rest and retreat.[2] There the life of Anno, Archbishop of Cologne, who had died in 1075 and was buried at Siegburg was read to him. He seems not to have appreciated it at first but on a second reading he began to enquire whether the blessed Anno had been received by the Church into the canon of saints and was venerated as other saints were. He was told that it had not occurred to any of the abbots to proceed in the matter because the task of negotiating a canonization in Rome seemed too much for them. The cardinal reproved the monks for having neglected the treasure which lay among them, and when they asked whether he could promote the case in virtue of his legatine office he replied: *plane inesse, ita dumtaxat, si hoc in mandatis domini papae accepisset.*[3] As a result the abbot of Siegburg set off for Rome to ask for the canonization of Anno. He arrived, however, two months after Alexander III had died and the case was dealt with by Lucius III. The subsequent history of it is rather complicated. Briefly we may say that the abbot at first had no success, but on 29 April 1183 Anno's body was translated by two papal legates who acted under the impression that a letter from the pope authorising them to do this had been issued but had gone astray through

[1] *Act. SS. May*, ii, p. 322.

[2] See H. Delehaye, 'Pierre de Pavie, légat du pape Alexandre III en France', in *Revue des Questions historiques*, vol. 49, new series, no. 5, 1891, pp. 1–61, and W. Ohnsorge, *Päpstliche und gegenpäpstliche Legaten in Deutschland und Skandinavien, 1159–1181, Historische Studien no. 188*, 1929, p. 82.

[3] *Translatio S. Annonis archiepiscopi, M.G.H., Script.* xi, p. 515.

the death of the messenger. It is most probable that they were mistaken as to the contents of the missing letter. A difference of opinion arose at Cologne about the validity of the translation and the matter was not finally settled until the pope authorised another legate, archbishop Philip of Cologne, to confirm it.[1] It is at least plain that the exclusive papal right of canonization was accepted at Cologne in 1181 and that it was further held that a legate could not canonize without an explicit papal mandate to do so.

We have now examined twelve cases of canonization begun or completed during the twenty-two years of Alexander III's pontificate. No previous pope had dealt with so many and over so long a period. We are now in a position to compare the situation in 1181 with that in 1159. It will be evident that the procedure of canonization has become clearly established. The case is promoted by the local ordinary, or the superior of a religious community with which the deceased was connected. Written evidence is regarded as essential and there is a careful enquiry into the virtues and miracles of the proposed saint. Sometimes, as in the case of Becket, this is done by sending legates to investigate miracles in the country of their occurrence, but most often witnesses are produced at Rome. The theory of canonizing only in a general council seems to have been finally abandoned and the pope contents himself with the advice of the cardinals. In two cases we have seen that the pope marked the canonization by celebrating the first Mass in honour of the new saint.

The distinction between beatification and canonization has now been clearly made and the case of William of Malavalle has become the *locus classicus* for it. Connected with this, however, is the question of legatine powers which is more puzzling. We have seen Becket given a mandate for the canonization of St. Anselm in 1163 and the case of Anno of Cologne shows a view firmly held in 1181 that a legate could not canonize without explicit permission to do so, the right of canonizing was not included in the general legatine commission. The problem is how to fit the actions of Cardinal Hyacinth into the picture. In the case of St. Rosendo Hyacinth's own words seem to show that he was acting in virtue of his general legatine commission, there is no evidence that he received a special mandate and it is incredible that he should consciously have exceeded his

[1] See the *Translatio S. Annonis;* T. J. Lacomblet, *Urkundenbuch für die Geschichte des Niederrheins* (1840), i. 343, no. 486; and A. Brackmann, 'Zur Kanonisation des Erzbischöfs Anno von Köln', in *Neues Archiv für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde*, vol. 32 (1906–7), pp. 157 ff.

powers. The Bollandists,[1] following the teaching of Benedict XIV,[2] suggest that a legate had power only to beatify, and that therefore Hyacinth beatified Rosendo as legate and canonized him as pope. There is, however, little contemporary evidence to support this view. In the first of the two clear examples noted above of legates taking part in canonizations before 1159 there is nothing whatever to indicate that Conon of Praeneste considered himself to be assenting only to a local cult of Arnulf of Soissons. In the second the legate Octavian did indeed allow only a limited veneration of Bernward of Hildesheim, but there is nothing to show that this was because he felt he had no power to do more. This theory savours rather of anachronism. It is perhaps more plausible to suggest that at the time of Hyacinth's second Spanish legation the powers of legates in this respect were not clearly defined but that by 1181 the position had been clarified and that in view of this Hyacinth felt it desirable to confirm his earlier actions when he had become pope.

The general impression made by the pontificate of Alexander III is that the pope was quite certain of his right to control the veneration of any new saints. We have noted expressions of this view in England and at Cologne and it seems to be implied also by the pope's deliberation in the case of such an important person as St. Bernard. If Alexander had had any doubt about the recognition of his exclusive right of canonization it is inconceivable that he should have taken ten years to canonize St. Bernard. Similarly if he had felt it necessary to vindicate this right it is likely that he would have taken advantage of the many petitions presented to him, to create precedents. His discouraging attitude to petitioners, his care about all the details of the process, his unwillingness to deal with more than one case at a time all seem to imply a considerable security in his position, and this view is confirmed by his one definite expression of opinion on the subject.

At some date during the last ten years of his life Alexander wrote a long and important letter to King Canute of Sweden.[3] In it he gives instruction on the nature of Christian marriage, the sanctity of the marriage bond, the prohibited degrees. Then he turns to the honour to be shown to bishops and other ecclesiastics, and to the payment of tithes. He condemns the

[1] *Act. SS. Oct.* vii, p. 1161.

[2] *De servorum Dei beatificatione et beatorum canonizatione*, Lib. i, cap. ix, n. 7.

[3] Probably 1171, 1172, or 1181, the only years in which Alexander seems to have been at Tusculum on July 6th which is the date of the letter. *P.L.*, 200, col. 1259.

practice of persons leaving all their goods to the Church and disinheriting their children, and he says that the wives of men who have been taken prisoner in war may not marry again during the husband's lifetime. Finally, the pope writes, he has heard that some of the Swedes are venerating as a saint a man who was killed while drunk. He expresses the Church's horror of drunkenness and warns the Swedes to avoid it in future and no longer to venerate the person in question, on peril of their souls, *cum etiamsi signa et miracula per eum plurima fierent, non liceret vobis pro sancto absque auctoritate Romanae ecclesiae eum publice venerari.* The letter concludes with a dispensation from the Lent before Michaelmas, and a commendation of the messenger.

The section concerning the drunkard venerated as a saint is found in the Decretals of Gregory IX as *cap.* 1, *Audivimus*, X. 1. xlv, and has become the *locus classicus* for the papal reservation of the right of canonization. Most writers on the subject treat Alexander III as the person who first formally reserved this right to the papacy.[1] Recently this view has been attacked by Dr. Kuttner, who has investigated the history of the decretal *Audivimus*.[2] He finds it first in the two purely English Cottonian collections (1179–91), in one of which it appears under the rubric *Non est pro sancto colendus per quem in ebrietate occisum fiunt miracula.* During the first years of Innocent III it was taken up by another group of English collections in two of which it appears with the bull of Becket's canonization under the rubric *Quod necessaria sit auctoritas Romani pontificis ad hoc, quod aliquis pro sancto habeatur.* In 1206 it appears in the collection of Master Alan, a Bolognese professor of English origin, and from there in 1210 it passed into the collection of Jean Galles, number two of the *Quinque compilationes* used by St. Raymund of Peñaforte as the sources for the Gregorian collection of 1234. Even so, Dr. Kuttner points out, it was not until after 1217 that the continental glossators regarded it as anything more than the prohibition of the veneration of a drunkard, and then it was due to the influence of a canon of the fourth Lateran Council.[3]

Dr. Kuttner seems to have proved conclusively that Alexander III can no longer be regarded as responsible for the formal reservation of the right of canonization to the papacy,

[1] E.g. Z. B. van Espen, *Jus Ecclesiasticum universum*, pars i, tit. xxii, cap. vii, n. xiv; *Dictionnaire de droit canonique*, ed. R. Naz, Article *Causes de béatification et de canonisation*, vol. iii, p. 12.

[2] S. Kuttner, 'La réserve papale du droit de canonisation', *Revue historique de Droit français et étranger*, 1938, pp. 172–228.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 196–9.

but his argument about the letter to Canute of Sweden must be regarded with more suspicion. He points out that in all other sections of the letter Alexander teaches but does not decree, and that *Audivimus* is the only part in which a particular case is treated and a judicial sentence given. The expression is *hominem illum, that* man, not *aliquem* or even *talem*. If Alexander had intended to announce a far-reaching change in the law why did he choose this obscure method of doing it, why not proclaim it in connection with say, the canonization of Becket? It must be therefore that this is a particular case and that Alexander is claiming this privilege only as regards this newly converted people.[1] We have tried to examine Alexander's practice in canonization fairly and without reference to this particular controversy. If our conclusions are correct we shall agree with Dr. Kuttner that the pope had no intention of making a far-reaching change in the law, but we should maintain that his words are not intended for Sweden only but are an expression of what he believed to be the law, possibly unwritten and customary, but still the law about the papacy and canonization. The evidence of the glossators is perhaps not so impressive when we remember how very small a place canonization occupied in the full-blown *Corpus juris canonici*. It was not a subject which was of much practical concern to the Bolognese lawyers, as were problems of marriages or wills or tithes, and it is natural that it should have been left very largely to be determined by custom.

Alexander III can no longer be regarded as the first great papal legislator in this field; but his pontificate emerges from a fresh examination as one of the great periods of the crystallization of ideas about canonization and we see how, long before there was any definite canonical enactment, the papal reservation of canonization was assumed by a great pope and lawyer. But perhaps more important still is the light which this section of history throws upon the growth of canon law, with enactment following practice, and upon the extent to which the law of the medieval Church depended upon customary procedure which never found its way into the official codes.

[1] S. Kuttner, 'La réserve papale du droit de canonisation', *Revue historique de Droit français et étranger*, 1938, pp. 190–6.

THE ORGANISATION OF INDENTURED RETINUES IN FOURTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND

By N. B. Lewis, Ph.D.

Read 11 March 1944

The fourteenth century is an important period in the history of aristocratic retinues in England not only because it was a period of some considerable activity on their part, but because it was one in which their leaders, adapting themselves to the general change in the structure of society, began to develop new forms of retinue organised on the principle of personal contract in place of the old feudal principle of tenurial loyalty.[1]

The appearance of these new retinues is traditionally regarded as a retrograde step in social organisation. They are criticised as a 'bastard' form of feudalism; the personal contract on which they were based is said to have lacked the 'stability of the tenurial relationship'[2]; and they themselves, unlike the 'voluntary associations of lord and man which had prevailed in the tenth century', are described as having been 'unfettered by legal restrictions, and as time went on increasingly indifferent to right and wrong'.[3] In consequence, they helped in a large measure to break up late medieval society by loosening the ties of traditional loyalty and obedience, by dislocating the work of public assemblies, by laying violent hands on disputed property in the interests of their lords, and by giving them the opportunity, if not the motive, for civil war.

And as far as some of the new forms of retinue are concerned the truth of these charges cannot be denied. But there was more than one type of retinue based on the principle of personal contract. The statute[4] of 1390, which deals in greater detail than any previous legislation with the formation of these retinues, recognises three distinct types: first, resident household attendants; secondly, men who are bound by written indenture to serve their lord for life in peace and war; and, thirdly those whose attachment to the lord is shown simply by the acceptance of his fees and the wearing of his

[1] I am indebted to Professor V. H. Galbraith for many helpful criticisms and suggestions in the preparation of this paper.

[2] H. M. Cam, 'The Decline and fall of English feudalism', in *History*, xxv. 225.

[3] J. E. A. Jolliffe, *The constitutional history of medieval England*, p. 424.

[4] 13 Richard II, c. 3; *Stat. Realm*, ii. 75.

badge and livery. And it is against the third of these types that almost all contemporary criticism is directed.[1] It is they who are denounced as 'Maintainers, instigators, barretors, procurers and embracers of quarrels': and whom lords are eventually forbidden to engage, while the other two types are accepted as legitimate and are expressly allowed to wear their master's livery as the outward sign of their allegiance.[2]

In the case of the household attendants the reason for this distinction is plain. It was indispensable for men of property to have servants to administer their affairs, to maintain their state and dignity, and to protect their property and person from attack.[3] And household retainers had, from time immemorial, discharged these services without developing the undesirable characteristics of the purely liveried retainer. Having regular duties and specified rewards they were not under temptation to secure illicit patronage by illegitimate forms of service; living in their lord's immediate presence they could be effectively controlled; and enjoying a stable tenure of office they were not subject to those rapid changes of allegiance which contributed so largely to making the purely liveried retainer a menace to ordered society.[4]

But why indentured retainers should have enjoyed the same approval is not so clear. They were not, like household attendants, old-established members of society in the early fourteenth century; and though the fact that they were retained by indenture implies that they had a more binding attachment to their lords than the purely liveried retainer, it tells us nothing more about their character and functions. And these are the less easy to ascertain because their numbers were never, in all probability, very large and they received, for the greater part of the century, very little public attention; no mention being apparently made in the legislature till the fifth year of Edward III's reign of even the limited group of such retainers who served the king,[5] and no specific legislation being enacted about the general body of indentured retainers

[1] *Stat. Realm*, i. 145, 303, 304; ii. 3, 75.

[2] *Ibid.*, ii. 75: though the right to give livery to retainers of both types is limited to laymen of the rank of banneret upwards, and indentured retainers who receive it must be of the rank of knight or squire.

[3] Public opinion had long recognised the right of magnates to give such retinues their livery; as is shown in the thirteenth-century reference, discovered by Mrs. F. M. Stenton, to the robber chief who clothed his band in uniform 'as if he had been a baron or an earl' (quoted by H. M. Cam, *op. cit.*, p. 224).

[4] Mr. MacFarlane has recently drawn attention ('Parliament and bastard feudalism', *Trans. R. Hist. S.*, 4th Series, xxvi. 70, 71) to the extreme instability of their allegiance and the undesirable results of that instability.

[5] *Rot. Parl.*, ii. 62, § 18, and *Cal. Close Rolls*, 1330–3, p. 390.

till the century was almost over.[1] They were, therefore, at one time, regarded by historians as being essentially a development of the later years of the century when, in the words of Stubbs,[2] 'in the troubled times of Richard II . . . the necessities of private defence compelled the great households to revive the practice of private war'. But of late years an increasing number of much earlier examples of this form of contract has come to light [3] and we now have ample evidence of the existence of indentured retainers from the last decade of the thirteenth century onwards, in the text of some two hundred examples of the contracts, surviving either in the original or in registered copies, and in contemporary references to others whose full text is no longer available.[4]

And from this evidence it seems clear that the indentured retinue played an important part in, and made a valuable contribution to, the working of two contemporary institutions: the contract army, established by Edward I in the closing years of the thirteenth century and brought to its full development by his grandson in the Hundred Years' War,[5] and the baronial household.

Co-operation between the indentured retinue and the contract army was, of course, made easy and natural by the fact that both were based on the same general principle and raised by the same methods. The king, that is, raised his army, as the barons did their retinues, by concluding personal and voluntary contracts with particular individuals to serve under agreed conditions in return for specified payments and allowances: the terms of the agreements being, as in the case of the private retinue, embodied in formal indentured contracts, written out in two identical copies, sealed alternately with the seals of both parties, so that each might have in his possession

[1] Above, p. 30, n. 1.

[2] *Const. Hist.* (5th edit.), p. 559.

[3] e.g. J. E. Morris, *The Welsh wars of Edward I*, p. 278; N. Denholm-Young, *Seignorial administration in England*, p. 23, and J. Conway Davies, *The baronial opposition to Edward II*, p. 36. Mr. Conway Davies also calls attention to the very widespread use of written bonds and verbal oaths of alliance as a means of building up parties and confederacies for political purposes on the principle of personal contract.

[4] Considerations of space prevent the quotation of examples, but considerable numbers are in print in two of the volumes of John of Gaunt's Register published by the R. Hist. Soc., Camden 3 Ser., xx. 288–350, and lvi. 13–26 (referred to below as Reg. I and III respectively). Other printed copies are referred to below and a number are fairly fully summarised in J. Bain, *Cal. of documents relating to Scotland*, ii. nos. 905, 1407, 1899; in the *Catalogues of ancient deeds*, iv. nos. A. 6404 and 8019, v. no. A. 11547, and in Dugdale's *Baronage*, i. 183, 780.

[5] See Morris, *Welsh wars*, and A. E. Prince, 'The indenture system under Edward III', in *Hist. essays in honour of James Tait*, pp. 283–97.

a permanent record of the terms to which he had bound himself, duly authenticated by the seal of the other. And it is clear from the indentures of retinue that most of the retainers so engaged were intended to find a place in the national system. For not only do the great bulk of indentures impose on the retainer the duty of serving under his lord in time of war, but the detailed conditions of this service, as laid down in the contracts, conform very closely to those obtaining in the national system. The retainers, that is, are to bring specified contingents to serve for given periods, they are to receive fees and wages according to their rank, compensation for their horses lost on service and the cost of shipping if the expedition goes abroad; while the lord, in return, enjoys a share of the ransom of the prisoners they capture or other profits of war which they secure.[1]

And from this close association with the contract army the indentured retinue certainly derived considerable support. The king's use of indentured contracts for military service must have helped considerably to spread the use of the indenture of retinue among the aristocracy by familiarising all classes of the nation with the forms of contract organisation. The frequent levy of contract troops by the king enabled lords to increase the size of their retinues, by giving them increased opportunities for employing the retainers in the national army and thereby recouping a part of the cost of their peace-time maintenance. It also facilitated the task of selecting new recruits by bringing lords into contact with potential retainers outside the limited circle of their own neighbourhood and tenantry, and by giving lord and retainer an opportunity of testing each other's quality and of acquiring the mutual loyalty and confidence necessary for the more intimate form of service. And quite possibly it was from the contract army that lords derived the practice of sub-contracting—of engaging retainers, that is, not only to serve in person, but to raise by a series of sub-contracts, a subordinate troop to serve the lord under their command, thereby greatly assisting him to develop and control his retinue by relieving him of the responsibility for selecting, equipping and commanding its rank and file.

The benefits of the association of the contract army and the indentured retinue are not, however, all on one side. In the matter of recruitment, for example, the contracts give no support to the suggestion sometimes made that indentured retainers were merely a selection of military subordinates,

[1] Most of these points are illustrated in John of Gaunt's contracts (above, p. 31, n. 4).

discharged after the war and re-engaged by their commanders for peace-time service. They were engaged, in the overwhelming majority of cases, not by a succession of temporary contracts to serve in war and then in peace, but by one permanent and all-embracing life-contract to serve in both[1]; and though lords may, in some cases, have made their first contact with their retainers by commanding them in the contract army, far more often, it seems from a study of their personal careers, their association developed directly from the ordinary contacts of civilian life and brought recruits to the army who, if they had not entered into the peace-time bond, might not have engaged themselves for purely military service.

And this permanent, life-long character of the military obligation imposed by the indenture of retinue, moreover, strengthened the contract army just at its weakest point. For the king rarely engaged the services of any purely military contractor for more than a single year at a stretch and very often for no more than six or even fewer months.[2] When the campaign was over the troops disbanded, and the king had no guarantee either that any particular commander would be prepared to serve or that his troopers would re-engage themselves with him. So that the contract forces had a fluctuating and somewhat unreliable personnel in comparison with that of the feudal army which they replaced. This defect was remedied, to some extent, within the framework of the military system by individual leaders who drew up purely military sub-contracts with some of their subordinates, engaging them for considerable periods, or even for life, to give military service whenever it might be required.[3] But such contracts are rare and, in the main, it was the members of the indentured retinues, retained to serve their lords for life in peace and war, who mitigated the instability of the contract army by providing a force always ready and under contract to serve whenever it was required. Its numbers may not have been large in proportion to the total size of any troop, but it was at least a nucleus round which the other less stable elements

[1] There are a few temporary contracts for peace service only (e.g. the fifteen months' contract between the earl of Pembroke and Sir Robert Fitzpain (Bain, *op. cit.*, ii. no. 1407)), and a certain number of contracts for limited periods of service in peace and war (e.g. the earl of Hereford's contract with Sir Thomas Mandeville for a year's service (Ancient Deed, L. 1981)), but the vast majority of known contracts in which peace service is included are for life in both peace and war. No instance appears to be known of a retainer being engaged for war and then for peace, or vice versa.

[2] Prince, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

[3] The Black Prince, for example, entered into several such engagements (*Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1377–81, pp. 192, 249 and 345).

could collect, and the support which the indentured retinues gave in this way to the national military system, both by bringing it recruits and by increasing its stability, supplies us with one reason for the favourable attitude to them of contemporary legislation.

A still stronger reason can be found in the relation of the indentured retinue to the baronial household which is revealed by the terms of the indentures. Contracts differ, of course, considerably in the particularity with which they state the terms of service. In some cases they merely lay down in general terms that the retainer shall 'serve' or 'stay with' or 'be retained in the service of' the lord. But in most cases it is clear that regular, personal attendance on the lord and in his household, not only in times of exceptional need, but in the normal occasions of both private and public life, is one of the essential purposes of the retainer's service. Most commonly it is laid down that the retainer shall come to the lord on his summons, and though, in some cases, this liability is limited to service in England or the British Isles, in others it is explicitly extended overseas, sometimes to service in the Holy Land and very often, as in most of John of Gaunt's numerous contracts, to service with the lord 'wherever he will'. And in many cases the nature of the occasions when the retainer may be required to attend is explicitly defined: he shall come to his lord at tournaments,[1] at parliaments and other assemblies [2]: sometimes he is to ride with the lord,[3] to take counsel with him [4] or to join him in his recreations [5]: and not infrequently it is explicitly laid down that he is to be 'menial with the lord',[6] to 'attend him in his court',[7] to 'be in the household' by the lord's command,[8] or, very formally in one case, 'to be in the household at his will, to do him honour and service',[9] So that though the indentured retainer was not, in general, permanently resident in his lord's household,[10]

[1] Henry Percy and Ralph Neville: *Percy Chartulary* (Surtees Society, vol. 117), p. 274.

[2] The earl of Lancaster and Sir Philip Darcy: Ancient Deed, L. 3254.

[3] The earl of Nottingham and Sir Thomas de Clinton: *Patent Roll*, 1 Henry IV, pt. i, m. 15.

[4] See n. 2.

[5] The earl of Lancaster and Sir John Eure: Bodleian Library, MS. Dugdale 18, f. 39 v.

[6] The earl of Warwick and Walter Power: *Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1391–6, p. 465.

[7] The duke of Gloucester and William Cheney: *Patent Roll*, 1 Henry IV, pt. iii, m. 8.

[8] The duke of Exeter and Thomas Proudfoot: *ibid.*, pt. vi, m. 18.

[9] See n. 3.

[10] In one or two cases, as in that of John Darcy, who was retained in 1309 as a yeoman 'to serve diligently about the person' of the earl of Pembroke (Ancient Deed, L. 6404), it seems that the retainer must have been in

his regular duties were clearly those of a household and personal attendant. And even in the discharge of his military obligations he was simply continuing or reviving an older household tradition. For, as Professor Stenton has shown,[1] in the early days of the feudal régime in England, it was with knights retained in his household that the tenant-in-chief discharged his feudal service. The process of sub-infeudation no doubt relieved the majority of household knights of this form of service in due course, but it never, perhaps, entirely died out; and even as late as 1276 we find a tenant-in-chief, Maurice de Berkeley, proffering his feudal service of three knights in the persons of himself, his son and one of his domestic knights.[2]

The same identity with normal household service is equally apparent in some of the rewards which the indentured retainer received [3]—diet at the lord's table for himself and his subordi-

more or less constant attendance. But the statute of 1390, as we have seen, makes a clear distinction between the indentured retainer and the resident household attendant (above p. 29), and in the great majority of cases the contracts also make it clear, either by laying down that the retainer shall come to the lord whenever he is summoned, or by specifying, as most of John of Gaunt's contracts do (p. 31, n. 4), that he shall have wages or travelling expenses from the time when he leaves his own home on the lord's summons, that normally he maintained his own household and came into residence or attendance on the lord, only for limited periods as and when he was required. And sometimes the lord is under obligation to give quite a substantial period of notice of his requirements—a month in the case of Hugh Despenser and Sir Peter Ovedale (*Cat. anc. deeds*, iv. no. A 8019).

But this intermittency of attendance was probably common among existing forms of household retinue. Knights and squires who had estates of their own must have had substantial periods of leave to attend to their affairs; and we find indications of an arrangement similar to that of the fourteenth-century indentured retainer, for example, in Walter Map's statement (De Nugis Curialium, Camden Soc. vol. I. Dist. V, Ch. vi. p. 224) of Henry I of England: 'Quemcunque juvenem infra montes Alpium audiebat captantem boni famam principii ascribebat familiae . . . et quandocunque contigisset ab ipso mandari, suscipiebat in adventu suo singulis diebus a recessu residentiae suae singulos solidos.'

[1] *First century of English feudalism*, pp. 139–45.

[2] John Smyth, in his *Lives of the Berkeleys* (vol. i, p. 169), gives the names of the three knights and, relying presumably on a household account or other family record, states that the third member of the troop was a 'domesticke knight' of the leader. And as far as the names of the three are concerned he is confirmed by the official Marshal's register in *Parl. Writs.*, i. 212.

[3] These, like the exact extent of the services to be rendered, vary considerably from one retinue to another, and even between members of the same retinue holding the same rank and having the same obligations. And some of them, it is true, do not necessarily imply personal attendance. The commonest and most valuable of all, for example the fixed annual fee, paid generally in cash from a specified treasury or manor, or sometimes, as in the earl of Norfolk's contract with Sir John Segrave (N. Denholm-Young, *op. cit.*, p. 167), taking the form of an outright grant of land itself: or the equally common grant of robes and saddles, although normal forms of reward to the household attendant, are not necessarily proof of residence. But the other forms of allowance, which are compatible only with residence, are equally common and almost equally important.

nates, fodder and supplies for his horses, and the explicit grant of 'household wages'[1] being compatible only with personal attendance. In some cases also there are such obviously domestic allowances as that of candles for the retainer's room,[2] while in one contract, that of Sir Thomas Berkeley with the earl of Pembroke,[3] it is explicitly laid down that the retainer shall be provided with lodging in the household if there is surplus room when the regular attendants are accommodated.

It is clear, therefore, that in the nature, both of his services and of his rewards, the position of the indentured retainer was almost identical with that of the already-existing household knight; and the only material difference between the two is that the lords, in their perpetual search for new ways of ensuring the personal loyalty of their followers, had imposed on them the obligation of giving a binding written acknowledgment of their undertakings.

This difference, however, is fundamental, because it brought a new element of stability into the retainer's relations with his lord. They had not, of course, the stability of the tenurial relationship but, on the other hand, they avoided the rigidity of the hereditary bond which must, at times, have strained the tenant's personal loyalty. Lord and retainer, in the indentured relationship, had complete freedom in their choice of each other and, normally, took full advantage of this freedom to make as sure as possible that the choice would be congenial enough to be enduring. Very frequently lords and retainers were men whose geographical proximity gave them considerable opportunity of realising each other's character and capacity. And it seems, further, that often enough the retainer would serve the lord, intermittently or continuously, for a considerable period before the binding indentured contract was entered into. In some cases the contracts themselves make this clear by stating that the retainer's fee is the reward, not only of the services he is undertaking in the future, but of the good service he has already given in the past,[4] and in some retinues we can find cases of retainers who seem to have done as much as fifteen years' probationary service before entering on their formal indentures.[5]

[1] The duke of Exeter and Thomas Proudfoot. (Above, p. 34, n. 8.)
[2] The earl of Lancaster and Sir Philip Darcy. (Above, *ib.*, n. 2).
[3] Exch. Accts., 68/1, m. 1: summarised by Bain, *op. cit.*, ii. no. 905.
[4] e.g. Henry, earl of Lancaster and Sir Edmund Ufford (Ancient Deed, L.S. 155): the earl of Salisbury and Sir Edmund Doumer (*ibid.*, B. 4915): *Gaunt's Register*, i. nos. 802, 823, 835 and 849.
[5] Henry Green, for instance, whose name appears in the list of John of Gaunt's knights drawn up between 1379 and 1383 (Reg. III, p. 7), and who, as early as November 1379, was drawing a fee as 'nostre bien ame

But once the indenture was concluded it was a very stable and a strictly binding contract. From the retainer's point of view the obligation it established was an exclusive and an overriding one, binding him not only to serve his lord, but to serve him 'before all others'[1] and to serve him on all occasions within the scope of the agreement. Some relaxation of this absolute obligation might, it is true, be made in individual cases. Contracts, for example, sometimes exempt the retainer from service on an occasion when his own affairs urgently require his personal attention—as for a lawsuit; he may have latitude to decide for himself, in the case of any particular campaign or Crusade, if he will go or not[2]; or if, on the other hand, the lord decides not to go on some particular Crusade[3] or expedition,[4] or if he doesn't require the retainer for a particular tourney,[5] the retainer may, for that occasion, take service with some other lord. On the other hand, the retainer may have to seek the lord's permission to go abroad on his own affairs[6] and, in any case, the lord to whom he is indentured has always the first claim and, normally, the only claim on his services. Unlike the lawyer who may take retaining fees from many clients, or even the feudal tenant who may hold lands from many overlords, his allegiance, once pledged, is indivisible.[7]

And not only is it exclusive but, normally at any rate, it is also permanent. For though, in a few cases, as we have seen, the duration of the bond is limited to a short period of months or years or is left indefinite,[8] in the majority of cases the engagement is for life: and contracts frequently give very

bacheler' (Duchy of Lancaster Misc. Books, 14, f. 20), does not seem to have been indentured till 1391 (*Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1396–9, p. 522). Similarly, though the name of William Holme appears in the list of squires in 1379–83 (Reg. III, p. 11), there is no indenture for anyone of that name till 1397 (*ibid.*, p. 564).

[1] The duke of Exeter and Thomas Proudfoot esq. (above, p. 34, n. 8).

[2] As in William Daventre's contract (*Pat. Roll*, 1 Henry IV, pt. v, m. 24).

[3] The earl of Hereford and Sir Bartholomew Denefeud (Bain, *op. cit.*, ii, no. 1899).

[4] John of Gaunt and Sir William Beauchamp (Reg. I, no. 832, p. 332). William Daventre also, apparently, is free to go to war with another leader if his lord gives permission (above, n. 2).

[5] The earl of Pembroke and John Darcy (*Cat. Anc. Deeds*, v. no. A. 11547).

[6] As in William Daventre's contract (above, n. 2).

[7] This is stated with particular explicitness in the very detailed and interesting contract of Sir John Segrave with the earl of Norfolk printed by Mr. Denholm-Young (*op. cit.*, p. 168) and referred to above (p. 35, n. 3): 'E il ne lyra james al avaunt dist sir Johan, taunt come le dist counte vist, a autre seignur demorer por nul fee ne bienfet ke em lui pusse doner saunz le gre e le volunte le Counte e ceo ad il premis e plein au Counte en sa bone leaute.'

[8] Above, p. 33, n. 1. Other examples are: Hugh le Despenser the elder and Sir Robert Fitzwalter for six months (Ancient Deed, A.S. 271); the earl of Pembroke and Sir Thomas Berkeley for an indefinite period (Bain, *op. cit.*, ii. no. 905).

explicit safeguards to ensure the fulfilment of the bargain on both sides. In one extreme case the retainer is even protected by a clause laying down that he shall not be dismissed except for reasonable cause: the reasonableness of the cause being judged by a tribunal of five independent arbitrators whose names are included in the contract, and who are also empowered to deal with any complaints which either the lord or his retainer may have against each other.[1] And it is quite common for the lord to give security to the retainer by submitting lands on which the retainer's fee is assigned to distraint if the fee is withheld or is in arrear for more than a limited period.[2]

The lord similarly is provided with safeguards against failure of service on the part of the retainer. Sometimes the retainer reinforces his written bond by a solemn oath on the Gospels to observe its terms [3]; in other cases he, like the lord, submits his lands and property to distraint or enters into recognisances for the payment of a substantial sum—sometimes as much as a thousand marks—if he is found at any time to have failed in loyalty to the lord.[4] And quite commonly the contract contains a clause explicitly entitling the lord to withhold payment of the retainer's fee or to cancel it altogether if he fails in the performance of his services.[5]

And the retainer had a further strong incentive, once he had engaged himself, to fulfil his obligations loyally. For the annual fee which was his principal reward was not only a payment for active service during the joint lives of himself and his lord, but was a pension which he continued to draw without further service if he had remained faithful to his engagements during the lord's life and survived him after his death. Contracts, in fact, sometimes explicitly submit the lands and property of the lord's heirs to distraint as security for the payment of these pensions [6]; and the number of retainers who sought confirmation of them from the king after their lords' death,[7] shows not only how much importance was

[1] Sir Ralph Hastings and John de Kirkby (Huntington Library, Hastings MS., no. 934: summarised in Hist. MSS. Comm., no. 78 (Hastings MSS.), vol. i, p. 198.

[2] e.g. Reg. I, nos. 830, 832.

[3] The earl of Lancaster and Sir Philip Darcy (Ancient Deed, L. 3254).

[4] The younger Despenser and Sir Peter Ovedale (*Cat. Anc. Deeds*, iv. no. A. 8019); Sir Stephen Segrave and Sir Nicholas Cryel (Berkeley Castle, *Select charters*, no. 490).

[5] See n. 3.

[6] Sir John Bluet and William Marcel (British Museum, Addit. Chart., no. 1531) and the earl of Hereford and William de Stapleton (*Pat. Roll*, 47 Ed. III, pt. i, m. 23).

[7] Many of John Gaunt's retainers, for example, secured confirmation of their indentures after his death (*Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1396–9, pp. 489–593), and

attached to them, but also how many retainers were enabled, by loyal service, to enjoy them. Although, therefore, the personal ties of the fourteenth century may not have been, in general, as stable as the tenurial ones of the feudal régime, the indentured retinue was certainly a steadying influence in a society where old institutional loyalties were breaking down and new ones had not yet fully developed to take their place. Its services in this respect were, perhaps, even greater than those it rendered in the military sphere : and the two forms of service together fully explain and justify the approval accorded to the indentured retinue by the constitutional mouthpiece of contemporary opinion.

the Black Prince's retainers, similarly, after his death, in the early months of Richard II's reign (*ibid.*, 1377–81, pp. 155, 159, 161, and 209). Confirmation of the indentures of private persons are found from time to time on the patent rolls of Edward III's and Richard II's reigns.

PETITIONS FOR BENEFICES FROM ENGLISH UNIVERSITIES DURING THE GREAT SCHISM

By Professor E. F. Jacob, D.Phil., F.S.A., F.R.Hist.S.

Read 16 October 1943

Few topics in ecclesiastical history have demanded so much revision and revaluation as the papal collation of benefices. Earlier generations of historians, even if they treated with reserve the criticism of provisions voiced by Matthew Paris, nevertheless regarded the successive general reservations from 1265 to 1362 as a glaring invasion of the rights of ordinary collators: *juris ordinariorum locorum usurpacio*, as Dietrich of Niem called them in 1410.[1] Papal provisions of whatsoever category were represented as acts of administrative intervention which aroused national feeling, especially in this country, to statutory counter-measures; as an abuse, not only because they introduced the non-resident alien into the English dioceses, but also because they diverted the normally resident incumbent from his cure in order to defend his title at the Court of Rome.[2]

In more recent years, with the growth of administrative studies, opinion has reacted sharply, perhaps even a little too emphatically, along lines which might be termed respectively diplomatic and canonist. The diplomatic method of approach to papal provisions in England is to view them, at all events until the second version of the Statute of Provisors (Jan. 1390) and the outbreak of the struggle between England and Boniface IX, as a working, though somewhat precarious, system of give and take between a monarch determined to utilize every available means to assert his rights of patronage, primarily in the interests of his own servants; and the Pope, whose eyes were chiefly turned towards the chapters of the English secular cathedrals, to provide for his brethren the cardinals and for the senior members of his own court. The second half of the fourteenth century, as M. Perroy's studies indicate, was a time of periodical (though increasing) friction and periodical (though increasingly unstable) settlement.[3] Upon

[1] Dietrich von Niem, *Dialog über Union und Reform der Kirche*, ed. Heimpel, p. 19.

[2] For a modern expression of this view, cf. L. E. Binns, *The decline of the medieval papacy* (1934), p. 118.

[3] E. Perroy, *L'Angleterre et le grand schisme d'occident* (1933), esp. chapters i, vii and viii.

this reckoning, provisions constitute one aspect, perhaps the predominant aspect, of the intercourse between two administrative organisations, royal and papal. This is an interesting, and in some ways an important conception ; but its emphasis on the professional element rather narrows the field and may hide the activity both of communities and of significant individuals that had no particular connexion with the Crown except for the fact that between 1351 and 1390 they had to buy a licence to seek the Curia.

The second, or canonist, method of approach, is more fundamental, and centres upon the act of provision. A papal letter of grace providing to a benefice is not to be interpreted as a final administrative mandate for A or B to be put in possession of this or that benefice ; but rather as a document initiating a *processus* which is to be carried to its legal termination by a group of *executores*, invariably the recipients of a mandate, concurrent with the provision, to inquire into the legal aspects of the grace and to discharge functions which are as much judicial as executive. In other words, the executors of a provision, even if it is their business to carry it to a conclusion, are inquisitors first and foremost. While, therefore, the disposal of benefices was an act of administration and in strict law could be carried out without any judicial action, in practice authoritarian action was avoided. To quote a recent opinion :

> As long as legitimate defence was not excluded, as long as the practice of provisions was governed by fixed juridical principles, as long as both sides had a recognised opportunity to maintain their own rights and to traverse the claims of their adversaries, there was no danger of the system of papal provision resulting more than any other method of distributing benefices, in injury to private rights, derogation of the public law of the Church, or impairment of the high standards of Church government.[1]

Petitions for provision, the favourable response (if given), and the letter conferring it should, if this view is correct, be regarded as the approach to promotion rather than as promotion itself. They are, in fact, a method of setting the machinery going. It was possible, though far from certain, that the petitioner would get something : by no means necessarily the actual benefice sought. For many clerks personally unknown to potential patrons it was a way of exploring the

[1] G. Barraclough, ' The executors of Papal provisions in the Canonical theory of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries ', *Acta Congressus Iuridici Internationalis Romae 12–17 Novembris 1934* (Rome, 1936), p. 44.

resources of patronage, of bringing their names forward for consideration.

The channels for the submission of such petitions were very important. It was advisable to find the best post-office to Rome. Well-sponsored collective petitions in the fourteenth century were more expeditious than individual requests that went into the *communis data* and had no priority in the office of the papal signature; and there was a resulting economy in the expenses of transit. For the curial administrator, a tidy *rotulus* was better than a mass of individual schedules, whether the petitions were about the same subject or not. It seems likely that in the early days the grouping of the humbler sort of petitioners for benefices was done at the Curia, perhaps by some clerk of the *signatura*: the petition of 1343 containing the names of seventeen poor clerks from various English dioceses (along with those of others seeking the office of public notary),[1] the groups supplicating in 1345,[2] the list of 'poor priests and others' in 1348,[3] may well be of curial compilation; and so too the roll of English *Romipetae*, graduates and priests, in 1363, which is followed in the Register by a lengthy collection of English clerks asking for benefices.[4] The persons included in these seem to have no English patrons to forward their claims, do not figure in the household lists of *beneficiandi* submitted by magnates or prominent ecclesiastics. Yet by the middle of the fourteenth century most petitioners appear to be finding sponsors and to be on somebody's roll. The 'competition of rolls' (*concurrencium pressurae rotulorum*) of which the University of Cambridge a little later so bitterly complained,[5] was a reality; and at least by the pontificate of Urban V, if not somewhat earlier, the headings of the *rotuli* indicate that they were compiled locally (e.g. a royal personage or an important magnate would have his own list),[6] while the proctor in the Curia employed by the petitioner-in-chief would, where necessary, make the required 'reformation' or re-draft, so that the petitions might conform to the rules of the Chancery or take account of facts and conditions unknown to the sender.

The actual date at which English universities began to

[1] *Cal. Papal Registers, Petitions*, i, pp. 54–5.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 95–6. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 136.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 426–35; cf. the 'Roll of the English', pp. 447 f., 484–9, 501–2. For *rotuli* under John XXII, cf. *Regulae Cancellariae Apostolicae*, ed. E. von Ottenthal, p. 2.
[5] In the first petition of the 'Colville' roll, described below.
[6] e.g. Roll of the Black Prince (1363), *Cal. Papal Reg., Petitions*, i. 454–6; the earl of Warwick (1364), *ibid.*, 493–5.

collect and forward to Avignon the petitions of their scholars and graduates for benefices is uncertain. Rashdall thought that it might have been in the pontificate of John XXII or Clement VI; he pointed out that the first actual benefice-roll sent by the University of Paris dates from the time of Clement VI.[1] The first uncontested example, in fact, dates from February 1335, when in letters to the king, the queen, and the bishop of Lincoln, the University of Oxford asked support for the petitions on behalf of regent and non-regent masters, which were being sent to the newly-created Benedict XII.[2] The letter to the king refers to the practice of according graces *in summorum pontificum novis creacionibus*.[3] Between March 1337 and July 1338 the University made a second appeal, this time for regents alone,[4] and it is quite likely that a *rotulus* was prepared, for when the University asked the chancellor, Robert de Stratford, to use his influence with the king in support of their request, the chancellor asked to see 'the petitions'. It is unlikely that he would be prepared to wade through a file of supplications: it must have been a list for which he asked, and, curiously enough, the list that he wanted to see was not forthcoming, because Simon de Bredon, one of the proctors and so the possessor of a key to the chest, disagreed with it and would not allow the seal to be used. The university appears to have decided that the outgoing proctors should have precedence in the list before the incoming, and Simon was one of the new proctors.[5] That in 1337–8 it was the regent masters [6] who received consideration, is suggested by the return made to the earlier practice in 1344, when it was decided that 'at each new papal creation, when the University writes for regents to secure grants, it should also write for non-regents who wish (to be included), the lists (*cedule*) being collected together, sealed however with the single seal of the University, the same date being kept

[1] *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, ed. F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden, i. 555 n.: 'several Oxford rolls sent to Clement VI are among the Roman transcripts sent to the Public Record Office by Mr. Bliss'. (Doubtless there is a reference here to the Oxford roll of 1343 printed by Bliss in *Cal. Papal Reg., Petitions*, i. 60.) His editors call attention to the provisions for Fellows of Merton College sought and accorded in 1317, which, they think, indicates something analogous: *Universities of Europe, loc. cit.*

[2] 'Qil vullie de sa grace otreier les peticions queles lui seront purposees de par la Universite, en purvoiant au ditz maistres dauquns benefices de saint eglise': *Formularies which bear on the history of Oxford, c. 1204–1420*, ed. H. E. Salter, W. A. Pantin, and H. G. Richardson (Oxf. Hist. Soc., New Series, IV), i. 87. Mr. Pantin calls my attention to *Ibid.*, i. 33 (1318).

[3] *Ibid.*, i. 86. [4] *Ibid.*, i. 90–1. [5] *Ibid.*, i. 92.

[6] For a comparison of the rights of regents and non-regents at Oxford, cf. S. Gibson, *Statuta antiqua Universitatis Oxoniensis*, pp. xxii f.

in both lists for composition, sealing, and presentation to the supreme pontiff';[1] in other words, precautions were taken against any list or group of names being inserted as an afterthought. This mention of the papal creation makes more than doubtful, as far as Oxford in the fourteenth century was concerned, Rashdall's statement that the *rotulus* was an annual affair, whatever may have been the continental practice. The papal Registers of Supplications certainly do not support his view as regards England; and the examples from both universities which I shall briefly review, are mainly creation or jubilee rolls.

By 1362 the competition of non-university interests was becoming felt; for in that year Archbishops Islip and Thoresby and the bishops of Exeter, Rochester, Ely and Ossory sought and were accorded permission to confer a limited number of benefices upon masters of theology and doctors of canon and civil law owing to the pressure of non-university provisors with expectatives. The archbishops could confer six each, the bishops three.[2] At the end of the year, however, as the result of Urban V's creation, both universities submitted *rotuli*,[3] while at the end of January 1363 another *rotulus* was forthcoming from English jurists and artists with academic degrees being then present in the Roman Curia. The long roll of non-graduate *Romipetae*, to which I have alluded, was also submitted in 1363, so that the pressure of other interests is evident. The Oxford list, both for regents and non-regents, was followed by an additional petition for persons not contained in the former roll[4]; furthermore, the Cambridge roll[5] received two supplements,[6] one of which is termed in the Register of Supplications a *reformatio* or modification, revising or re-wording some of the petitions (e.g. since by inadvertence it was omitted to state whether the benefices asked for were with or without cure, the pope is prayed to extend the grant so as to include both). No mention of any Cambridge *nuncius* occurs, but shortly afterwards the undated reply to a petition shows that the chancellor himself, Dr. Michael Causton the elder, had seen fit to go to the Curia, perhaps to 'labour' there on behalf of his graduates.[7] We

[1] Gibson, *Statuta*, p. 143: 'diversis cedulis colligatis, unico tamen sigillo universitatis consignatis, eadem data concepcionis, consignacionis ac summo pontifici presentacionis utriusque cedule conservatis'. 'Conservata' would be the form expected, but this is a sense construction.

[2] *Cal. Papal Reg., Petitions*, i. 387.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 390–2.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 404–8.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 404–8.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 435–8; 441–2.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 408.

also know the names of three Cambridge men who were there too: William de Gotham, described as 'of the dioceses of Lincoln and Evreux'[1]; Robert de Wistow, *rectius* Robert Weston, who complained that he had been left out of the roll,[2] and Michael Causton the younger, then only a B.A. and 23, but included in the roll, who was praying for a dispensation on account of age.[3] Whether Gotham, Weston and the younger Causton presented the roll or followed it in order to secure a *reformatio* to meet their cases, there seems no way of knowing. The mention of numerous errors and omissions in the composition of the roll shows, as we have suggested, that making it up was a ticklish business. The order of the petitioners had to be correct, both as regards status and degree; the wording of the supplications had to comply with the requirements of the Chancery: any error or omission called for an *emendatio*, so that a long roll demanded quite a list of *addenda* and *corrigenda*.

Much of the technique of composition can be illustrated from the drafts of three *rotuli* from the second half of the fourteenth century in the possession of the University Registry, Cambridge.[4] Extensive notes on these rolls, with lists of petitioners, were made by the late Dr. A. H. Lloyd, the historian of Christ's College, and by his daughter, the late Miss M. E. H. Lloyd.[5] Through the generosity of Mrs. Lloyd, who sent me all the relevant papers of her husband and her daughter at the kind suggestion of Mr. J. Harold Brown, Hon. Secretary to the Governors of the John Rylands Library, I have been

[1] 'Whereas he is of that of York': *Cal. Papal Reg., Petitions*, i., pp. 411, 415.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 415.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 415–16. *Alumni Cantabrigienses* does not distinguish between the two Caustons, both named Michael, both of the same diocese (Norwich). The elder was chancellor of Cambridge University in 1361, 1362, 1363, rector of East Dereham in 1371 and until his death in 1396 (Reg. Fordham, fo. 53); the younger was B.A. in 1363 (when the elder was S.T.P.). In 1370, when he petitioned for a canonry and prebend in Chichester, Michael Causton junior is described as clerk of the diocese of Norwich, M.A., scholar of laws, and rector of Hamerton (Hunts, a living in the gift of the abbot and convent of St. John of Colchester). He was fellow of Pembroke, whereas the elder Causton was master of Michaelhouse.

[4] Cambridge University Registry, 'Livings', no. 1.

[5] Their interest in the rolls was partly biographical. It was clear to them that the 360 petitions there contained added a considerable number of new names (c. 258) to *Alumni Cantabrigienses*; and they made a number of valuable biographical notes on these newly revealed members of the university. Had they carried these biographies further, it would have become equally clear that a number of the petitioners were as distinguished as, if not more distinguished than, their Oxford contemporaries. In helping her father, Miss Lloyd had embarked upon a prolonged study of curial procedure; and if her researches into papal administrative history were unhappily cut short, she had at any rate begun to face some of the more difficult archival and administrative problems raised by the Cambridge rolls.

able to study their notes, many from the Vatican Archives, while through the courtesy of the University registry I have been allowed to inspect a draft of the longest of the rolls.[1]

More than 200 years previously the Cambridge antiquary, Thomas Baker, had made brief extracts from these rolls of petitions, which he found at the Registry in the cylinder (*capsula*) marked P, when he was planning an *Athenae Cantabrigienses*. His nomenclature for the first of the three was *Rotulus vetustior*, which we may adopt. This is the earliest, and contains 75 names. It is not in order of degrees, as the other two are, and the fact suggests that it is an early draft, perhaps an incomplete draft, of the final roll. In the two later Cambridge rolls, masters (i.e. professors) of theology and doctors of decrees and doctors of laws stand first: then the rolls differ. The earlier of the two puts the bachelors of laws, decrees and the scholars in canon law, theology and laws, in front of the masters of arts; the later places masters of arts just after doctors of laws, and the bachelors of laws and decrees at the end.[2] The dating of *Vetustior* can be gauged with some degree of accuracy. The *regesta Avinionensia* (Vatican Archives) contain the majority of provisions solicited in *Vetustior*, most of them granted in February, 1 Gregory XI (Feb. 1371). Now on Roll 173 of that series, under similar dates, is to be found a parallel group of provisions accorded to graduates of Oxford, when the name of the Oxford *nuntius* who presented the roll, John Mandour, LL.B., is given. These university rolls, *Vetustior* and the Oxford list, must have been prepared in 1370, and sent to Avignon late that year for the creation of Gregory XI.

The second Cambridge *rotulus*, of the time of the chancellor William Colville (which we may accordingly term *Colville*) survives in one complete copy, one slightly less complete draft, and several small and incomplete rough drafts. This little series shows how much time and care the composition of a *rotulus* must have involved. The scribe may have begun copying either before the full complement of petitions had come in or before the order of the petitioners had been fully settled. In the longest version, Colville contains no less than 265 petitioners, including nine members under age and three

[1] My thanks are due to Mr. William Baker, of the University Registry, for these facilities. Owing to circumstances arising from the war, I was unable to see the originals of the first and third of the rolls, and have to rely on Dr. Lloyd's full and careful calendar of the petitions they contain.

[2] The Paris *rotuli* put doctors and masters under their respective faculties: Theology, Decrees, Medicine and Arts, in that order, and Arts, as might be expected, is subdivided into nations, French, Picard, Norman and English.

married bedels. At the end of the roll is a petition, tendered on behalf of all those supplicating, for general permission to continue in the university for a period of five years, and while absent, either to enjoy the fruits of their benefices, or to lease them (*arrendare*) to others. The roll begins with a flowery exordium requesting that men whose light has been hidden under a bushel may now be erected upon the candlestick of promotion, and that those who have to face the competition of rolls backed by powerful persons shall not have to stand outside the door while others 'enter to enjoy the delights of the marriage'. Biblical allusion apart, the dates of Colville's chancellorship, 1388–91, and the mention, in the roll, of John Wace and Richard Baston as proctors (*rectores*—they held office in 1388–9) point to the marriage of Boniface IX to the Church. *Colville* is both a creation roll and a jubilee roll, for the new Pope, to whom it was sent, held his first jubilee in 1390. 1389 or early January 1390 must be its date, for after 29 January 1390 licences out of the Statute of Provisors were, in accordance with the terms of the reissue, heavily penalized, and no such licence for Cambridge occurs or indeed was likely to occur among the letters patent of 1390, as it was to do in 1399, when Richard II had been given power to modify the statute.

The third roll was sent during the chancellorship of Eudo la Zouche, and may accordingly be termed *Zouche*. This is merely a draft. There are 109 petitions in all, but as many as 16 have no names attached, and six appear very doubtful, as the usual particulars of the petitioners are missing. The date is a more difficult matter than in *Vetustior* and *Colville*. The two proctors mentioned in *Zouche*, William Alyn and John Hollebroke, held office in 1397–8.[1] Now Richard II had been granted power in 1392 and again in 1397 to modify the Statute of Provisors according to his discretion, and it seems unlikely that a body like the University could have availed itself of the King's moderating power to get permission to petition Rome without the consequent licence appearing on the Patent Roll. On 27 April 1399 the university secured such a licence, 'according to the form of the moderation', to petition for benefices,[2] and the patent is still preserved, tested by the King, and with part of the great seal in white wax attached, in the University Registry. It seems likely, therefore, that the first efforts to compose the roll were made in

[1] For Alyn, cf. *Alumni Cantabrigienses*, i. i. 20; for Hollebroke (later Master of Peterhouse and Chancellor), *ibid.*, i. ii. 388.

[2] *Cal. Pat. R., 1396–99*, 547.

the second half of 1398, and that the roll was sent in 1399 after formal permission from the Crown had been received. 1399 is probable, too, because in 1400 Boniface IX was to hold his second jubilee. It is interesting to note that the patent to Cambridge was granted ' on the information of John Rome '. Rome was rector of Fenstanton and an important official in the Privy Seal office, who later, under Henry IV, became clerk of the parliament.[1] *Zouche* gives the name of the *nuncius* who bore the roll to the Curia, *presentis rotuli portatori pro ipsius expedicione deputato*: it was Dr. John Ixworth, the distinguished proctor in the Curia, the senior colleague of William Swan and Visitor of Clare College.[2]

While there are minor divergences, the essential form of these rolls is the same. The *rotulus* is an ordered and edited assemblage of individual petitions, headed by the petition of the chancellor himself. It is therefore, just as at Paris, a document from which no scholar of any standing in the university would wish to see himself omitted. The formidable list of seniors, *olim cancellarii*, who figure in Colville, was not likely to encourage the hopes of a young petitioner. Each supplicant in the roll gives his diocese, his degree, the category of benefice at which he aims, and in a final *non-obstante* clause the benefice or benefices which he at present occupies, if any, or any other fact that might require dispensation: e.g., that he has lost half the little finger of his right hand. These *non-obstante* clauses would be required for the concurrent tenure of a rectory with the canonry and prebend or office sought. Where serious incompatibility is involved, a petitioner makes, as he is bound to do, the offer to resign one of the benefices, and in the papal reply such resignation is liable to be imposed.[3] There are five types of petition for canonry and prebend. In the highest, confined to the senior doctors, the chancellor and former chancellors, the petitioner supplicates for a canonry ' under ' (i.e. with) expectation of a prebend " as well as (*necnon*) of a dignity. ' parsonage,' administration or office with cure or without, even if the dignity itself is elective and the highest (*maior*) after the episcopal, and one which a man reaches normally by election ". The other

[1] See the account of him in A. F. Pollard, ' Fifteenth-century clerks of parliament ', *Bull. Inst. Hist. Research*, xv (1937–8), 141–2.

[2] For his preferments, cf. *Cal. Papal Lett.*, v (1396–1404), 596–7, and Jacob, ' To and from the Court of Rome in the fifteenth century ', *Studies . . . presented to Mildred K. Pope*, p. 163.

[3] Among the seniors pluralists are fairly numerous. They deserve the analysis given by Professor Hamilton Thompson to the Lincoln pluralists of 1366 in *Associated Architectural Societies' Reports and Papers*, vols. 34, 35, 36 (1919–22).

variants for graduates lower down the scale, omit some or all of these latter offices and qualifications. The second and more numerous type of petition asks for a benefice of so many pounds value with cure or without—the proportion is normally £40 with cure, £20 without—in the gift of the bishop, or of the bishop, dean and chapter of this or that cathedral church, or for a benefice in the presentation of a monastic house. The wording of the petitions is made to conform to the style of the Curia.

Petitions for benefices in the gift of the religious are, on the whole, in the majority. It is natural therefore to ask upon what principle petitioners name the bishop, cathedral or monastery whose patronage they desired to secure, for the *rotuli* leave no doubt that local ties were by no means the prevailing reason. It is not surprising that in 1370 a canon of Chichester, Thomas Wyrmonde, should be found asking for a dignity, 'parsonage' or office in the cathedral, nor that the rector of Eversham, York, should the same year seek a canonry and prebend in the mother church. For Cambridge men, too, the liberties of St. Edmunds and St. Albans were comparatively local dispensers of patronage: but why should the rector of Barnack near Stamford ask for a canonry and prebend in Chichester, or the vicar of St. Edward's, Cambridge, seek a benefice in the gift of Glastonbury? Why in *Colville* should so many petitioners look to the Prior of Lewes, when in *Vetustior* and *Zouche* they do not? The only possible answer is that roughly within their own ecclesiastical province petitioners glanced in the direction of the largest and most likely ecclesiastical sources of supply, wherever they were to be found. They asked for anything that might be going. It would be convenient to suppose that the university authorities had some inside intelligence about those sources of supply, some means of estimating the possibilities: did Cambridge, for instance, draw upon sees and monasteries untouched by Oxford? A comparison of the 1363 rolls does not encourage any such hypothesis. All that the Cambridge University authorities ask in their nation-wide search is that the Pope shall pay regard to seniority and experience. In one of the drafts of the Colville roll, Boniface IX was asked that in cases where several graduates petitioned for the same collation, or for a provision in the same church, preference should be given, among the seniors, to the holders of the more important degree (*pociores in gradu*), and that when the degrees of the candidates were equal, the older candidate should be preferred.

The main problem raised by these rolls is: how many of

these 360 petitioners got what they asked? The question is complicated by serious archival gaps. For 1389 and 1399 no register of supplications has survived, and it is to that particular record that we should normally look to find brief notes of the Papal replies. For 1 Gregory XI, the Avignonese series of Papal registers supplies the collations made; but for 1389 and 1399, years of the Schism, there is no corresponding source.[1] Nor are the Cameral records of any avail; the class of benefices with which we are dealing were not conferred in Consistory, and therefore do not show in the *Obligationes et solutiones*, while the *Libri annatarum*, so valuable for provisions in the fifteenth century, do not begin until 1421. All we can safely rely upon is the bishop's registers for the institution of the provisors, where it took place. The latter qualification is worth underlining, because as we saw, papal provision, under whatever formula granted, does not necessarily imply that the clerk secured his title. Each provision was accompanied, as requested in the petition itself, by a mandate to the executors, but the executors, who were as much investigators as administrators, had to observe law and custom, had to ascertain whether the provision was judicially practicable. At an earlier date Bishop Simon Montacute's Ely register records the appearance of an executor charged with putting a provisor into possession of Cottenham, a Ramsey living. The executor's commission instructed him to inquire into the life and conversation of the poor clerk so provided, and to hold a discussion with representatives of the abbey, who are invited to come and state their case (*ea que proponere voluerunt*), before action is taken.[2] In 1375 the record of the Ely Consistory shows master Edward Beylam, LL.B., of Cambridge (who had petitioned in 1370), presenting his letters of provision together with the *processus* (the statement of legal action that followed), and being instituted by the bishop to a benefice which it had taken four years to secure.[3] This is not a long period, as things went, for provisions which necessitated the examination of the candidate, let alone expectatives, which might take much longer to mature.

All save fifteen of the petitioners in *Vetustior* received provision, most of them on January 28, a few not until Michaelmas 1371: by no means everyone to the benefice desired. Michael Causton the younger, the nephew (it is to be surmised)

[1] The 'Lateran' registers of Boniface IX contain no *Littere de Curia* nor *Littere Secrete*, and are therefore useless for the present purpose.

[2] Reg. Montacute, fo. 27b.

[3] Ely Consistory Court, Reg. D. (1378–81), fo. 33. His provision is in Regesta Avinionensia, vol. 178, fo. 499.

of the Chancellor, supplicated for a canonry and prebend in Chichester—he was under age and had to be dispensed—but was provided to the prebend of Howden in York.[1] He does not appear ever to have secured possession. Thomas de Ely, M.A., who sought a benefice of £40 with cure in the gift of Lewes Priory, was provided to one of £30 with cure, or £20 without, in the gift of Castle Acre.[2] Robert de Tunstede, M.A., S.T.B., rural dean of Hingham, Norwich diocese, who asked a £40 or £30 benefice in the gift of the Prior of Christchurch, Canterbury, was rewarded with a prebend at Llandefi-Brefi, near Lampeter.[3] Take again the three clerks of the name of Eltesley, Thomas the elder, master of King's Hall, Thomas the younger, LL.B., rector of Croxton, and Robert, LL.B., all petitioners in *Vetustior*.[4] The elder Thomas, who had asked for a canonry and prebend in Lichfield, received provision of one in St. Paul's [5]; the younger who had sought a prebend in York, one in Beverley.[6] Neither, as far as can be discovered, ever got possession. The position of the younger is revealed in a papal mandate of 19 November 1373, by which the Official of Ely was directed to assign to him, if found fit after examination, the canonry and prebend of the free chapel of Wolverhampton.[7] He had, the mandate states,[8] already been provided to a canonry in Beverley, upon getting possession of which he was bound to resign Croxton. So far he had not got possession, but in the meantime had exchanged Croxton for Teversham in the same diocese, and subsequently Teversham for the Wolverhampton canonry; the present provision, which he had solicited and received, permitted him, notwithstanding the resignation clause in the letters of provisions, to hold Wolverhampton along with the Beverley canonry. The mandate cautiously adds, '*when he gets them*'. We know that by November 1373 he had secured neither, so that the Teversham-Wolverhampton exchange cannot have materialized, and his position cannot have been very promising.

[1] Reg. Avin., vol. 178, fo. 471 v. References to this source are Miss Lloyd's.

[2] 'Castillacie': Reg. Avin., vol. 178, fo. 471 v.

[3] Reg. Avin., vol. 177, fo. 87 v.

[4] The relationship between the two Thomases is a little difficult to trace: on 18 April 1349 the elder Thomas, as rector of Lambeth, presented the younger Thomas to the rectory of Eltisley (Reg. de Insula, fo. 18b, 36), and towards the end of the elder's life they exchanged (29 March 1375) their respective churches of Landbeach and Granchester (Reg. Arundel (Ely), fo. 6). In 1371 Robert was rector of Histon (Reg. Avin, vol. 181, fo. 81 v.); in 1382 he exchanged Hecham for the rectory of Fletchergate, Lincoln (Reg. Arundel, fo. 41 v.)

[5] Reg. Avin., vol. 179, fo. 583 v. [6] Reg. Avin., vol. 179, *ibid.*

[7] Provision in Reg. Avin., vol. 188, fo. 529.

[8] *Cal. Papal Lett.*, iv. 193.

It is worth observing that the Official of Ely was one Thomas de Eltesley. Was this his elder namesake?

Ten of the petitioners in *Vetustior* had been in the Cambridge University roll of 1363. Of these, in spite of mostly favourable replies, only Robert de Sutton the younger (to be distinguished from Robert de Sutton, LL.D., rector of Glatton in Lincolnshire, who appears in Sudbury's return of pluralists in 1366 [1]) seems actually to have got possession of the benefice he was seeking, one 'value 30*l.* in the gift of the abbot and convent of St. Mary's, York' [2]. Thomas de Eltesley, junior, who asked for a canonry in Witton (Ely) obtained one in Lincoln; and Robert de Tunstede, M.A. and S.T.B., rural dean of Hingham, did not get the benefice he was hoping for from Christchurch, Canterbury, but the rectory of Eversholt in Bedfordshire. Thomas de Bingham, M.A. and S.T.B., asked for a canonry and prebend (name erased) and was provided to a benefice in the gift of the prior and convent of Spalding. The latter he failed to obtain: but in *Vetustior* he is described as rector of Westmill (Hunts). The impression gained from the prebendal odyssies of these university graduates is that while a canonry was undoubtedly a prize, the process of acquiring it was an uncertain affair: a rectory was a sounder investment: it formed the permanent foundation of the university graduate's career. None the less, the desirable course for the higher academics was, through dispensations, to combine rectory with canonry and prebend.

In *Colville*, there are eighteen petitions for canonries and prebends in Salisbury alone. Only one succeeded, Walter Eston's petition for a priest's instead of a subdeacon's prebend. For canonries in Lincoln, there are likewise eighteen, none successful. Papal provisors to canonries in St. Paul's met with the same fate. Even Bartholemew Sidey, archdeacon of Middlesex, Simon Sudbury's former domestic clerk, who held the prebend of Neasdon from 1370 and at one time held Twyford,[3] did not succeed in gaining a more lucrative stall. The petitioners who sought these higher promotions must have known that the chances were against their obtaining possession, even if the papal signature was favourable; the young regents have been only too conscious that the roll contained a substantial number of senior non-regents and of graduates holding respectable positions outside the University, using the Cambridge *rotulus* as a convenient way of bringing

[1] *Reg. Sudbury* (C. and Y.S.), ii. 181.
[2] *Cal. Papal Reg., Petitions*, i. 406. He got St. Mary's, Binbrook (Lincs).
[3] *Reg. Sudbury*, i. 271, 274.

their names forward. At the same time, generalization on this head is dangerous, until we know much more about the permanent personnel of the University in the later years of the fourteenth century. One indication of limited value we do possess: the lists at our disposal are separated by periods of seven, nineteen and ten years. A comparison of the names and *status* of a supplicant whose name occurs twice, that is, in successive rolls, should give some indication of what success he has met with in the interim.[1]

We may begin with Thomas Bacton, a distinguished ecclesiastical lawyer, who in *Vetustior* is called clerk of the diocese of Norwich, doctor of laws, and petitioner for a canonry in Hereford. He received provision to one in Lincoln,[2] bnt he does not appear to have obtained possession. By an earlier petition in the roll of 1363 he had secured the rectory of St. Gregory, Sudbury, and this he was ordered in 1370 to resign.[3] Bacton was a lawyer of considerable experience: the Close Rolls (1375) show him engaged in transactions over Cambridge landed property,[4] and during the middle of Richard II's reign he is named upon various commissions as doctor of laws.[5] In 1381 Archbishop Courtenay made him Dean of the Arches and he later appears as Commissary General in the Court of Canterbury as well as Commissary of the Prerogative, with a house in the parish of St. Nicholas, Cole Abbey.[6] Here then is a jurist to whom at any rate the first of the Cambridge *rotuli* proved fruitful. Next comes John de Burgo, reputed author of the popular manual of ecclesiastical duties and administration, the *Pupilla oculi*, who is said in *Alumni Cantabrigienses*, on the authority of the Dict. Nat. Biog. (which apparently took the statement from Pits), to

[1] It is not always possible from this conjunction to argue for that individual's continuous residence, because some clerks leave the university, then return for a period sufficient for the academic grace they will be seeking, then leave again. This particularly applies to the civilians and the canonists (in the majority in the three rolls), many of whom took service under a bishop or archbishop, thereafter obtained licences to study for three or five years, and, having got their degrees, passed on to their former, or more profitable, employments. This can be illustrated in the next century by the careers of some of Archbishop Chichele's lawyers who were mostly Oxford graduates. There is reason to think that Chichele himself left his practice in London to return to Oxford for a period of further study so as to take his doctorate in civil law. Experience in the ecclesiastical courts (*practica*) might count in the requirements for a lawyer's degree: cf. *Reg. Chichele*, i. xxi.

[2] Reg. Avin., vol. 174, fo. 210 v. [3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Cal. Close R.*, 1374–77, 203.

[5] e.g. *Cal. Pat. R., 1381–85*, 356, 425, 498, 587, 596; *ibid., 1385–89*, 85, 169, 173; *Cal. Close R., 1381–85*, 460, 561; *ibid., 1385–89*, 104.

[6] I. J. Churchill, *Canterbury administration*, i. 396–7, 398, 445.

have died c. 1386.[1] But he was alive in 1389, when he asked for a canonry and prebend in Lincoln. In *Vetustior* he appears as master of arts and as proctor, supplicating for a £40 benefice with cure in the gift of the abbot of Selby. In reply, he was given one of £30 or £20 in the patronage of Peterborough abbey.[2] This was South Collingham, Yorkshire, which he was holding when he made his second petition in 1399. Between 1370 and 1389 he had been chancellor, and had proceeded to the mastership—that is, the doctorate—in theology. He was, I think, a veritable resident who secured a benefice at the first asking, but probably did not live to follow up any grant made to him by Boniface IX. One stalwart, John Pulham, appears in all three rolls. In *Vetustior* Pulham described himself as priest of Ely diocese, master of arts and scholar of theology. He had just been proctor (1369–70). He asked for a benefice of £40 with cure in the gift of St. Mary's, York. He was provided to one of £30 or £20 in the gift of the bishop of Worcester.[3] In his petition of 1389, when he sought a benefice of £40 or £30 in Ely diocese, he described himself as licentiate in theology, and as engaged in litigation for St. Mary's in the Strand, without being in possession. The patron of this church was the bishop of Worcester, so it seems that the executors of Gregory XI's provision had met with legal opposition. In 1399 Pulham was still of the same degree, still asking for a similar benefice and still litigating, he states, for St. Mary's in the Strand.

Both in *Colville* and *Zouche*, Eudo la Zouche, LL.D., brother of Lord Zouche of Harringworth, petitioned for a canonry and prebend in Salisbury. On neither occasion was he successful. In *Colville* he described himself as *olim cancellarius*, as canon of Lincoln [4] and rector of Hogsthorpe. In 1399 he was chancellor again, prebendary of Langford in Lincoln Cathedral, and archdeacon of Huntingdon. More successful than the chancellor was another doctor of laws, Brian Fairfax, clerk of the diocese of York. He was LL.B. in 1389 when he petitioned for a canonry and prebend in York. In 1399, now a doctor, he described himself as rector of East Gilling, near Richmond, and asked for a valuable benefice in the gift of the bishop of Durham. It seems that for some period within those ten years he had been residing, for by the will of John Fairfax, rector of Prescot, dated 7 June 1393, a bequest of books in canon and civil law and the sum

[1] i. i. 257. [2] Reg. Avin., vol. 178, fo. 401.
[3] Reg. Avin., vol. 181, fo. 317 v.
[4] Provision in Reg. Avin., vol. 179, fo. 183.

of £40 came to Brian 'for his sustentation while attending the schools'.[1] He was instituted to the rectory of Long Marston (Glos.) on 17 May 1394, exchanged it for Foxhall (Suffolk) on 18 April 1398, and Foxhall for East Gilling on 28 April that year. In 1399 he secured leave of absence 'causa standi in scholis'. It seems likely that he spent two or three years away from Cambridge, and returned, probably to take his doctorate. In the end he got his desire. In 1410 he was collated to the precentorship of York and, in 1420, to the prebend of Langtoft, and died at a good age in 1436.[2] In the absence of any recorded papal reply, it is doubtful whether his cathedral appointments can be connected with his petitions; but in any case the chapter of York might very well have been aware that Fairfax had turned his youthful eyes in their direction and have not forgotten him.

The younger applicants in *Colville* are worth some analysis, since some of them appear again in *Zouche*. In the former roll, the Bachelors of Arts stand just after the Licentiates in Arts. In *Colville* there are as many as 45: 28 are in priest's orders, the remainder are described as clerks. Eight are also scholars in canon law, mostly in their second or third year, and two are also scholars *in utroque*, while one from York diocese is also a Master of Grammar. In most cases which I have been able to trace, it was the second petition, not the first, that brought them some measure of success. But early difficulties should not be over-exaggerated, since in *Colville* there is a group of 10 clerks, described as scholars, most of them under 23 years of age, who petition for dispensations to hold expectatives, mostly of benefices in the gift of the religious. If it was worth while for such young men to supplicate, it could not have been entirely unfruitful for the bachelors of arts, who were of full age. Probably much depended on who you were. In the Colville roll William Airmyn, clerk of the diocese of York, B.A., petitioned for a canonry and prebend in Southwell. Airmyn bore a well-known name. He was possibly great-nephew of William Airmyn, the administrator of Edward III's early years, the 'pushing clerk', as Prof. Tout called him, who became bishop of Norwich 1344–53;[3] and a kinsman of William Airmyn or Ermyn, treasurer of Calais under Richard II and a baron of the exchequer under Henry IV. Airmyn had already (1388) been presented by

[1] *Testamenta Eboracensia*, i. 187.

[2] I owe these particulars to Dr. and Miss Lloyd's notes on the petitioners.

[3] *Chapters in Medieval administrative history*, ii., 366–9. Tout calls the Airmyns 'quite an official family'.

the Crown to the prebend of North Newbald in York [1]: he did not get Southwell: but in 1392 he was collated to a prebend in Exeter, which in 1394 he exchanged for a canonry in the collegiate church of Abergwilly.[2] Prebends came with some ease to the well-connected. A not dissimilar case, though he is a much older man, is that of Robert Foljamb, LL.B., of the diocese of Lichfield. Foljamb was the son of Sir Godfrey Foljamb of Nottinghamshire, a prominent shire knight and tenant-in-chief (d. 1389). As early as 1362 we find Robert holding a prebend in Lichfield. In 1366, when he was a scholar of canon law, he was on the *rotulus* of the duke of Lancaster, asking for a prebend in Beverley, which he did not get.[3] But he must have had good helpers, for when he petitioned in 1389 he was holding the prebend of Morehall in the collegiate church of Noseley. He was never provided to Lichfield, but, strangely enough, to a prebend in the King's free chapel of All Saints, Derby, for in 1391 he was ordered, with others, to come before the King's Council for infringing the King's privileges in that chapel by accepting a benefice in virtue of a provision by the Pope.[4] Boniface IX could not have done a more maladroit thing in answer to Foljamb's petition in the Colville roll.

But there were more exalted petitioners than Airmyn and Foljamb. In the Colville roll, there is a little group of *generosi* beginning with Thomas Grey, licentiate of laws, rector of Wethersfield, *de nobili genere procreatus*. Dr. Lloyd thought that he was a different person from Grey, bachelor of laws, *de generoso sanguine procreatus*, the son of Sir Thomas Grey, who is found petitioning in *Vetustior*, but I see no reason to distinguish them. Thomas Grey may have been son of Sir Thomas Grey of *Wark* (not Sir T. Grey of Heton, the author of the Scalachronicon). His first petition was in 1364 for a canonry and prebend in Salisbury, and it was granted with the qualification ' if he is eighteen years of age '.[5] In *Vetustior* he states that he had been granted a prebend in Salisbury by Urban V, but had not obtained it; and so he asked for it again. Whatever Gregory XI's reply may have been, there is no evidence that he secured it at the second attempt. By the time of the Colville roll he had been presented by Alice Lady Nevill to Wethersfield, London diocese.[6] He died in 1396, and is therefore missing from *Zouche*. More successful

[1] *Cal. Pat. R., 1385–89*, 478: described as 'late Treasurer of Calais', *ibid.*, p. 99, which does not distinguish between the two Williams.
[2] *Reg. Brantingham*, Part I, p. 134.
[3] *Cal. Papal Reg., Petitions*, i. 529.
[4] *Cal. Pat. R., 1388–92*, 523.
[5] *Cal. Papal Reg., Petitions*, i. 490.
[6] *Newcourt, Repertorium*, ii. 654.

than Thomas de Grey was Roger de Grey, son of Lord Grey of Ruthin, described in *Colville* as clerk of the diocese of Bangor, and scholar of canon law in his third year, who asked for a canonry and prebend in Abergwilly. He declared that he was holding the prebend of Netheravon in Salisbury cathedral, and his estate in Netheravon had been confirmed to him by the king in 1388.[1] He did not get possession of Abergwilly, but on 26 May 1394 his father gave him a good living in Norfolk. Other Cambridge *nobiles* on the Colville roll are Roger Cromwell, son of Ralph, Lord Cromwell of Tattershall; William Bardolf, brother of Lord Bardolf; Roger le Despenser, son of Sir Philip le Despenser (grandson of Sir Edward le Despenser), and Edmund Clifton, *de nobili genere procreatus*, who was probably son of Sir Nicholas Clifton, deputy admiral in the west. None of them was above the status of B.A., and Bardolf, Despenser, and Clifton had as yet no degree. It is therefore reassuring to find that they, like humbler and perhaps abler young clerks, did not succeed at the first attempt. In *Zouche* there is, besides the chancellor and Grey, only one *nobilis*, John de la Pole, son of Richard's friend, the chancellor Michael, earl of Suffolk. He is bachelor of both laws and in his petition asks for a benefice value £200 vacant or to be vacant, in the gift of the archbishop of Canterbury, as well as for a canonry and prebend in Lincoln. He declared that he held the canonry and prebend of Wistow, York, and the canonry and prebend of the altar of St. Andrew in Beverley. The latter declaration is interesting, because this prebend had been the subject of a famous prolonged suit in the Curia between Pole and Thomas de Wallington, Papal chaplain, who claimed that he had been collated to it as a reserved benefice by Urban VI, and pleaded that, after holding it some time, he had been ejected from it by Pole. By Rome it was adjudged first to Wallington, then to Pole, then to Wallington again.[2] But in the end Boniface IX, *motu proprio*, four months after his judgment ordering the executors to turn Pole out, annulled the previous sentence, and awarded the prebend to Pole.[3] The last mandate shows that this is a case where the same benefice was granted twice, a phenomenon much less common than critics of Papal provisions imagine. Did Pole ever get the Lincoln canonry? Probably not, for it seems unlikely that he is to be identified with the Thomas Pole, M.A., who received Corringham prebend in July 1426; Professor Hamilton Thompson is undoubtedly

[1] *Cf. Cal. Pat. R., 1385–89*, 478.
[2] *Cal. Papal Lett.*, iv (1362–1404), 369–70.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 409–10.

right in asserting that this Pole was a son of the second earl of Suffolk.[1]

This little assembly of facts is far from being an adequate basis for generalization about the effectiveness of the university *rotulus*. All that can be shown is that some petitioners were successful through the action of executors, or after litigation, some not. The proportion is hard to determine. Yet had the university roll been a mere waste of labour, would it have been prepared and sent? And would the Oxford Convocation in 1417 have defended the 'approved custom of writing for benefices'[2] which Archbishop Chichele's projected constitution seemed likely to supersede? If the roll was more or less a lucky dip, it was at least a method of enabling the university clerk to compete with others more advantageously placed through being under the protection of the influential, or known to local patrons.[3]

[1] *Lincoln Visitations*, i. 194. [2] *Reg. Chichele*, iii. 50.

[3] My best thanks are due to Professor J. A. Twemlow for a number of suggestions and corrections embodied in this paper.

BISMARCK AND THE THREE EMPERORS' ALLIANCE, 1881–87

By W. N. Medlicott, M.A., F.R.Hist.S.

Read 13 November 1943

The Alliance of the Three Emperors was Bismarck's attempt to escape from a dilemma which had led him to a typical crisis of nerves and irritability during the early months of 1879. He had soon recognized after 1871 that the interests of the new Germany could no longer be served by war. Could he secure the isolation of the unforgiving French without embarrassing commitments to his friends and potential allies? The maintenance of friendly relations with, and between, Austria and Russia seemed to him the indispensable basis of German predominance in Europe; the worsening of Austro-Russian relations during the long-drawn-out Near Eastern crisis after 1875 had, however, led both his neighbours to grumble at his limited support, although Russia had been very much more open and indiscreet in her complaints than Austria. Accordingly he decided at the end of 1878 that the very nebulous *Dreikaiserbündnis* of 1872–3 no longer provided an adequate basis for German security; in October 1879 he formed a defensive alliance with Austria against Russia, and in June 1881 the new alliance of the three emperors was concluded, although the Austro-German alliance remained in force. The collapse of the three emperors' alliance in the first major crisis that it had to face, namely the Bulgarian crisis of 1885–6, suggests that the solution was hardly a happy one.

On the whole, however, the great body of comment on this phase of his policy has not been unfavourable. The case for a Russian alliance, of which Prince Lichnowsky has been the best-known exponent, has not been very widely supported by historians; the general tendency in recent years has been to defend the alliance of 1881 as a statesmanlike achievement which at least removed for the time being the likelihood of open conflict in the Near East.[1] This seems, even on the evidence

[1] Examples are F. Rachfahl: *Deutschland und die Weltpolitik, 1871–1914* (1923), pp. 367–9; E. Heller, *Das deutsch-österreichisch-ungarische Bündnis in Bismarcks Aussenpolitik* (1925), pp. 70–1; A. O. Meyer, *Bismarcks Friedenspolitik* (1930), p. 11; W. L. Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments* (1931), pp. 211–12. This interpretation is usually followed in the numerous German inaugural dissertations and similar studies dealing with

which has hitherto been available, to be too favourable an interpretation, and in any case the formation of the alliance is still one of the least known of his diplomatic adventures. Relatively little of the non-German documentary evidence critical of his policy at this period has yet been published or evaluated; the limited number of German documents available leaves many obvious questions unanswered, and the chief published source is in fact the somewhat vainglorious *mémoire* of Peter Saburov, the principal Russian negotiator, which was first published privately in St. Petersburg in 1914.[1] Practically nothing has hitherto been published, in the form either of documents or of secondary accounts, on Austria's rôle, and in particular Professor Pribram's long-promised account of the alliance negotiations has not appeared.[2] In this paper I should like to advance some criticisms of this phase of Bismarck's diplomacy; the general tendency of my argument will be to suggest that many of his difficulties were of his own creation, and that in any case the course of Austro-Russian rivalry in the Near East was not materially affected by his intervention.

Bismarck made two decisions in 1879: firstly, to seek an ally, and secondly to seek an ally in Austria. It is therefore necessary to ask not only whether his choice was wise, but whether it was necessary. It is probably true that his diplomacy before 1879 represented a genuine attempt to act as an impartial mediator, an honest broker, between Austria and Russia; the advantage of this position was that while he was offering his two neighbours relatively little, he was not offering more than he could fulfil. He was asking in effect that in return for his more or less passive friendship they should refrain from contracting an alliance with France; they knew well enough that even if such an alliance were not directed against Germany he would be bound to take it amiss, and he seems for some years to have been satisfied that they would

Bismarck's later diplomacy. A recent example is Gert Fricke, *Bismarcks Ostpolitik . . . (1871–1888)* (1938), pp. 61–9. Bismarck's own *Gedanken und Erinnerungen* contains no reference to the alliance.

[1] J. Y. Simpson (ed.), *The Saburov memoirs* (1929). The important Russian monograph by S. Skazkin, *Konets avstro-russko-germanskogo soyusa* (1928) is based on the Russian foreign office archives, but does not use the Saburov memoirs.

[2] The first volume of A. F. Pribram's *Die politischen Geheimverträge Oesterreich-Ungarns* (1919) contains the text of the treaty (signed on 18 June 1881); the second volume, which has never appeared, was to have included an account of the negotiations. Great secrecy was maintained by the Austrian foreign office during and after the negotiations; all the relevant embassy correspondence in Berlin and St. Petersburg was sent to Vienna immediately after the signature of the treaty. The whole documentation is in the Wiener Staatsarchiv: Geheim Liasse iii and iv.

not be so shortsighted as to reject even the passive friendship of the strongest military power in Europe.

Distrust of Russia's intentions formed at least the ostensible reason for his abandonment of this policy in 1879. The Congress of Berlin in the summer of 1878 had been his supreme effort as the 'honest broker'; but Austro-Russian tension increased after August, and in November Austria rebuffed decisively a Russian attempt, prompted by Bismarck, to separate her from England and to revive the *Dreikaiserbündnis*.[1] An anti-German campaign, which started in the Russian press in January 1879, continued with intermissions throughout the year. Bismarck made use of these Russian manifestations to break down the resistance of the German Emperor to the conclusion of the alliance with Austria, but the evidence at present available seems to make it clear that he had done a great deal himself, early in 1879, by various vexatious measures, to stimulate the Russian press campaign against Germany.[2] It is also clear that his professed fear of a Russian attack was not entirely feigned.[3] We can reconcile these two facts only by assuming that he was to some extent alarmed by a bogey of his own creation; there are, however, some obvious analogies here with his conduct in earlier crises. Nevertheless the evidence for this phase of his policy is scanty and conflicting; he had no immediate concern over France, for Franco-German relations were at this period unusually amicable, and his insistence on the dangers of an Austro-Russian agreement shows that the honest broker did not wish to go entirely out of business.[4]

His judgment was certainly clouded by dislike and distrust of the directors of Russian policy, and throughout 1879 he gave evidence of the irritability, vindictiveness, and over-wrought nerves which characterized his conduct in most of the great crises of his chancellorship. It is true that Prince Gorchakov, the old Russian chancellor, still clung to the independent rôle in European affairs which he had played with considerable success in the early seventies; the result of the Congress in no

[1] W. N. Medlicott, *The Congress of Berlin and after* (1938), pp. 154–62, 177–80, 183–9.

[2] Dr. Irene Grüning's careful study of the Russian press, *Die russische öffentliche Meinung und ihre Stellung zu den Grossmächten, 1878–1894* (1929), shows that the Russian press campaign was due in the first instance to these measures, and was not linked with the eastern question for some weeks (pp. 63–71). Cp. H. L. von Schweinitz, *Denkwürdigkeiten* (1927), ii. 58, and the discussion in Medlicott, *op. cit.*, pp. 370–1.

[3] *The Saburov memoirs*, p. 56; Saint-Vallier to Waddington, 27 June 1879, *Documents diplomatiques français* (1871–1914), first series, ii. 519–20.

[4] Lucius von Ballhausen, *Bismarck Erinnerungen* (1920), p. 174.

way decreased his jealousy of Bismarck, and he and his satellites—like Baron Jomini—remained convinced that Bismarck was a false and dangerous friend who was best kept at arm's length. But Gorchakov's age and ill-health meant that his days of influence were nearly over, and in any case there is no conclusive evidence that he or the tsar contemplated at any stage a resort to war to overthrow the Berlin treaty. Nor did they seek an alliance with France. Bismarck quite misunderstood the position of Giers, the assistant minister of foreign affairs, and the strengthening of friendly relations which his growing influence made possible.[1]

The result was that Bismarck placed himself in a false position from which he was never able to escape. He had after the October treaty either to admit his preference for Austria, and so risk alienating the Russians, or deny it, and risk the loss of Austrian support. It is, I think, arguable that if he had allowed his relations with Austria and Russia to remain on their earlier footing none of the consequences which he painted so graphically in 1879 would have followed. Whatever enthusiasm Russia had had for foreign adventures had been exhausted by the war with Turkey and the depressing diplomatic defeat which followed it, and the gravity of the internal situation was increasingly evident; she would probably in any circumstances have settled down after 1879 into a phase of more or less quiescent diplomacy which would have excluded for many years any flirtations with France or any ambitious campaigns in the Balkans. If this is the case the October treaty was unnecessary; but Bismarck did not take this view, and instead embarked on the impossible task of attempting to create Russian confidence in German friendship while keeping a markedly anti-Russian treaty in existence.

The fact that Russia accepted this position is evidence of Russian, rather than of German, statesmanship. Even Gorchakov's strongest critics in the Russian government and diplomatic service were compelled, after the events of 1879, to accept his underlying assumption of a permanent anti-Russian bias in Bismarck's policy, and there is no doubt that all the leading Russians believed that Russia had been the victim of a phase of gratuitous hostility on his part. Thus Peter Shuvalov, the ambassador in London, hitherto the chief advocate of close friendship with Germany, wrote on 2 March 1879 that already before the end of the previous year Bismarck had brought about intimate relations with Austria at the

[1] Cp. B. H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans, 1870–1880* (1937), pp. 557–60; Ada v. Erdmann, *Nikolaj Karlovič Giers* (1936), pp. 4–5, 39–43.

expense of Russia. Count Andrássy, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, had been emboldened by this support.

> Depuis lors, le Comte Andrassy s'étant assuré de l'appui du Prince Bismark (*sic*) a cherché à établir une communauté de vues avec le Cabinet de Londres : . . . Les plans du Comte Andrassy ont réussi—le Prince de Bismark semble se désintéresser au profit du Comte de tout ce qui se passe en Bulgarie ou en Roumelie chez ces ' gens là ', comme il les appelait au Congrès ; d'autre part nous voyons l'Autriche se ranger dans toutes les questions du côté de l'Angleterre quand elle ne la dévance pas dans l'opposition qu'elle nous fait.

He added that ' ils servent que le Prince Bismark laissera faire et que lorsqu'il semble incliner vers nous ce n'est que pour la forme '.[1] Shuvalov was sent to Vienna early in May 1879 to assure Andrássy that the Russian government was determined to carry out the Berlin treaty, but during the summer Russia's sense of isolation increased.[2] From this stage Saburov took Shuvalov's place as the leading exponent among the Russian ambassadors of close relations with Bismarck. After conversations with the chancellor in July, he argued that as long as Bismarck was sure of Russia he would certainly not dream of letting go of Lorraine ; it therefore rested solely with Russia to perpetuate the political estrangement between France and Germany, so rendering every anti-Russian coalition difficult, if not impossible.[3] The tsar's well-known outburst in August betrayed the same sense of apprehension and annoyance at Bismarck's attitude. Similarly in the following May (1880), after Gorchakov had seen Bismarck in Berlin, he said that he had convinced himself ' that the ill-humour of Bismarck towards Russia was passed and that he was happy to have found the chancellor again the friend of old '.[4]

Giers, who was in effective control of Russian foreign policy by this stage, readily accepted Saburov's view that close treaty relations with Germany formed Russia's best defence against German hostility. Gladstone's accession to office in England in April 1880 considerably eased the position of the Russian

[1] Gorchakov had asked for information on this point. ' L'entente intime qu'on suppose d'être établie entre Berlin et Vienne est un signe du temps. Il n'échappe pas à notre attention. Vous nous renseignerez sur ce qu'on pense à Londres.' Gorchakov to Shuvalov, 12/24 Feb. 1879 ; Shuvalov to Gorchakov, 18 Feb./2 March 1879, Russian embassy archives, London. Cp. Gorchakov to Novikov, 14 Feb. 1879, quoted in E. Cyon, *Histoire de l'entente franco-russe* (1895), p. 21.

[2] Medlicott, *op. cit.*, pp. 375–81.

[3] *Extract from a second conversation*, 14/26 July 1879, *The Saburov memoirs*, pp. 55–6 ; 60.

[4] Széchényi to Haymerle, 5 June 1880, W.S.A., Varia Prusse, iii. 121.

government, and it even became possible to discuss the advantages of an Anglo-Russian alliance, but Giers was not prepared to abandon or compromise the understanding with Germany. His correspondence with the Russian ambassadors at this stage throws considerable light on his interpretation of Russia's needs. Gladstone proposed to replace Disraeli's policy of close Anglo-Austrian resistance to Russian advance in the Near East by the concerted action of all the European powers in compelling Turkey to execute the outstanding clauses of the Berlin treaty relating to Montenegro and Greece, and it was clear that a complete relaxation of the Anglo-Russian tension in the Near East and Central Asia was now possible. Jomini, who did not welcome the agreement with Germany, found Gladstone's programme attractive, although Saburov could see little value in the Concert of Europe beyond an opportunity for clever manœuvring on the diplomatic chessboard.[1] On 10 May 1880 he referred to a recent declaration by Lord Granville, the new foreign secretary, that England would not occupy Herat, and would not give it to Persia, and asked whether, having nothing to fear concerning Herat, Russia should not voluntarily offer to reassure the British with regard to Russia's aims in Central Asia. His own view was that Russia should not do so, as she would thereby relinquish her sole bargaining weapon.[2] Giers set out the Russian government's decision in a long and carefully reasoned reply to Saburov on 18 May. Russia, he said, certainly did not intend to abandon or compromise the accord with Berlin and Vienna. Close proximity made close relations with these two powers inevitable. But good relations with England would also be useful, and, whatever the difficulties, both ends must be achieved. There was a third position, neither Austro-German nor English, but Russian. He recognized that the favourable disposition of England made it possible for Russia to negotiate on terms of equality with Germany, and he rejected Saburov's somewhat Machiavellian plan for keeping England perpetually on tenterhooks over India. The security of India and the freedom of communication with India formed the final objective of all the Near Eastern policy of England, and it was that which gave the Straits their principal importance for her. 'The prolongation of her fears in Asia', he wrote, 'can only perpetuate and amplify her hostility towards us in the [Near] East, and every [Near] Eastern crisis can only be aggravated by diversions in Asia'. On the other hand, a satisfactory arrangement

[1] *The Saburov memoirs*, pp. 136–7.
[2] Saburov to Giers, 28 April/10 May 1880, Russian embassy archives.

in Asia would diminish the keenness of Anglo-Russian antagonism in the Near East and in consequence the danger of a violation of the Straits.[1]

In general, then, Russia's decision to enter the alliance and to abandon Gorchakov's policy of the 'free hand', was due not to Bismarck's skill in reviving Russian confidence in his friendship but to Russia's conviction that he would be less dangerous within an alliance than outside. There was, however, a second factor of great importance in Russia's decision. Bismarck after the end of 1879 showed an eagerness in pressing her views on Austria which would have been singularly welcome to her twelve months earlier, and accordingly the alliance offered her an unexpected opportunity to secure a considerable triumph over Austria and England, her chief opponents at the Congress of Berlin. In this attempt to win Russia by favours at Austria's expense Bismarck did not efface Russian suspicions as to the character of the October treaty, and he succeeded in alarming the Austrians at the strengthening of Russia's position in the Balkans.

The advantages which Russia hoped to secure arose from the fact that in the autumn of 1879 many of the clauses of the Berlin treaty were still unfulfilled, and an agreement at this stage to suspend the further execution of the treaty would benefit her interests almost exclusively. Thus Turkey had received under the treaty the right to garrison the Balkan mountains; the Turks however had simply not had the nerve to send their troops forward when the Russian evacuation of the area was completed in July 1879, and the Russians were quick to see that if this state of affairs could be perpetuated the separation of Eastern Roumelia, the Bulgarian province south of the mountains which had been left under Turkish suzerainty, from Bulgaria itself, would cease to be of practical value. In the second place the Congress had reaffirmed the principle of the closing of the Straits; a unilateral declaration by Salisbury on 11 July 1878 had in effect left the British government free to accept or reject the principle as it saw fit. If Russia decided to seize the Straits in the future it would be of the utmost importance to her to prevent German or Austrian intervention in the rear of her armies. In the third place Great Britain had recently sent a number of military consuls into Asia Minor in the hope of forwarding reforms in that shockingly misgoverned region; both the Turkish and Russian governments feared that this would lead to the setting up in due course of a British protectorate. In the fourth place Austria had secured at the

[1] Giers to Saburov, 6/18 May 1880, *ibid.*, lettre confidentielle.

Congress the right to occupy the sanjak of Novipazar, the small Turkish enclave between Montenegro and Serbia; Austrian troops did not, however, occupy the sanjak until September 1879, and if the further consolidation of Austria's legal and administrative hold on this area could be prevented, the chance would remain of some day securing a joint Serbo-Montenegrin frontier, and thereby placing a barrier in the way of Austria's expansion to Salonica.

A bargain, whereby Russia would accept the treaty of Berlin on condition that the further execution of its clauses should be suspended, had become the Russian government's main objective in its Near Eastern policy by the end of 1879, and would have been pursued by her even if Bismarck's changed attitude had not made her path unexpectedly smooth.[1]

Russia had, therefore, reasons for entering an alliance with Austria which were not incompatible with the continuation of her rivalry with Austria over Balkan questions, and, on the other hand, Austria's reluctant agreement to enter the alliance was in no sense due to the abandonment of her suspicion of Russian aims. The rôle of Haymerle, the Austrian foreign minister, has hitherto been known mainly from Saburov's account of the negotiations, and as he and Haymerle never met during the negotiations he is really telling us only what Bismarck wished him to know about the Austrian government. Bismarck endeavoured throughout to ascribe Austria's hesitations to Haymerle's timidity and inexperience rather than to his profound distrust of Russia, his determination to strike a hard bargain, and his fear of giving offence to the strongly anti-Russian currents of Austro-Hungarian opinion. It is true that Haymerle, who had been promoted in October 1879 from the comparative obscurity of the Rome embassy to succeed the able and picturesque Count Julius Andrássy, was a second-rate and somewhat woebegone individual; at the Congress, which he attended as the third Austrian delegate, he was said to look like a 'half-drowned poodle', and his Austrian colleagues had grumbled at mistakes in drafting, manner and tactics which they attributed in part to his unparalleled nervousness.[2] But Haymerle, though clumsy, was stubborn rather than

[1] Medlicott, *op. cit.*, pp. 382–4; 396. Lobanov received instructions on these lines when he succeeded Shuvalov as ambassador in London: R.E., Gorchakov to Lobanov, 31 Dec. 1879/12 Jan. 1880. Cp. *ibid.*, Giers to Lobanov, 7/19 May 1880.

[2] W.S.A., 'Notizen über den Berliner Congress, 1878' (v. Schwegel), pp. 37, etc.; Fürst zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, *Memoirs* (1906), ii. 222; L. Ritter von Przibram, *Erinnerungen eines alten Oesterreichers* (1910), pp. 107–8.

hesitant; he found it necessary to enter an alliance which he disliked, and his primary concern throughout the negotiations was to give the treaty a form which prevented Russian aggression or Bismarck's defection from the Austro-German alliance.

The determining factor in Haymerle's agreement in September 1880 to commence negotiations was his alarm at the anti-Turkish policy of the new Gladstone government. To Haymerle as to Bismarck the new British policy suggested alarming possibilities. Both feared that the Russian and British governments would join in a vigorous attack on Turkey which would open a fresh phase of crisis in the Near East; and although Bismarck did not feel great alarm at the possibility of territorial or diplomatic gains by Russia in the Balkans he had persuaded himself that a close Anglo-Russian understanding might have dangerous consequences.[1] Haymerle at first clung to the hope that the new British government could be induced to maintain the close relations with Austria of its predecessor [2]; at the end of May he even extracted from Bismarck a disclaimer of any intention to recommend an intimate or general understanding with Russia.[3] But during June and July the British government went ahead with its plans for a naval demonstration by the powers in the Adriatic, and in August the sultan's continued refusal to be overawed by these threats opened the possibility of more drastic action, including the possibility of a joint Russo-British move against Constantinople itself.[4]

Austria and Russia were therefore prepared to enter the

[1] Bismarck to Reusz, 13 May 1880 (extract, communicated to Haymerle), W.S.A., Varia Prusse iii. 121; Széchényi to Haymerle, 28 May, *ibid.*; *The Saburov memoirs*, pp. 140–1.

[2] He made various attempts in May to persuade Granville to enter into an unreserved exchange of views with Austria before communicating proposals about the Balkans to any other powers. Elliot to Granville, 3 May, F.O. 7/990, no. 201; Haymerle to Károlyi, 10 May, W.S.A., tel.; Granville to Elliot, 11 May, F.O. 7/985, no. 221A; Elliot to Granville, 14 May, F.O. 7/990, no. 236; Haymerle to Károlyi, 18 May, W.S.A., dispatch; Elliot to Granville, 20 May, F.O. 7/990, no. 244.

[3] Haymerle to Emperor Francis Joseph (d.d. Stift Neuburg), 9 Sept. 1880, W.S.A., Geheim iii.

[4] Cp. Bismarck's remarks to Dr. E. Cohen, 25 Sept.: 'Dulcigno sei ein Unsinn . . . Gladstone sei ein verrückter Professor, seine Bulgarenschwärmerei reiner Blödsinn' (Brauer, Marcks, Müller, *Erinnerungen an Bismarck* (1924), p. 313); and Gladstone's remark to Granville: 'Misericordia! Patience is a great virtue, but really the heavy-going Teuton is too slow . . .' (Gladstone to Granville, 1 Oct., G. & D. 29/123). There is some evidence that the sultan's final surrender on the Montenegrin question early in October was due to Bismarck's intervention at Constantinople: *Documents diplomatiques français (1871–1914)*, first ser., no. 268; *The Saburov memoirs*, pp. 158–61.

alliance in order to safeguard their positions in the Balkans during the period of quiescence that both desired for reasons of internal policy, and it is an exaggeration of Bismarck's rôle to suggest either that a truce of this type would have been impossible without his intervention, or that the resulting arrangements represented a genuine advance under his mediation towards a solution of their differences. The opposite is rather the case: in his anxiety to retain their confidence he was almost forced to sympathize with, and confirm, their mutual suspicions. As early as September 1879 Russia had indicated her willingness to agree to remain neutral in a Franco-German war,[1] and her very readiness in offering this assurance was evidence that she realized the unwisdom of playing on Bismarck's fears of a Franco-Russian *rapprochement* even for bargaining purposes. An equivalent concession on Bismarck's part would have been the abandonment of the Austrian alliance, but as he was determined to hold on to this he endeavoured to bedazzle the Russians by his zeal in forcing Austria to give way on nearly all the major points in dispute in the alliance negotiations.

Austria's attitude was defined when Haymerle visited Bismarck at Friedrichsruh on 4 and 5 September 1880.[2] Haymerle's long account of these important discussions shows how misleading were Bismarck's brief reports to Saburov, which have formed hitherto the main source available. Early in the discussions Bismarck told Haymerle that he fully understood Austria's mistrust of Russia, but thought that any display of mistrust would only tend to bring Russia and England together. Alarm in England at the revival of the alliance of the emperors was the only way of awakening her to a consciousness of her true interests and of overthrowing Gladstone, which he regarded as one of his most important aims. Haymerle concluded that the main ground for not simply refusing the understanding so warmly recommended by Bismarck certainly appeared to be the attitude of England, and the circumstance that there was no effective means at Austria's disposal of preventing the union of the two Bulgarias, whether it was brought about by Russia or by a spontaneous movement of Bulgarian and Roumelian elements. It is clear however that he was not deceived by the ostentatious violence of Bismarck's attacks on Gladstone. He attached relatively little importance to the prevention of the Bulgarian union, and he was, in fact, prepared

[1] *The Saburov memoirs*, p. 83.

[2] The meeting appears to have been due to Bismarck's initiative: Kállay to Haymerle, 2 Aug. 1880, W.S.A., Geheim iii, tel.

to concede this point from the start.[1] In the same way the Russian government had agreed before these conversations, and without argument, to the eventual conversion of Austria's occupation of Bosnia and the Hercegovina into a formal annexation.[2] Each government knew that by this stage it could offer no effective resistance to the other in these two questions. To assume that because they appear as the two major concessions in the treaty they represented a substantial advance, under Bismarck's mediation, towards a genuine reconciliation between Austrian and Russian interests, is, indeed, to miss the whole point of the negotiations.[3] These were prolonged for another ten months because of the intensive efforts of each power to concede nothing which would allow any advance by the other in the future.

Haymerle stated his own aims quite frankly at Friedrichsruh. He said that as Russian influence would, by the union of the two Bulgarias, be afforded a greater degree of activity, Austria must be correspondingly anxious that this influence was not extended over neighbouring states. She would probably find it necessary to recommend a territorial compensation for Rumania. She wished also to secure Russia's acquiescence in the eventual annexation not only of Bosnia and the Hercegovina, but also of Novipazar. His boldest demand was for a free hand (apparently in the immediate future) if Serbia's continued hostile attitude made it necessary for Austria to proceed against her with something more energetic than economic pressure. 'Our aim', he said, 'would not be conquest, but merely to turn a bad neighbour into a good one'.

He questioned Bismarck very searchingly concerning the future of the Austro-German alliance. He was convinced that although Bismarck was careful to avoid any display of anxiety over Franco-German relations they formed his constant preoccupation, and explained the intensity with which he had returned to the idea of a *rapprochement* with Russia. Bis-

[1] Haymerle to Kállay, 5 Sept. 1880, W.S.A., Geheim iii, tel.

[2] Saburov to Giers, 6/18 August, 11/23 August, Russian embassy archives, reporting conversations on this point with Hohenlohe; 'Telegramm Hohenlohes durch Fürst Bismarck mitgetheilt in Friedrichsruhe, am 4 September 1880', W.S.A., Geheim iii.

[3] Russia and Austria would, in fact, have been prepared, in certain circumstances, to concede these two points at the Congress of Berlin. Andrássy had not attached great importance to the retention by Turkey of control of the Balkan Mountain frontier; Russia had agreed conditionally to the annexation of Bosnia and the Hercegovina in the Budapest Convention of March 1877. Andrássy's decision at the Congress to be content with occupation was due to considerations of internal policy, rather than to Russian opposition; Medlicott, *op. cit.*, pp. 41, 42.

marck insisted ' in eloquent terms ' on the identity of Austro-German interests, but Haymerle continued to argue that Bismarck's plans for reciprocal assurances between the three powers against aggression could hardly be executed in a form which would not alter the character of the Austro-German treaty and weaken Austria's position. The conception of ' aggression ' was, he said, too elastic. To attack Germany, Russia must straightway invade German territory, the fact of aggression would be clearly established, and the *casus foederis* for Austria would then apply. Russia, however, could attack Austria not only directly but also through her neighbours, and particularly Rumania. To Haymerle's inquiry whether Germany would consider the *casus foederis* to apply if Russia attacked Austria in this ' indirect ' manner, and if Austria were compelled to retaliate, Bismarck ' did not reply with the desired clarity '. It was of course impossible for him to do so when the whole purpose of the alliance negotiations was to avoid the development of future Austro-Russian conflicts over Balkan affairs. He said that he could scarcely believe that any such breach of the peace was included in Russia's calculations, and assured Haymerle that he would never allow Austria to be injured ; Haymerle retorted that they did not wish to be in a position in which they would have to guard themselves against injury. Bismarck was, in spite of his assurances, very unwilling to make himself the interpreter to Russia of the Austrian suspicions concerning Rumania, and repeatedly asked Haymerle whether he really desired this : Haymerle said very emphatically that he did.[1]

Haymerle's willingness to enter the triple alliance, and his persistence in seeking support against indirect aggression by Russia, suggest that at this stage he was less concerned about the possible weakening of the October alliance than about the securing of some guarantee of Austria's position in the Balkans. Bismarck had no intention of agreeing to this : circumstances might arise in which it would be to Germany's interest to assist Austria against Russia, but he intended that he, and not Austria, should define these circumstances. The solid fact of his guarantee of Austrian territory remained, and he had little need at this stage to promise Austria more.

Bismarck's account of the Friedrichsruh discussions, conveyed to Saburov by Count Limburg-Stirum on 12 September, was decidedly misleading : he omitted all reference to Hay-

[1] These references to the Friedrichsruh discussions are taken from Haymerle's telegram of 8 September to Kállay, and from his two dispatches to the emperor, 9 September, all in W.S.A., Geheim iii.

merle's strongly expressed distrust of Russia, to his insistence on the safeguarding of Austria's flank in Rumania, and to his hint of coercive action against Serbia. After the Russian and Austrian governments had agreed early in October to the opening of negotiations he was a little more frank ; at the end of November he told Saburov that Haymerle suspected Russia of trying to come to an arrangement with Rumania for the eventual passage of Russian troops through her territory. But he attributed all Haymerle's hesitations to timidity, fear of responsibility and lack of familiarity with high politics.[1]

When Saburov asked point blank whether Haymerle was unwilling to enter the triple alliance because he believed Austria to be sufficiently protected by the alliance with Germany, Bismarck flatly denied this. According to Saburov he said explicitly, ' our interest orders us not to let Austria be *destroyed*, but she is not guaranteed against an attack '. The terms of the Austro-German alliance, which provided without reservation that Germany should come to Austria's assistance with all her forces if Austria were attacked by Russia, were of course unknown to Saburov. His comment on Bismarck's statement shows that he was satisfied that if the three emperors' alliance were formed, Bismarck would have no obligation, and possibly no desire, to come automatically to Austria's assistance in an Austro-Russian war. Some weeks later, Saburov suggested that provision should be made for an alliance of any two of the three powers signing the treaty against the third, if the third should wish to infringe the treaty. Bismarck, while appearing to sympathize with the idea, rejected it on the ground that to formulate it would be mutually offensive. He then said, ' frankly, the only Power which would be inclined not to keep an engagement is Austria. That is why, with her, a triple alliance is better than an alliance between two '. Saburov in his account of this to Giers, exclaims, ' it seems to me that we have there the most eloquent funeral oration on what was done at Vienna last year ! ' Again, on 26 January 1881, Bismarck made the bold statement that he could make with Russia a treaty exactly like the Austro-German treaty, without Austria being offended by it. He explained this by saying that Germany must see that neither Austria nor Russia ' is *completely defeated*. They are both necessary to us '.[2] Here again he appears to assert, quite contrary to the facts, that Germany would not be obliged to intervene in an Austro-Russian war in the early stages, and when she did so would be

[1] *The Saburov memoirs*, pp. 144–7, 156, 172.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 173–4, 195–6, 207–8.

moved only by her own interests. Saburov certainly accepted this view.

How far this was from the truth can be seen from an examination of the negotiations between Bismarck and Haymerle during the first three months of 1881. On 23 January a draft text of the treaty, which had previously been agreed to by the Russian and German governments, was handed to Haymerle by Prince Reusz, the German ambassador in Vienna [1]; Haymerle presented a series of elaborate counter-proposals which would certainly have upset Saburov if he could have seen them in their entirety. Bismarck was able to reject Haymerle's bid to secure German support against indirect attack only by giving unqualified assurances that the spirit and text of the dual alliance remained unmodified. He made a skilful use of the conversations by reporting to Saburov, with every appearance of frankness, all the arguments which he had used in rejecting Haymerle's proposals, while omitting reference to his counter-assurances; this served the double purpose of confirming Saburov's belief in the limited importance of the October treaty, and at the same time of giving a plausible explanation of the slow progress of the negotiations. A comparison of Saburov's account of the negotiations with Haymerle's will, however, show how much Bismarck found it necessary to suppress.

The essential point that Bismarck omitted was his wrangling with Haymerle over the exact nature of the *casus foederis* under the October treaty. In a memorandum of 30 January Haymerle proposed the addition of a clause in the draft treaty to the effect that if, after the failure of an attempt at mediation, Russia should proceed to an attack on the 'military power' of Austria or Germany, the *casus foederis* of the 1879 treaty should apply.[2] Bismarck replied immediately by telegraph rejecting this proposal on the ground that it would involve an enlargement of the terms of the Austro-German treaty, for which he would have to secure the agreement of the German emperor. He suggested a provision whereby any initiative by Austria and Russia with regard to Rumania should be dependent on the agreement of all three powers.[3] Haymerle told Reusz that his government attached particular importance

[1] Note by Haymerle of conversation with Reusz, 23 Jan. 1881, W.S.A., Geheim Liasse iv.

[2] Haymerle, 'Notizen über ein Gespräch mit dem Prinzen Reusz am 30 Jänner', – Jan., W.S.A., Geheim iv.

[3] Bismarck to Reusz, 1 Feb., tel. no. 8, *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, iii, no. 165; Haymerle, note of conversation with Reusz, 3 Feb., W.S.A., Geheim iv.

to the filling of the gap in the draft agreement concerning Rumania by an agreement with Germany alone; he admitted that this went beyond the letter of the 1879 treaty, but argued that if the spirit of that treaty were considered it seemed rather obvious that the protection against attack already provided by the treaty should include their military forces, which were essential to their security. Bismarck maintained his refusal to accept any reference to an attack on the military power of Austria and Germany, but in rejecting it he gave further explicit assurances as to the extent and significance of Germany's obligations under the October treaty, and thereby gave Haymerle a positive guarantee that the treaty would remain intact.[1] Haymerle continued to argue the point for some weeks, and at last on 1 March Bismarck had to say bluntly that the German emperor refused to recognize any alterations in the October treaty.[2] On 5 March Bismarck agreed in principle to sign a secret ministerial declaration that the new treaty would not supersede the October treaty, and Haymerle gave up at this point the attempt to extend the *casus foederis*.

The assassination of the tsar on 13 March 1881 raised the possibility of a reversal of Russian policy; but three days later Giers was able to announce that the new emperor, Alexander III, had confirmed his father's last instructions. Bismarck, however, recommended that Haymerle should be kept in the dark as to the new tsar's intentions: 'if Austria desires that there should be no change, it is necessary for her to deserve it'.[3] Haymerle's counter-proposals were discussed in St. Petersburg during the following weeks, and he had little inkling of the Russo-German reply until this was presented at the end of April. Most of Haymerle's amendments, even on points of drafting, were rejected, with Bismarck's approval. These included two amendments designed to reserve Austria's right to make further changes in Bosnia, the Hercegovina, and Novipazar, and also his attempt to suppress a provision whereby Turkey was to maintain the neutrality of the Straits in time of war.[4] On 29 April Bismarck sent a very weighty recommendation to Haymerle to accept the new text, together with the threat of a separate agreement between Russia and

[1] 'Auszug aus einer Depesche des Fürsten Bismarck übergeben vom deutschen Botschafter', 11 Feb.; Haymerle, 'Gespräch mit Reusz', 10 Feb.; 'Notiz über eine Unterredung mit Pr. Reusz am 17 Februar'; W.S.A., Geheim iv.

[2] 'Notizen über Mittheilungen des deutschen Botschafters übergeben am 1 März 1881', *ibid.*

[3] *The Saburov memoirs*, pp. 223–4; Schweinitz, *op. cit.*, ii. 156.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 227–32.

Germany if the negotiations for a triple understanding failed.[1] On this Haymerle again gave way, except for a redraft of Article II reserving Austria-Hungary's right to make changes in the political situation of Bosnia, the Hercegovina and Novipazar, and he appealed to Bismarck to support this single Austrian proposal with the same energy that he had displayed in pressing all the Russian demands on Austria.[2] The real difficulty was the question of the sanjak, and the Russian government persisted in its refusal.[3] After a further attempt to force Haymerle's hand on this point, Bismarck at the end of May announced that his patience was exhausted, and that he would retire from the negotiations. In the end, however, he resumed his direction, and the final Austrian draft included Haymerle's abandonment of the sanjak-demand.[4]

It is clear that Bismarck had made an impressive use of his peculiar diplomatic talents, and had quite won over Saburov, who showed the greatest possible satisfaction with the course of the negotiations. The important fact, however, is not the deception deliberately practised on Saburov with regard to the October treaty, but the effect which this unjustifiable raising of Russian expectations was bound to have in time on the Russian government. The treaty was satisfactory enough to Russia and Austria in its immediate purpose, for both wished to wind up the existing Near Eastern crisis. Jomini's comments show, however, that even during the negotiations Bismarck's critics in St. Petersburg were taking the view that while the terms of the October treaty remained unpublished his blandishments were in themselves a ground for suspicion.[5] Giers, though cautious and fairminded, does not appear to have attached more than a negative value to Bismarck's assurances of sympathy; it was all to the good that Bismarck was prepared to be friendly, but no positive support, particularly against Austria, could necessarily be assumed.

The treaty was followed by four years of nominal peace. The alliance was renewed in March 1884; Bismarck's position

[1] 'Skizze einer Depesche des Fürsten Bismarck an Prinzen Reuss von letzterem vorgelesen am 29 April 1881': W.S.A., Geheim iv. Bismarck appears to have finally agreed at this point to the exchange of ministerial declarations that the Austro-German treaty should not be in any way affected by the new treaty.

[2] Reusz to Bismarck, 2 May, W.S.A., Geheim iv; *G.P.*, iii, nos. 528, 529; *The Saburov memoirs*, pp. 233–4.

[3] 'Abschrift eines geheimen Erlasses des Fürsten Bismarck an Prinz Reusz, dd Berlin 7 Mai 1881, no. viii', Haymerle to Kálnoky, 20 May, W.S.A., Geheim iv.

[4] Bismarck to Reusz, 12 June 1881, no. xi, Geheim; 'Protocole annexe betreffend'; Haymerle to Széchényi, 15 June; W.S.A., *ibid.*

[5] *The Saburov memoirs*, pp. 161–2, 167.

appeared to be further strengthened by the triple alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy in 1882, and in the colonial disputes with England in 1884 he felt free to give expression to some of his accumulated irritation against the Gladstone government. There was, however, no genuine relaxation of tension between Austria and Russia; for reasons of internal policy neither power was in any hurry to involve itself in a major international crisis, but each was busily engaged, during these few years of apparent quiescence, in measures to defend and strengthen itself against possible encroachments by the other, and to ensure that its opportunities for future expansion were not jeopardized.

The detailed story of the half-bold, half-furtive forward policy carried out by the two powers during these four years belongs to the general history of the Near Eastern question, and lies outside the scope of this paper. It is sufficient to note on the Russian side the prolonged and undignified attempts to force control on the reluctant Bulgarians; on the Austrian side the secret treaty with Serbia of 28 June 1881, the secret treaty with Rumania of 30 October 1883, the close relations with the Greek government, and the prolonged struggle with Russia and Bulgaria over the Danube commission. The advantage seemed to lie with Austria. While Russia was meeting with continued difficulties in Bulgaria, Austria had taught Rumania, Serbia and Greece to look to her as their defender against any attempt to extend the Bulgarian frontiers; in the Bulgarian railway question Austria was able to push her economic and political interests even into Russia's sphere of interest.[1] Austria, however, by no means had it all her own way; at the end of 1882 Calice, the ambassador in Constantinople, found so little response from the Turks to his arguments in favour of an Austrian annexation of Bosnia and the Hercegovina that Kálnoky, the new Austrian foreign minister, had to let the matter rest.[2] Moreover, Serbia, Rumania and Greece were almost as suspicious of Austria's aims as they were of those of Russia, Bulgaria, or Turkey.

Bismarck seems to have satisfied himself in 1880 and 1881 that his diplomacy had produced a genuine strengthening of Russian confidence in his attitude; but although the Russian

[1] Skazkin, pp. 212 *et seq.*; E. C. Corti, *Alexander von Battenberg* (1920); H. Hajnal, *Le Droit du Danube International* (1929); A. F. Pribram, 'Milan IV von Serbien und die Geheimverträge Österreich-Ungarns mit Serbien, 1881–1889,' *Historische Blaetter*, 1922, pp. 478–83; M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce* (1926), iv. 160–1, 178–94.

[2] R. W. Seton-Watson, 'Russian commitments in the Bosnian Question and an early project of annexation', *Slavonic and East European Review*, March 1930, pp. 585–8.

leaders were at great pains to make themselves pleasant to him they continued to regard the treaty primarily as a means of postponing active hostility on his part towards them.

This appears to be the real explanation of Giers' policy, and he succeeded in holding the tsar to it throughout the eighties, although he was never free from the danger of a successful panslav campaign for nationalist gains in the Balkans, either in defiance of Germany, or, as Saburov appears to have hoped in 1883, with Bismarck's support. Giers continued as in the summer of 1880 to speak of the alliance as the avoidance of a danger which would recur if the *status quo* were disturbed, and he and the tsar continued to emphasize the importance of friendly relations with England as a check on the central powers. This view is expounded at great length by Giers in the course of his 54-page instructions in August 1882 to Baron Mohrenheim, the newly-appointed ambassador to London.[1] The following passage on Russia's choice in 1880 gives the gist of Giers' argument.

> . . . l'intimité établie à Vienne entre le Prince de Bismarck et le Comte Andrássy avait un caractère d'hostilité marqueé envers la Russie.
>
> Nous avions à choisir entre un rapprochement sérieux et solide avec l'Angleterre sur les bases posées par M. Gladstone, ou bien notre rentreé dans la triple alliance avec l'Allemagne et l'Autriche.
>
> Dans le premier cas nous nous exposions à envenimer nos rapports avec ces deux Puissances. Or, elles étaient limitrophes de la Russie. Leur puissance militaire, unie au centre de l'Europe, les mettait à même de jeter deux millions d'hommes sur leurs frontières. Cette force pouvait se porter contre nous. L'Angleterre était loin . . .
>
> Ces raisons appuyées par l'opinion unanime de nos Ambassadeurs, déterminèrent feu l'Empereur Alexandre II à préférer une restauration de la triple entente avec les Cours Impériales.

In further instructions to Mohrenheim a year later he said that Russia's accession to the Austro-German entente had given it a negative and defensive character which had made it, for the time being, a guarantee of peace.[2] 'It is to our interest to maintain it as long as possible. It guarantees us against Germany and saves us from a conflict in the immediate future with Austria.'

There was, therefore, little danger that Russia would be

[1] Giers to Mohrenheim, 15/27 Aug. 1882, Russian embassy archives.

[2] Giers to Mohrenheim, covering letter and notice, 6/18 Aug. 1883, *ibid.* Cp. Giers' annual report for 1887, quoted by S. Goriainov, 'The end of the alliance of the emperors', *American Historical Review*, Jan. 1918, pp. 326–8.

tempted to embark on any ambitious plans in the Near East in reliance on Bismarck's assistance. He had told Saburov in November 1880 that he had been the first in Europe to break with the old tradition that Constantinople in the hands of Russia would be a European danger.[1] He repeated this hint on various occasions, and the idea of two spheres of influence—the western Balkans for Austria and the eastern for Russia—was familiar enough to the three governments during the early eighties. But it is going too far to magnify these very academic suggestions into a constructive attempt to find a solution of the whole Balkan problem. The real object of this, as of all the moves in his Near Eastern policy, was to soothe or restrain one of his two allies when some injudicious activity appeared to be contemplated. When the ever-sanguine Saburov took Bismarck's proposals at their face value he found the chancellor singularly unhelpful. Early in 1883 Saburov began to sound the German government as to the possibility that the renewal of the treaty might be made the occasion for a comprehensive agreement between the three powers to meet the eventuality of a break-up of Turkey, on the basis of Bismarck's spheres-of-influence plan.[2] Kálnoky told Bismarck in September that the tracing of a line of demarcation would profit no one but Russia, and would leave Turkey completely powerless; Giers, however, was equally opposed.[3] Saburov, who had either underestimated the strength of Giers' views or was intriguing against him, continued to press his proposals, and found encouragement from conversations in Russia during the tsar's coronation. On 25 August he told Busch, the German under-secretary for foreign affairs, that the tsar had made three criticisms of the treaty. These were, (1) the essential stipulations of the treaty, particularly those relating to the union of the two Bulgarias, remained unfulfilled; (2) the liberty of action of Russia *vis-à-vis* Turkey was more restricted than that of Germany and Austria *vis-à-vis* France; (3) Russia was not sufficiently informed of the extent of the agreement between Germany and Austria,

[1] *The Saburov memoirs*, p. 176. Cp. Skazkin, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

[2] Hatzfeldt (Berlin) to Reusz, 10 Feb. 1883, *G.P.*, iii, no. 574; Hatzfeldt to Schweinitz, 6 Feb., *ibid.*, no. 599; Schweinitz to Hatzfeldt, 9 March 1883, *ibid.*, no. 601.

[3] Goriainov, *op. cit.*, pp. 326–8. Reusz to Bismarck, 12 Sept. 1883, *G.P.*, iii, no. 609; Giers' remarks to Bismarck at the Berlin meeting on 14 Nov.: Bismarck to Emperor William, 16 Nov., *ibid.*, no. 611. Giers told Herbert Bismarck in March 1884: 'Mir persönlich widerstrebt es überdies, eine Liquidation des türkischen Reichs auf Grund der Reichstädter Basis vorzunehmen, so lange letzteres noch besteht; ich würde einen derartigen Teilungstraktat für immoral halten . . .' (*ibid.*, no. 629). Schweinitz, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, ii. 224–5.

nor of that concluded between these two powers and Italy.[1] It was not known in Berlin how far Saburov was acting on his own initiative; his persistence in his embarrassing plans led to an open struggle with Giers for the ear of the emperor, and he was recalled early in 1884.[2] The treaty was then renewed with only verbal alterations in March, and Bismarck and Kálnoky were not called upon to offer open opposition to Saburov's plan.[3]

Bismarck had made no attempt to persuade Kálnoky to look favourably on Saburov's ideas, and on 8 September 1883 he had outlined the plan of campaign which he was to follow until the tsar's refusal in the spring of 1887 to renew the treaty for a second time placed Russo-German relations on a new footing. The first task of Austria and Russia should be to prolong if possible the agreement with Russia, and 'either to moderate or to localize her activities'. Failing this, it was expedient that 'we should not be the first to put ourselves in opposition to Russia's aspirations'; this task should be left 'to other opponents whose interests are more menaced than ours, or equally menaced'. He mentioned Rumania and Turkey, and after that England, as the opponents in question.[4] Although this advice was tactically sound, and was not inconsistent with Bismarck's determination to hold Austria back, it clearly implied the rejection of the partition plan as a practicable solution of the Near Eastern question. On 30 October 1883 Germany's accession to the Austro-Rumanian treaty meant that Bismarck had agreed to regard action by Austria in defence of Rumania as a *casus foederis* under the Austro-German alliance, and had thereby conceded the point urged so vainly by Haymerle in 1881.[5]

These developments showed how closely Bismarck had identified himself with the defence of Austria's position in the Balkans, and how far he had moved in this respect even since 1880. When the long-threatened unification of the two Bulgarias took place in September 1885 Bismarck was only partly

[1] Busch: memorandum, 25 Aug., *G.P.*, iii, no. 605.

[2] By this stage he had thoroughly annoyed Bismarck: 'Saburov hat den letzten Rest meiner guten Meinung durch seine Intrigen und Angriffe auf Giers vollständig eingebüsst. Ich halte seine Ablösung für beiderseitiges Bedürfnis'. Bismarck to Schweinitz, 5 Feb. 1884, *ibid.*, iii, no. 622; cp. nos. 615, 617, 619.

[3] *Ibid.*, nos. 625–8; *The Saburov memoirs*, pp. 280–1; Schweinitz, *op. cit.*, ii, 257, 260–1, 293.

[4] Bismarck to Reusz, 8 Sept. 1883, *G.P.*, iii, no. 606. Cp. Goriainov, *op. cit.*, p. 327; at the meeting between Bismarck and Giers at Friedrichsruh in November 1883 Bismarck again attacked Gladstone, 'whose system was in no wise suitable to Germany'.

[5] *G.P.*, iii, nos. 583–96.

successful in preventing an Austro-Russian crisis, although the tsar was moved primarily by strong personal irritation at the anti-Russian form which the unification had taken.[1] But he was exasperated by Austria's ill-concealed alarm and hostility, and refused to consider a renewal of the alliance. At this stage the question broadened into a general European crisis, and there were various hints in the early months of 1887 of the possibility of a Franco-Russian agreement. The so-called Reinsurance treaty—the Russo-German treaty of 18 June 1887—was therefore a triumph for Giers, but marked no change in his attitude towards Germany. Once more Russia was moved, not by any confidence in Bismarck's friendship or by any hope of securing his material support, but by the conviction that it was unwise to allow so formidable a neighbour to become an open enemy. Russia, like Germany, was seeking reinsurance.[2]

The three emperors' alliance was certainly a failure, whether we view it as an attempt to provide a *modus vivendi* for Austrian and Russian interests in the Balkans, or as a means of satisfying Bismarck's craving for formal guarantees of security. Bismarck did not create the Near Eastern problem ; his political arithmetic was not at fault when he worked out the combinations of powers which might produce German isolation ; in no circumstances could the chancellor of the new Germany ignore the necessity for constant vigilance and stout defences. He could, however, at least secure credit for the pacific rôle that his country was now prepared to play, and the steadily-increasing tension in European affairs in the seventies and eighties is a measure of his failure to do so. What he failed to understand in the seventies was that the chief danger to Germany's position arose less from the irritation of Austria and Russia at his limited support than from their fear that he was conspiring against them : Europe by this stage had become so thoroughly convinced of his ability to flatter, deceive, and outmanœuvre his friends and potential enemies that they could not easily believe that his pacific protestations were genuine. Any such doubts as to whether

[1] W. N. Medlicott, ' The powers and the unification of the two Bulgarias, 1885,' *English Historical Review*, Jan. and April 1939, particularly pp. 68–9, 263–7, 278–84.

[2] All later accounts of the negotiations are based on Goriainov, *op. cit.*, pp. 330–8. The fullest general study is still that of the late J. V. Fuller, *Bismarck's diplomacy at its zenith* (1922), especially chaps. 4, 7, 9–12. Fuller, however, was obsessed with the idea of an anti-Russian plot on Bismarck's part, for which there is little evidence. A more judicious account is by Langer, *op. cit.*, chap. 12.

he was indeed an 'honest broker' were strengthened by the evidence which both Austria and Russia possessed as to his equivocal attitude towards his choice for Austria in 1879.

But if he was in this sense the victim of his own reputation he was also the victim of his own personality. After 1870 he had to build a new reputation as a man of peace; he failed, partly because the memories evoked by his great name were too strong; partly, however, because his nerves and his character did not allow him to play the new rôle with any real conviction. In January 1881 Saburov described him as a man subject to hallucinations, a victim of sleepless nights and disordered nerves.[1] Both he and Shuvalov were in their way admirers of Bismarck, and were prepared to attribute much of his conduct in 1879 to his personal feud with Gorchakov. But they were also never free from the fear that they were themselves the victims of some clever deception; early in his narrative Saburov refers specifically to the need to protect himself against the tricks practised on Benedetti in 1866.[2] In the end even his closest allies watched him with as little confidence in his ultimate intentions as they felt towards their more ostensible opponents.

This distrust was not unjustified: he understood international politics only in terms of struggle and manœuvre, and his contempt for Gladstone's conception of a Concert of Europe was due to something much more fundamental than his immediate purpose of preventing a weakening of the three emperors' grouping. Gladstone, indeed, had only the vaguest knowledge of the causes of European dispute outside the Balkans, and there was in reality little in his plan either to alarm or to satisfy the Continental powers. If concerted action in the interests of European peace were impossible he preferred inaction to any plan of intervention in association with individual states, and this ensured that he would provide neither Russia nor Austria with an ally. His general aim in 1880 appears at first sight to have been the same as Bismarck's, namely, to tranquillize Europe by the liquidation of the outstanding problems in the Near East, but in practice a genuine solution of the Balkan question, in a form which would remove Austro-Russian rivalry, had been the last thing that Bismarck desired. He had argued in 1879 that the dual alliance was necessary in order to prevent a Russo-Austrian *rapprochement*, and he showed no interest at all in plans for solving the Balkan problem by strengthening the Balkan states. He could see no solution of Germany's international problem beyond endless

[1] *The Saburov memoirs*, p. 197. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 84.

manœuvres to avoid the embarrassing alternatives of, on the one hand, a war between two or more European powers, and, on the other, an agreement between them sufficiently complete to enable them to quarrel with him, or to ignore him.

We must, therefore, reject appreciations of Bismarck's later foreign policy which confine themselves too closely to praising the ingenuities of his diplomatic technique; the three emperors' alliance is perhaps the clearest example of the extent to which these ingenuities could defeat their own purpose. It was not a coincidence that by the time of his retirement in 1890 his one reliable ally was Austria, and that to Austria alone had he given a pledge which he would unquestionably fulfil.

INDEX

Abergwilly, Carmarthen, 57–8.
Airmyn, William, 56.
Alexander II, emperor of Russia, 64–5, 75, 78.
Alexander III, emperor of Russia, 75, 78–80.
Alexander III, pope, 16–20, 22–8.
Alyn, William, 48.
Andrássy, Count J., 65, 68, 78.
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 1–3.
Anno, archbishop of Cologne, 24–5.
Anselm, saint, 17, 25.
Arnulf, saint, of Soissons, 14, 16, 26.
Austria, 61–83.

Bacton, Thomas, 54.
Baker, Thomas, 47.
Balkans, 64, 67–70, 72, 78–82.
Bardolf, William, 58.
Barnack, Northants, 50.
Baston, Richard, 48.
Beaconsfield, earl of. *See* Disraeli.
Beauvais, Council of (1120), 14.
Becket, Saint Thomas, archbishop of Canterbury, 17–21, 25, 27–8.
Benedict XII, pope, 44.
Benedict XIV, pope, 26.
Benefices, papal collation of, 41–3; sponsored collective petitions for, 43; petitions collected by English universities, 44–6; procedure described, 46–50; results of petitions, 51–9.
Berkeley, Maurice de, 35.
Berkeley, Sir Thomas, 36.
Berlin, Congress of (1878), 63, 65–8.
Bernard, saint, 17, 22, 26.
Bernward, saint, of Hildesheim, 15–16, 26.
Bertrand, saint, bishop of Comminges, 18.
Beverley, 52, 57–8.
Beylam, Edward, 51.
Bingham, Thomas de, 53.
Bismarck and the Three Emperors' Alliance (1881), previous opinion on, 61–2; detailed study of events, 1879–81, 62–76; 1881–7, 76–81; failure of the Alliance, 81–3.
Boniface IX, pope, 41, 48–50, 55, 57–8.
Boniface, saint, archbishop of Mainz, 14.
Bosnia, 71, 75–7.
Bredon, Simon de, 44.
Bulgaria, 61, 65, 67, 70–1, 77, 79–80.
Burchard of Würzburg, 14.
Burgo, John de, 54.
Busch, Dr., German under-secretary for foreign affairs, 79.

Calice, Baron H. von, 77.
Cambridge University, 41, 43, 45–50, 53–4, 56.
Canterbury, Christchurch, 53.
Canute, king of Sweden, 26, 28.
Canute Laward, king of Denmark, 16, 18–19.
Carthage, 5th Council of (401), 13.
Castle Acre, Norf., 52.
Causton, Michael, chancellor of Cambridge University, 45.
Causton, Michael, the younger, 46, 51.
Cecil, R. A. T. G., 3rd marquis of Salisbury, 67.
Celestine III, pope (Cardinal Deacon Hyacinth), 18, 21–2, 25–6.
Chichele, H., archbishop of Canterbury, 59.
Chichester, 50, 52.
Claudius, saint and martyr, 21.
Clement VI, pope, 44.
Clifton, Edmund, 58.
Collingham, South, Yorks, 55.
Colville, William, chancellor of Cambridge University, register of, 47–50, 53, 55–8.
Conon of Praeneste, papal legate, 16, 26.
Corringham, Linc., 58.
Cottenham, Camb., 51.
Councils, *see* Beauvais; Carthage; Lateran; Mainz; Tours.
Cromwell, Roger, 58.
Croxton, 52.
Crusades, 37.

Danelaw, 1–6, 10–11.
Danube, 77.
Dardanelles, 67, 75.
Derby, 57.
Despenser, Roger le, 58.
Dietrich of Niem, 41.
Disraeli, B., earl of Beaconsfield, 66.
Domesday Book, 2, 7.
Dudo of St. Quentin, 2.

Eastern Roumelia, 65, 67, 70.
Edgar, King, 11.
Edward the Confessor, king of England, 17.
Eltesley, Robert de, 52.

Eltesley, Thomas de, elder and younger, 52–3.
Ely, Thomas de, 52.
Ely consistory, 51.
England and Bismarck, 63, 65–6, 70, 77–8, 80.
Eskil, archbishop of Lund, 16, 18–19.
Eston, Walter, 53.
Eugenius III, pope, 14, 17.
Eversham, Yorks., 50.
Eversholt, Beds., 53.
Exeter, 57.

Fabricius, A., *Danske Minder i Normandiet*, 4, 8.
Fairfax, Brian, 55–6.
Foliot, Gilbert, bishop of Hereford, 17.
Foljamb, Robert, 57.
Foxhall, Suff., 56.
France, 61–2, 64–5, 70, 79, 81.
Frankish kingdom, 4, 12.

Gelasius I, pope, 14.
Germany, 61–4, 67, 74–6, 80–1.
Giers, N. K., 64–6, 73, 75–6, 78–81.
Gilling, East, Yorks., 55–6.
Gladstone, W. E., 65–6, 69–70, 77–8, 82.
Glastonbury, Som., 50.
Godehard, saint, of Hildesheim, 15–16.
Gorchakov, Prince A. M., 63–4, 65, 67, 82.
Gotham, William de, 46.
Gratian, Decretum of, 13.
Greece, 66, 77.
Gregory IX, pope, 27.
Gregory XI, pope, 47, 51, 55, 57.
Grey, Roger de, 58.
Grey, Thomas, 57.
Gröhler, Hermann, 4.

Halfdan, 3.
Haymerle, H., Freiherr von, 68–76, 80.
Henry II, king of England, 17.
Henry III, emperor, 15.
Herat, 66.
Hercegovina, 71, 75–7.
Hollebroke, John, 48.
Howden, Yorks., 52.
Hyacinth, cardinal deacon. *See* Celestine III, pope.

India, 66.
Iñigo, saint, abbot of San Salvador, 18.
Innocent II, pope, 15–17, 27.
Innocent III, pope, 23.
Islip, Simon, archbishop of Canterbury, 45.
Italy, 77, 80.
Ixworth, John, 49.

Jakobsen, J., *Stednavne og Personnavne i Normandiet*, 8.
John XV, pope, 14.
John XXII, pope, 44.
John of Gaunt, 34.
John of Salisbury, 20.
Jomini, Baron A. H., 64, 66, 76.

Kálnoky, G. S., count, 77, 79–80.
Kilian, saint, 14.
Kuttner, S., 14, 27–8.

Langtoft, 56.
Lateran Council (993), 14; 4th (1215), 13, 27.
Lewes, prior and priory of, 50, 52.
Lichfield, 52, 57.
Lichnowsky, Prince, 61.
Limburg-Stirum, Count, 72.
Lincoln, 53–5.
Llandefi-Brefi, near Lampeter, 52.
Lloyd, Dr. A. H., 46, 57.
Longnon, A., *Les noms de lieu de la France*, 4.
Lucius III, pope, 23–4.
Lupercus, saint and martyr, 21.

Mainz, Council of (813), 13.
Malachy, archbishop of Armagh, 22.
Mandour, John, 47.
Marston, Long, Glos., 56.
Mohrenheim A. P., baron, 78.
Montacute, Simon, bishop, 51.
Montenegro, 66, 68.
Morehall, near Noseley, Leic., 57.

Near East, 61, 66, 68, 76–7, 79–82.
Neasden, Midd., 53.
Netheravon, Wilts., 58.
Nevill, Alice Lady, 57.
Newbald, North, Yorks., 57.
Normandy, 1–12.
Northumbria, 3.
Novipazar, 68, 71, 75–6.

Octavian, papal legate, 15, 26.
Osbert of Clare, 16.
Othmar, saint, 15.
Oxford University, 44–5, 47, 50, 59.

Paris, Matthew, 41.
Paris University, 44.
Pembroke, earl of, 36.
Perroy, E., 41.
Persia, 66.
Peter, cardinal, of Pavia, 24.
Peter the deacon, 15.
Peter of Tarentaise, 23–4.
Place-names illustrating Scandinavian settlement, 3–11.
Pole, John de la, 58.
Pole, Thomas, 58–9.
Provisors, 2nd statute of (1390), 41, 48.
Pulham, John, 55.

Rashdall, H., 44–5.
Rectitudines singularum personarum, 2.
Reinsurance Treaty (1887), 81.
Retinues in 14th-century England, based on personal contract, 29; indentured retainers, 29–32; their co-operation with the contract army, 31–4; their relation to the baronial household, 34–6; terms of indenture, 36–9.
Reusz, prince Henry VII, 74.
Richard II, duke of Normandy, 2–3.
Richard, duke of the Pirates, 3.
Rollo, duke of Normandy, 7–8, 12.
Rome, John, 49.
Rosendo, saint, bishop of Duma, 21–2, 25–6.
Rouen, Holy Trinity abbey cartulary, 7, 9.
Rumania, 71–5, 77, 80.
Russia, 61–74, 76–82.

Saburov, P. A., 62, 65–6, 68, 70, 72–4, 76, 78–80, 82.
St. Albans, Herts., 50.
St. Edmunds, 50.
St. Paul's cathedral, 52–3.
Saints, canonization of, early decrees, 13–14; early practice, 14–16; position at accession of Alexander III, 16–17; canonizations by Alexander III, 17–25; position by 1181, 25–8.
Salisbury, 3rd marquis of. *See* Cecil, R. A. T. G.
Salisbury, Wilts., 53, 55, 57.
Salonica, 68.
Scandinavian colonies in England and Normandy, their founding, 1–2; illustrated by Norman place-names, 3–6; by Norman personal names, 6–7; by personal names in Norman place-names, 7–8; Danish and Norwegian elements in early Normandy, 8–9; contrast between settlements in England and Normandy, 11–12.
Seine river, 1.
Serbia, 68, 71, 73, 77.
Severinus, saint, 14.
Shuvalov, P. A., 64–5, 82.
Sidey, Bartholomew, 53.
Spalding, Linc., 53.
Stephen of Uppsala, 19.
Stigand, archbishop of Canterbury, 7.
Straits. *See* Dardanelles.
Stratford, Robert de, 44.
Sudbury, 54.
Sutton, Robert de, 53.
Swan, William, 49.

Teversham, Camb., 52.
Thoresby, J., archbishop of York, 45.
Three Emperors' Alliance (1881), 61, 73.
Tours, Council of (1163), 17–18.
Treaties, *see* Reinsurance Treaty; Three Emperors' Alliance.
Tromund, monk of Clairvaux, 22.
Tunstede, Robert de, 52–3.
Turkey, 64, 66–9, 75, 77, 79–80.
Twyford, Midd., 53.

Ulric, saint, of Augsburg, 14.
Ulric of Constance, 14.
Urban II, pope, 14, 16.
Urban V., pope, 43, 45, 57.
Urban VI, pope, 58.

Victoricus, saint and martyr, 21.
Vitalis, papal notary, 18.

Wace, John, 48.
Waldemar I, king of Denmark, 15, 19.
Wallington, Thomas de, 58.
Westmill, Hunts., 53.
Weston, Robert, 46.
Wethersfield, Ess., 57.
William of Canterbury, *Miracula S. Thomae*, 20.
William of Jumièges, 3.
William of Malavalle, 23, 25.
Wistow, Yorks., 58.
Witton, Ely, 53.
Wolverhampton, 52.
Wyrmonde, Thomas, canon of Chichester, 50.

York, 52, 55–6; St. Mary's convent, 53, 55.

Zacharias, pope, 14.
Zouche, Eudo la, chancellor of Cambridge University, register of, 48, 50.

REPORT OF THE COUNCIL. SESSION 1942–43

THE Council of the Royal Historical Society have the honour of presenting the Annual Report to the General Meeting as follows :—

The Society continued its regular meetings throughout the session, and they were well attended despite the growing burden of the war. The Society should, therefore, be ready to resume its activities with full vigour as soon as circumstances permit.

The Assistant Secretary, Miss M. B. Curran, suffered a serious illness in November, 1942. The Council were able, through the good offices of the English Place-Name Society, to provide the assistance of Miss A. M. Armstrong ; and Miss Curran returned, for a time, to her work. But it was clear that she ought not to attempt to go through another winter, and she decided that she must resign her office as from the 24th June, 1943. Miss Curran had been due to retire in June, 1941, but had consented to continue in her post in order to save the Society the embarrassment of having to appoint an Assistant Secretary at a time when so few would be free to become candidates. She had served the Society for forty-two years, having been appointed part-time Assistant Secretary and Librarian on 1 July, 1901, and full-time Assistant Secretary and Librarian on 1 January, 1915. The Council expressed in their Report, presented to the Annual General Meeting in February, 1942, their sense of obligation to Miss Curran for her courage in continuing to carry on the work of the Society in London during the winter of 1940–41 ; and her recent illness was no doubt due in large measure to the severe strain of those months, together with the additional burdens which have fallen upon the Assistant Secretary in war time in consequence of the growing difficulty of securing help either clerical or domestic. The Council have, however, not only to express their regret that the last years of Miss Curran's service to the Society should have been overclouded by war and have ended in illness, and to recall their sense of the courage with which these events have been faced ; they have to place on record their appreciation of the services

rendered to the Society during the many years before the outbreak of war in 1939. In losing Miss Curran, the Society loses the principal repository of its traditions, and that one among its officers who has been most widely known among the Fellows and the most familiar figure at the monthly meetings. The Council record with high appreciation the long and unremitting devotion of Miss Curran to the interests of the Society.

The Council were of the opinion that a permanent appointment to fill the vacancy in the office of Assistant Secretary should not be made so long as it remained unlikely that any substantial number of candidates would be free to offer themselves for the post. In these circumstances they were fortunate in finding Miss C. Jamison most opportunely released from service with the Foreign Research and Press Service, on the return of that department from Oxford to London and its absorption in the Foreign Office. Miss Jamison was accordingly appointed to the post temporarily, to hold office until the state of public affairs is such that a permanent appointment can be made.

Since the Society had, in 1939, a number of volumes in a fairly advanced stage of preparation, it was able during the first three years of war to maintain something like a normal rate of publication. But it became clear in 1942 that this could not continue, and in 1943 there has been available little more than a third of the supply of paper and other materials used in 1939. Moreover, editors have often found other and more urgent claims pressing hard upon their time. The result has been that in the session under review only one publication has actually been delivered to members of the Society, namely *Transactions*, Fourth Series, Vol. XXV, and this is a somewhat slimmer volume than those issued in previous years. Three volumes in the Camden series are now approaching completion: Miss Mary Coate's *Letter-book of John Viscount Mordaunt, 1658–60*, the second part of Miss L. Margaret Midgley's *Ministers' accounts of the earldom of Cornwall, 1296–97*— both of these to be issued in respect of the session 1941–42 —and Dr. Albert Peel's edition of the hitherto unpublished *Prison diary of John Penry*. It is hoped that *Transactions* will appear as usual early in the New Year. One other publication is complete as far as editorial work is concerned.

The edition in facsimile of *The Domesday monachorum of Christ Church, Canterbury*, which was announced in the last Annual Report, is in its final stage with the printer. While the Council hope that the volume will be in the hands of subscribers before long, it is unfortunately not yet possible to state a definite date of publication.

In 1942, the Carnegie Corporation of New York made a grant of $2,000 to Dr. Stanley Pargellis for the provision of assistance in the preparation of the *Bibliography of British History, 1715–89*, and the Council trust that this volume may be ready for the press by the time that publication becomes possible. Mr. G. E. Morey has completed for the Society the index to *Writings on British History, 1937*, and that volume is ready for publication as soon as circumstances permit. A substantial part of the material for the 1938 volume has been collected.

At the Annual General Meeting held on 13 February, 1943, Mr. M. S. Giuseppi and Mr. C. Johnson were elected Honorary Vice-Presidents. The Vice-Presidents retiring under By-Law XVII were Dr. Rose Graham and the Rev. J. M. Thompson. L. C. Loyd and Professor C. W. Previté-Orton were elected to fill the vacancies. The Members of Council retiring under By-Law XVII were C. T. Flower, Professor E. F. Jacob, Professor W. Rees and Dr. C. S. B. Buckland. A further vacancy was caused by the resignation of A. L. Poole. J. G. Edwards, Professor W. K. Hancock, Dr. W. P. Morrell, Mrs. F. M. Stenton and Miss L. S. Sutherland were elected to fill the vacancies. Messrs. C. Ryland Beeby & Co. were appointed auditors for the year 1942–43.

The following papers were read during the session 1942–43 :—

"Some Developments in English Monastic Life, 1216–1336." By the Rev. Dom David Knowles. (10 October 1942.)

"Official History." By Professor W. K. Hancock. (14 November 1942.)

"Ownership of Newspapers in the Eighteenth Century." By Graham Pollard. (12 December 1942.)

"From the Witness of the Shire to Full Parliament." By Miss H. M. Cam. (16 January 1943.)

"Politics and Economics in the History of Modern Greece since 1840." By C. W. Crawley. (13 March 1943.)

"Parliament and 'Bastard Feudalism'." By K. B. McFarlane. (15 May 1943.)
"Carteret in Dublin and in Private Life." By Professor Basil Williams. (12 June 1943.)

The President, Professor F. M. Stenton, delivered an address at the Anniversary Meeting on 13 February, 1943, his subject being "English Families and the Norman Conquest." The Alexander Medal was not awarded in 1943, no essays having been entered for the competition. The Council are grateful to Professor Basil Williams for his kindness in reading a paper at very short notice on the day set aside for the presentation of the Alexander Essay. The Presidential Address, together with the papers by Miss Cam, Dom David Knowles, and K. B. McFarlane are being printed in *Transactions*, Fourth Series, Volume XXVI.

The Council record with regret the death of 24 Fellows, one of whom was both a Fellow and a Corresponding Member; among these the Council would especially mention Sir Reginald Blomfield, an Honorary Vice-President from 1933 until his death, Professor M. Handelsman, a Corresponding Member from 1935 until his death, Professor Mary Haydon, a Corresponding Member from 1926 until her death, and R. A. Roberts, a member of Council from 1919–23, 1924–28, and an Honorary Vice-President from 1929 until his death. In addition, 9 Fellows and 1 Library have been lost by resignation. Seven Fellows and 4 Associates have been elected and 3 Libraries have been admitted as Subscribing Libraries. One Fellow has been reinstated. The membership of the Society on 31 October, 1943, was 790 Fellows, including Ordinary, Life, Honorary and Corresponding Fellows, and 49 Associates; there were 291 Subscribing Libraries, including 28 in enemy-occupied territory. Of the Fellows, 1 was Honorary, 33 were Corresponding and 169 were Life Fellows. There was a loss of 24 Fellows and a net gain of 1 Associate. There were 21 Societies, British and foreign, which exchanged their publications with the *Transactions* and Camden Series. Nine of these Societies are in enemy or enemy-occupied territory and no exchange has been possible.

The Treasurer reports that the income of the year 1942–43 exceeded the expenditure chargeable against it by £237 10*s*. 8*d*. This surplus has been allocated, as to £200

to the Publications Reserve Fund, and as to £37 10*s.* 8*d.* to the General Income and Expenditure Account. The sum of £1,050 was granted for publications as against £850 for the previous year. During the year, £900 India 3½% Stock 1931 was redeemed and the proceeds were reinvested in £914 3*s.* 8*d.* Local Loans 3%. The book value of this investment was £500. The profit of £400 on redemption has been allocated, as to £300 to the Publications Reserve Fund, and as to £100 to the Library Account. During the year, the sum of £1,000 was invested in 3% Defence Bonds and £250 in 3% Savings Bonds. The accumulation of surpluses shown in the Society's accounts is due to the inability of the Society to maintain in war time its full programme of publications. But the accumulated reserves will enable arrears of publication to be made good as soon as the opportunity offers.

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

I.—Income and Expenditure Account for the Year ended October 31, 1943.

Dr. | Cr.

Expenditure.			£ s. d.
To Establishment Expenses :—			
Rent—96, Cheyne Walk	£218 18 0		
Rent—Warehousing of Stock	19 10 0		
Rates	60 13 0		
Fire Insurance	17 17 1		
Repairs	3 4 6		
Wages	52 0 0		
Extra Service and Cleaning	8 11 3		
Lighting and Heating	17 9 10		
National Insurance	6 18 0		
Workmen's Compensation Insurance	0 15 2		
War Damage Insurance	17 0 0		
Monthly Meetings—Refreshments	7 8 3		
		430 5 1	
„ Secretarial and Administrative Expenses :—			
Salary	500 0 0		
Typing	8 10 9		
General Printing and Stationery	76 2 9		
Accountancy and Audit	31 10 0		
Postages	33 11 6		
Telephone	7 5 5		
Travelling Expenses	3 18 6		
Sundries	11 4 10		
		672 3 9	
„ Library :—			
Grant		100 0 0	
„ Other Charges :—			
Friends of National Libraries	1 1 0		
British Records Association	1 0 0		
		2 1 0	
„ Publications :—			
Directors' Honoraria	150 0 0		
Salary of Assistant Officer, less Army Pay	169 13 3		
Premium on Pension Fund for Assistant Officer	27 9 7		
Grant for Publications £1,050 0 0			
Proceeds from Sales 35 14 0			
	1,085 14 0	1,432 16 10	
		2,637 6 8	
„ Balance, being Excess of Income over Expenditure for the year, transferred :—			
(*a*) to Publications Reserve Fund	200 0 0		
(*b*) to General Income and Expenditure Account	37 10 8	237 10 8	
		£2,874 17 4	

Income.			£ s. d.
By Arrears of Subscriptions Account			61 13 0
„ Subscriptions of 1943 :—			
44 Associates at 21s.	£46 4 0		
259 Libraries at 30s.	388 10 0		
552 Fellows at 42s.	1,159 4 0		
		1,593 18 0	
„ Life Subscriptions	107 2 0		
Less Proportion required by By-Law IX to be invested (see Balance Sheet)	70 12 0		
		36 10 0	
„ Proceeds from Sale of Publications		35 14 0	
„ Dividends on Investments and Tax recovered		301 12 4	
„ Interest on Deposit Account at Bank		6 2 8	
„ The Sir George W. Prothero Bequest :—			
Dividends on Investments and Tax recovered	800 1 9		
Royalties	39 5 7		
		839 7 4	
		£2,874 17 4	

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

II.—Publications Account for the Year ended October 31, 1943.

Dr. Cr.

	£ s. d.		£ s. d.
To Payments made during the Year:—		By Balance of Allocations at October 31, 1942, Brought Forward	1,636 9 4
Transactions, Vol. XXV	239 8 6	„ Allocation for Publications 1942–43:—	
Sundry Postage, Packing and Expenses	3 2 1	Grant £1,050 0 0	
	242 10 7	Proceeds of Sales 35 14 0	
Balance of Allocations at October 31, 1943, Carried Forward	2,546 15 3	(As per Income and Expenditure Account)	1,085 14 0
		„ Advance Subscriptions for "Domesday Monachorum"	67 2 6
	£2,789 5 10		£2,789 5 10

N.B.—There is an estimated liability of £1,125 due to the Printers, of which £235 is chargeable against the allocations for future years.

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

III.—Balance Sheet as at October 31, 1943.

Liabilities.

			£ s. d.
Life Subscriptions required to be invested as Capital Account (By-Law IX) :—			
Amount brought forward from last Balance Sheet	£2,161 0 0		
Add Proportion of Life Subscriptions received in 1943 (see Income and Expenditure Account)	70 12 0		
	2,231 12 0		
Less Amount transferred to General Income and Expenditure Account	89 12 0		
		2,142	0 0
Publications Reserve Fund :—			
Balance from last Account	500 0 0		
Add Transfer from Income and Expenditure Account	200 0 0		
Transfer from General Income and Expenditure Account	300 0 0		
		1,000	0 0
Lease Renewal Fund :—			
Balance from last Account		112	0 4
Fund in Aid of Pensions :—			
Balance from last Account	2,706 4 6		
Less Payment to Miss M. B. Curran	50 0 0		
		2,656	4 6
Publications Account :—			
Balance of Allocations at October 31, 1943		2,546	15 3
Library Account :—			
Balance from last Account	19 13 9		
Grant for the year	100 0 0		
Transfer from General Income and Expenditure Account	100 0 0		
Receipts from sales of books withdrawn	33 14 7		
	253 8 4		
Less Expenditure during the year	104 17 0		
		148	11 4

Assets.

			£ s. d.
Investments, viz. :—			
£699 9s. 9d. Consols 2½%, valued in 1920 at	£314 0 0		
£879 3s. 6d. Conversion Stock 5% at cost	826 3 1		
£4,052 12s. 4d. Conversion Stock 3½% at cost	3,638 11 0		
£1,000 Defence Bonds 3% at cost	1,000 0 0		
£1,379 3s. 8d. Local Loans 3% at cost	1,351 13 11		
£400 Metropolitan Water Board 4½% "D" Stock at cost	470 1 0		
500 National Savings Certificates at cost	400 0 0		
£744 19s. 6d. National War Bonds 2½% 1945/47, at cost	750 0 0		
£296 4s. New Zealand 4% Stock, 1943/63, at cost	297 6 10		
£250 Savings Bonds 3% 1960/70, at cost	250 0 0		
		9,297	15 10
(Market Value at October 31, 1943 £10,140 0s. 9d.)			
Cash at Bank : Current Account	200 2 6		
Deposit Account	927 3 2		
„ in Hand	4 18 6		
		1,132	4 2
Stock of Publications :—			
As at October 31, 1942		600	0 0
Library :—			
As at October 31, 1942		1,000	0 0
Furniture, Etc. :—			
As at October 31, 1942		300	0 0
Subscriptions in Arrear estimated to be received		35	0 0

			Brought forward	£8,605	11	5
Subscriptions Received in Advance				10	19	0
The Sir George W. Prothero Bequest:—						
Balance from last Account	£22,121	9	6			
Add Profit on redemption of Investments	177	1	0			
				22,298	10	6
"Writings on British History": Production Account:—						
Balance from last Account	454	2	11			
Less Cost of Index, 1937	30	0	0			
				424	2	11
General Income and Expenditure Account:—						
Balance of accumulated income at October 31, 1942	3,197	4	0			
Add Profit on redemption of £900 India 3½% Stock	400	0	0			
Amount transferred from Life Subscriptions Account	89	12	0			
Excess of Income over Expenditure for the year, as per Account I	37	10	8			
	3,724	6	8			
Less Transfer to Publications Reserve Fund £300 0 0						
Transfer to Library Account 100 0 0						
	400	0	0			
				3,324	6	8
				£34,663	10	6

			Brought forward	£12,365	0	0
The Sir George W. Prothero Bequest:—						
Investments—As at October 31, 1942	£22,273	9	1			
Cash at Bank—Deposit Account	25	1	5			
				22,298	10	6
(Market Value at October 31, 1943, £21,736 10s. 3d.)						
				£34,663	10	6

We have examined the foregoing Income and Expenditure Account and Balance Sheet with the Books and Vouchers of the Society. We have verified the Investments appearing in the Balance Sheet. We report that the above Balance Sheet is, in our opinion, properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the affairs of the Society, according to the best of our information and the explanations given to us and as shown by the books of the Society.

London, Uxbridge and Slough.
December 3, 1943.

C. RYLAND BEEBY & CO.,
Chartered Accountants, Auditors.

THE DAVID BERRY TRUST.

Income and Expenditure Account for the year ended October 31, 1943.

DR. CR.

Receipts.	£	s.	d.
To Balance in hand, October 31, 1942, brought forward from last Account, viz. :—			
Cash at Bank £146 17 7			
„ in Hand 19 0			
£200 3% Defence Bonds (at cost) . . 200 0 0			
	347	16	7
„ Dividends on Investments per Charity Commissioners .	45	10	6
„ Interest on £200 3% Defence Bonds	6	0	0
„ Interest on Deposit Account at Bank. . . .		6	8
	£399	13	9

Payments.	£	s.	d.
By Printing and Postages	1	15	6
„ Balance in hand, October 31, 1943, carried forward, viz. :—			
„ Cash at Bank : Current Account . . £57 2 7			
„ „ Deposit Account . . 140 6 8			
Cash in Hand 9 0			
£200 3% Defence Bonds (at cost) . . 200 0 0			
	397	18	3
	£399	13	9

We have examined the above account and find it correct.

C. RYLAND BEEBY & Co.,
Chartered Accountants,
Auditors.

LONDON, UXBRIDGE AND SLOUGH.
December 3, 1943.

ALEXANDER PRIZE

The Alexander Prize was established in 1897 by L. C. Alexander, F.R.Hist.S. It consists of a Silver Medal awarded annually for an essay upon some historical subject. Candidates may select their own subject provided such subject has been previously submitted to and approved by the Literary Directors. The essay must be a genuine work of original research, not hitherto published, and one which has not been awarded any other prize. It must not exceed 6,000 words in length and must be sent in on or before 28 February 1945.

LIST OF ALEXANDER PRIZE ESSAYISTS (1898–1944)[1]

1898. F. Hermia Durham (" The Relations of the Crown to Trade under James I ").

1899. W. F. Lord, B.A. (" The Development of Political Parties in the reign of Queen Anne ").

1901. Laura M. Roberts (" The Peace of Lunéville ").

1902. V. B. Redstone (" The Social Condition of England during the Wars of the Roses ").

1903. Rose Graham (" The Intellectual Influence of English Monasticism between the tenth and twelfth centuries ").

1904. Enid W. G. Routh (" The Balance of Power in the Seventeenth Century ").

1905. W. A. P. Mason, M.A. (" The Beginnings of the Cistercian Order ").

1906. Rachel R. Reid, M.A. (" The Rebellion of the Earls, 1569 ").

1908. Kate Hotblack (" The Peace of Paris, 1763 ").

1909. Nellie Nield, M.A. (" The Social and Economic Condition of the Unfree Classes in England in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries ").

[1] No award was made in 1900, 1907, 1910, 1911, 1913, 1914, 1921. The prize Essays for 1909 and 1919 were not published in the *Transactions*. No Essays were submitted in 1915, 1916 and 1943.

1912. H. G. Richardson (" The Parish Clergy of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries ").
1917. Isobel D. Thornley, B.A. (" The Treason Legislation of 1531–1534 ").
1918. T. Plucknett, B.A. (" The Place of the Council in the Fifteenth Century ").
1919. Edna F. White, M.A. (" The Jurisdiction of the Privy Council under the Tudors ").
1920. J. E. Neale, M.A. (" The Commons Journals of the Tudor Period ").
1922. C. E. Martin (" The English Establishments on the Gold Coast in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century ").
1923. E. W. Hensman, M.A. (" The Civil War of 1648 in the East Midlands ").
1924. Grace Stretton, B.A. (" Some Aspects of Mediæval Travel ").
1925. F. A. Mace, M.A. (" Devonshire Ports in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries ").
1926. Marian J. Tooley, M.A. (" The Authorship of the *Defensor Pacis* ").
1927. W. A. Pantin, B.A. (" Chapters of the English Black Monks, 1215–1540 ").
1928. Gladys A. Thornton, B.A., Ph.D. (" A Study in the History of Clare, Suffolk, with special reference to its development as a Borough ").
1929. F. S. Rodkey, A.M., Ph.D. (" Lord Palmerston's Policy for the Re-juvenation of Turkey, 1839–47 ").
1930. A. A. Ettinger, D.Phil. (" The Proposed Anglo-Franco-American Treaty of 1852 to guarantee Cuba to Spain ").
1931. Kathleen A. Walpole, M.A. (" The Humanitarian Movement of the Early Nineteenth Century to Remedy Abuses on Emigrant Vessels to America ").
1932. Dorothy M. Brodie, B.A. (" Edmund Dudley, Minister of Henry VII ").
1933. R. W. Southern, B.A. (" Ranulf Flambard and Early Anglo-Norman Administration ").
1934. S. B. Chrimes, M.A., Ph.D. (" Sir John Fortescue and his Theory of Dominion ").
1935. S. T. Bindoff, M.A. (" The Unreformed Diplomatic Service, 1812–60 ").
1936. Rosamond J. Mitchell, M.A., B.Litt. (" English Students at Padua, 1460–1475 ").
1937. C. H. Philips, B.A. (" The East India Company 'Interest,' and the English Government, 1783–4 ").
1938. H. E. I. Phillips, B.A. (" The Last Years of the Court of Star Chamber, 1630–41 ").

1939. Hilda P. Grieve, B.A. ("The Deprived Married Clergy in Essex, 1553–61").
1940. R. Somerville, M.A. ("The Duchy of Lancaster Council and Court of Duchy Chamber").
1941. R. A. L. Smith, M.A., Ph.D. ("The *Regimen Scaccarii* in English Monasteries").
1942. F. L. Carsten, D.Phil. ("Medieval Democracy in the Brandenburg Towns and its Defeat in the Fifteenth Century").
1944. Rev. E. W. Kemp, B.D. ("Pope Alexander III and the Canonization of Saints").

DAVID BERRY PRIZE

The David Berry Prize was established in 1929 by David Anderson-Berry in memory of his father, the Reverend David Berry. It consists of a Gold Medal and Money Prize awarded every three years for Scottish History. Candidates may select any subject dealing with Scottish History within the reigns of James I to James VI inclusive, provided such subject has been previously submitted to and approved by the Council of the Royal Historical Society. The Essay must be a genuine work of original research not hitherto published, and one which has not been awarded any other prize. There is no limit to the length of the Essay. It must be sent in on or before October 31, 1946.

LIST OF DAVID BERRY PRIZE ESSAYISTS (1937–1943) [1]

1937. G. Donaldson, M.A. ("The Polity of the Scottish Reformed Church *c.* 1560–1580, on the Rise of the Presbyterian Movement").
1943. Rev. Prof. A. F. Scott Pearson, D.Th., D.Litt. ("Anglo-Scottish Religious Relations, 1400–1600").

[1] No Essays were submitted in 1940.

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

(INCORPORATED BY ROYAL CHARTER.)

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL—1944–45.

Patron.

HIS MAJESTY THE KING.

President.

PROFESSOR F. M. STENTON, D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A.

Honorary Vice-Presidents.

PROFESSOR SIR RAYMOND BEAZLEY, J.P., D.Litt., D.Phil.
THE RIGHT HON. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, C.H., M.P., F.R.S.
PROFESSOR SIR J. H. CLAPHAM, C.B.E., Litt.D., F.B.A.
M. S. GIUSEPPI, I.S.O., F.S.A.
G. P. GOOCH, C.H., D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A.
PROFESSOR A. J. GRANT, Litt.D.
THE RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF ILCHESTER, O.B.E.
CHARLES JOHNSON, M.A., F.B.A., F.S.A.
A. G. LITTLE, D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A.
PROFESSOR SIR JOHN LLOYD, D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A., F.S.A.
PROFESSOR SIR CHARLES OMAN, K.B.E., D.C.L., LL.D., F.B.A., F.S.A.
A. F. POLLARD, D.Litt., D.Lit., Litt.D., F.B.A.
G. M. TREVELYAN, O.M., C.B.E., D.C.L., LL.D., D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A.
PROFESSOR A. F. BASIL WILLIAMS, M.A., F.B.A.
PROFESSOR G. M. WRONG, LL.D.

Vice-Presidents.

PROFESSOR F. M. POWICKE, LL.D., Litt.D., F.B.A.
PROFESSOR A. HAMILTON THOMPSON, C.B.E., D.Litt., F.B.A., F.S.A.
C. T. CLAY, C.B., M.A., F.S.A.
PROFESSOR LILLIAN M. PENSON, Ph.D.
L. C. LOYD, M.A.
PROFESSOR C. W. PREVITÉ-ORTON, Litt.D., F.B.A.
PROFESSOR V. H. GALBRAITH, M.A., F.B.A.
PROFESSOR C. K. WEBSTER, Litt.D., F.B.A.

Council.

C. W. Crawley, M.A.
Professor Margaret Deanesly, M.A.
Miss Kathleen Major, B.Litt., F.S.A.
H. G. Richardson, M.A., B.Sc.
A. Aspinall, Ph.D.
Miss H. M. Cam, Litt.D.
C. G. Parsloe, B.A.
J. G. Edwards, M.A., F.B.A.
Professor W. K. Hancock, M.A.
W. P. Morrell, D.Phil.
Mrs. F. M. Stenton, B.A.
Miss L. S. Sutherland, M.A.
Professor D. C. Douglas, M.A.
P. Grierson, M.A.
Rev. Dom D. Knowles, O.S.B., Litt.D.
K. B. McFarlane, M.A.

Honorary Secretary.

Professor H. Hale Bellot, M.A.

Literary Directors.

C. R. Cheney, M.A.
A. V. Judges, B.A.

Honorary Treasurer.

Malcolm Letts, F.S.A.

Assistant Secretary and Librarian.

Miss C. Jamison.

Assistant Officer and Junior Librarian.

A. T. Milne, M.A.

Library and Offices.

96 Cheyne Walk, Chelsea, S.W.10

Bankers.

Barclays Limited.

STANDING COMMITTEES—1944-45.

Finance Committee.

A. H. Cheney.
C. T. Clay, C.B., M.A., F.S.A.
L. C. Loyd, M.A.
C. G. Parsloe, B.A.
H. G. Richardson, M.A., B.Sc.
Professor F. M. Stenton, D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A., *President.*
A. V. Judges, B.A., *Literary Director.*
Malcolm Letts, F.S.A., *Hon. Treasurer.*
Professor H. Hale Bellot, M.A., *Hon. Secretary.*

Library Committee.

P. Grierson, M.A.
Miss K. Major, B.Litt., F.S.A.
W. P. Morrell, D.Phil.
C. G. Parsloe, B.A.
Professor F. M. Stenton, D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A., *President.*
C. R. Cheney, M.A.
A. V. Judges, B.A. } *Literary Directors.*
Malcolm Letts, F.S.A., *Hon. Treasurer.*
Professor H. Hale Bellot, M.A., *Hon. Secretary.*

Publication Committee.

A. Aspinall, Ph.D.
C. W. Crawley, M.A.
Professor Margaret Deanesly, M.A.
J. G. Edwards, M.A., F.B.A.
Professor V. H. Galbraith, M.A., F.B.A.
Professor L. M. Penson, Ph.D.
Miss L. S. Sutherland, M.A.
Professor A. Hamilton Thompson, C.B.E., D.Litt., F.B.A., F.S.A.
Professor F. M. Stenton, D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A., *President.*
C. R. Cheney, M.A.
A. V. Judges, B.A. } *Literary Directors.*
Malcolm Letts, F.S.A., *Hon. Treasurer.*
Professor H. Hale Bellot, M.A., *Hon. Secretary.*

Bibliography (Annual) Committee.

A. Aspinall, Ph.D.
Miss H. M. Cam, Litt.D.
C. G. Parsloe, B.A.
Professor William Rees, M.A., D.Sc.
Professor F. M. Stenton, D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A., *President.*
C. R. Cheney, M.A.
A. V. Judges, B.A. } *Literary Directors.*
Malcolm Letts, F.S.A., *Hon. Treasurer.*
Professor H. Hale Bellot, M.A., *Hon. Secretary.*

TRANSACTIONS AND PUBLICATIONS

OF THE

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

The annual publications of the Society issued to Fellows and Subscribing Libraries include the *Transactions* supplemented since 1897 by a continuation of the publications of the Camden Society (1838–1897) as the *Camden series*, and since 1937 by a series of *Guides and handbooks*. The Society has also issued from time to time certain miscellaneous publications, has published since 1937 an annual bibliography of *Writings on British history*, and is publishing in conjunction with the American Historical Association a series of *Bibliographies of British history*. Additional copies of the *Transactions*, the *Camden series*, the *Guides and handbooks*, and the " Miscellaneous publications " may be obtained by Fellows and Subscribing Libraries at the prices stated below. The series of annual bibliographies of *Writings on British history* and the *Bibliographies of British history* are not included among the volumes issued to subscribers, but may be obtained by them through the Society, at the special prices stated below, upon application to the Assistant Secretary, Royal Historical Society, 96 Cheyne Walk, S.W.10. Associates, while receiving only the *Transactions* in return for their subscription, are entitled to purchase at a reduction of 25 per cent one copy of other volumes issued to Fellows and Subscribing Libraries and one copy of each of the volumes of the *Writings on British history* and the *Bibliography of British history* at the special price.

The *Transactions* and the *Camden series* are not available on sale to the public. Copies of the " Miscellaneous publications " may be had at the stated prices on application to the Assistant Secretary. The *Guides and handbooks*, the *Writings*, and the *Bibliographies of British history* may be obtained from the publishers or through the booksellers.

TRANSACTIONS.*

Old series, 1872–1882. Vols. I to X.
New series, 1884–1906. Vols. I to XX.
Third series, 1907–1917. Vols. I to XI.
Fourth series, 1918–1945. Vols. I to XXVII.

* Vols. 1, 2, 3, 4, 9 and 10 of the Old series are out of print. Old series vols. 5 and 7, and Third series, vol. 9, are only supplied by special leave of the Council. Others are supplied at the following rates: current number, 15s.; volumes of the New, Third, and Fourth series, 10s. each; volumes of the Old series, 7s. 6d. each. The earliest volumes of the *Transactions* were issued to Fellows in unbound parts. Any discrepancies in the lettering of bound volumes during these periods are doubtless due to this.

MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS.

Domesday commemoration. Notes on the manuscripts, etc., exhibited at the Public Record Office. 1886. 5s. (*Out of print.*)

Domesday studies. 2 vols. Edited by P. E. Dove. 1886. 24s. (*Out of print.*)

England and Napoleon in 1803 : being the despatches of Lord Whitworth and others. Edited by Oscar Browning. 1887. 7s. 6d. (*Out of print.*)

Walter of Henley's Husbandry, together with an anonymous Husbandry, Seneschaucie, and Robert Grosseteste's Rules. Edited by Elizabeth Lamond and the Rev. W. Cunningham. 1890. 12s.

Proceedings of the Gibbon commemoration, 1794–1894. 1895. 5s.

The Domesday of Inclosures, 1517–18. Edited by I. S. Leadam. 2 vols. 1897. 30s.

A bibliography of the historical works of Mandell Creighton, William Stubbs, S. R. Gardiner and John, Lord Acton. Edited by W. A. Shaw. 1903. 5s. (*Out of print.*)

German opinion and German policy before the War. By G. W. Prothero. 1914. 4s.

Magna Carta commemoration essays. With preface by the Right Hon. Viscount Bryce. Edited by H. E. Malden. 1917. 25s.

* A repertory of British archives. Part I. England. Compiled by Hubert Hall. 1920. 10s. 6d.

A list and index of the Transactions and Publications of the Royal Historical Society (1869–1924) and of the Publications of the Camden Society (1840–1897). Edited by Hubert Hall. 1925. 5s.

The *Domesday monachorum* of Christ Church, Canterbury. 1944. 30s. (7s. 6d. to Fellows, Associates and subscribing libraries.)

BIBLIOGRAPHIES ISSUED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION.

Bibliography of British history : Tudor period, 1485–1603. Edited by Conyers Read. 1933. Oxford Univ. Press, 30s. (Special price, 20s. 9d.)

Bibliography of British history : Stuart period, 1603–1714. Edited by Godfrey Davies. 1928. Oxford Univ. Press, 21s. (Special price, 16s. 6d.)

Bibliography of British history : 1715–1789. Edited by D. J. Medley and S. M. Pargellis. (*In preparation.*)

ANNUAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES.

Writings on British history, 1934. Compiled by A. T. Milne. 1937. London, Jonathan Cape, 12s. 6d. (Special price, 10s.)

Writings on British history, 1935. Compiled by A. T. Milne. 1939. London, Jonathan Cape, 12s. 6d. (Special price, 10s.)

Writings on British history, 1936. Compiled by A. T. Milne. 1940. London, Jonathan Cape. 12s. 6d. (Special price, 10s.)

Writings on British history, 1937. Compiled by A. T. Milne. London, Jonathan Cape. (*In preparation.*)

GUIDES AND HANDBOOKS.

1. Guide to English commercial statistics, 1696–1782. By G. N. Clark, with a catalogue of materials by Barbara M. Franks. 1938. 7s. 6d.
2. Handbook of British chronology. Edited by F. M. Powicke, with the assistance of Charles Johnson and W. J. Harte. 1939. 7s. 6d. (*Out of print.*)
3. Medieval libraries of Great Britain, an index of surviving books. Edited by N. R. Ker. 1941. 7s. 6d. (*Out of print.*)

Approved for publication for the session 1939–40:

Handbook of dates for students of English history.

Provisionally accepted for future publication:

Handbook of British currency. Edited by A. E. Feavearyear.

List and index of parliamentary papers, 1700–1800. Edited by E. Wagstaff and A. T. Milne.

Bibliography of medieval cartularies. Edited by W. A. Pantin.

Fasti ecclesiæ anglicanæ, 1066–1541. Edited by A. Hamilton Thompson.

PUBLICATIONS OF THE LATE CAMDEN SOCIETY, CONTINUED (FROM 1897) AS THE CAMDEN SERIES OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

For lists of volumes issued from 1838 to 1937 inclusive (i.e. Old series 1–105; New series, 1–62; Third series, 1–57) see Transactions, *Fourth series, vol xxiv, pp. 186–200.*

THIRD SERIES.†

58. Early charters of the cathedral church of St. Paul, London. Edited by Marion Gibbs. 1939.
59. The formation of Canning's ministry, February to August 1827. Edited by A. Aspinall. 1938.
60. The correspondence of Lord Aberdeen and Princess Lieven, 1832–1854. Vol. I, 1832–1848. Edited by E. Jones Parry. 1938. (*See* no. 62.)
61. The letters of Arnulf of Lisieux. Edited by F. Barlow. 1939.
62. The correspondence of Lord Aberdeen and Princess Lieven, 1832–1854. Vol. II, 1848–1854. Edited by E. Jones Parry. 1939. (*See* no. 60.)
63. British Consular reports on the trade and politics of Latin America, 1824–1826. Edited by R. A. Humphreys. 1940.
64. Camden Miscellany, Vol. XVII: 1. Ely chapter ordinances and visitation records, 1241–1515. Edited by Seiriol A. J. Evans. 2. Mr. Harrie Cavendish, his journey to and from Constantinople, 1589. By Fox, his servant. Edited by A. C. Wood. 3. Sir John Eliot and the vice-admiralty of Devon. Edited by Harold Hulme. 1940.

† Volumes in the Third series may be had at prices from 10s. upwards current volumes, 15s. each.

65. Correspondence of Charles Arbuthnot. Edited by A. Aspinall, 1941.
66. Ministers' accounts of the earldom of Cornwall, 1296–1297. Vol. I. Edited by L. Margaret Midgley, 1942.
67. The notebook of John Penry, 1593. Edited by Albert Peel, 1944.
68. Ministers' accounts of the earldom of Cornwall, 1296–1297. Vol. II. Edited by L. Margaret Midgley, 1945. (*See* no. 66.)

Approved for publication for the session 1941–42 *:*

The letter-book of John Viscount Mordaunt, 1658–1660. Edited by Mary Coate.

Provisionally accepted for future publication :

British diplomatic representatives, 1509–1688. (*See* nos. 46 and 50.)

The chronicle of Walter of Hemingburgh. Edited by H. Rothwell.

Proceedings under the *Dictum de Kenilworth*. Edited by F. M. Powicke and M. Tyson.

Historia Roffensis, 1315–1350. Edited by H. G. Richardson.

Liber Eliensis, books I and II. Edited by Dorothy Whitelock.

Commercial correspondence of Lionel Cranfield. Edited by F. J. Fisher.

The Gascon Calendar, 1320–1322. Edited by G. P. Cuttino.

Correspondence of Austin Henry Layard, 1877–1878. Edited by W. N. Medlicott.

Documents relating to the English estates of the abbey of Le Bec. Edited by Miss M. M. Morgan.

Encomium Emmae. Edited by Alistair Campbell.

The order of publication for volumes in the press or in preparation is provisional.

SHL
WITHDRAWN

1956
1957
1958